On Affirming an Ideal Link Between Language & Reality (original) (raw)

2004, Concrescence: The Australasian Journal of Process Thought

I have two main objectives in this paper. First, I seek to show that Whitehead's metaphysical venture has roots in a tradition that led to the emergence of the ideal linguists, namely those philosophers who assert the need to construct an ideal language in order to solve philosophical problems and render the metaphysical structure of reality intelligible. More specifically, I seek to illustrate that Whitehead's speculations on language bear strong similarity to one of the three traditions in ideal language philosophy, namely the constructionist tradition. The other two traditions are the formalist and the pragmatist. I argue, however, that Whitehead's constructionism differs in character from its analytic namesake. The crucial difference, as I see it, is that traditional constructionism calls for an ideal language of a symbolic nature, as is the case in the symbolic language of logic, whereas Whitehead's constructionism is based on a revision of ordinary language that entails stretching the meaning of its concepts beyond their everyday use. I take Whitehead's coining of terms to convey his philosophical insights into the nature of reality as an exemplification of his reconstruction of ordinary language rather than of constructing a new symbolic language. I argue that the difference between Whitehead and the other ideal language philosophers on this point is rooted in his serious concern not only for meaning but also for truth. As a philosopher of truth, Whitehead seeks to find the conditions for the possibility meaning in a truth that is independent of that meaning, something that is not of great concern to the ideal linguists in the analytic tradition. Thus, I conclude, although Whitehead affirms an ideal link between language and reality, as his analytic colleagues in the ideal language philosophy do, his goals are ultimately post-analytic and the appropriation of his philosophical insights by analytic philosophers is unlikely.