The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective (original) (raw)

Wittgenstein's use of language in knowing Other Minds

The main purpose of this paper is to deal with the problem of 'knowing other minds'. The problem of other minds is the question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own. It is a common feature of our life that the knowledge of other people's minds (if there is any such knowledge), is very different from our own mind. I can neither have any phenomenological experience of other people's mental states; nor know them through introspection. The reason for analyzing this problem is that it concerns any philosophical theory, as it raises a particular challenge-if minds and bodies are entirely independent, then how can I infer from seeing a body that there is a mind 'attached' to it? Also, other 'people'other bodies -could all be machines, programmed to behave as they do, but with no minds. This paper highlights Wittgenstein's theory of language as a tool to show that there is no epistemic problem about the knowledge of other minds and their identity either, because for Wittgenstein it is in fact a 'pseudo problem'.

Wittgenstein: Escaping the Language Maze of Minds

This paper discusses the traditional philosophical problem of other minds and the notion of consciousness. Through an elucidation of Wittgenstein's works, focusing primarily on the later publishing of Philosophical Investigations (1953), it will be shown that rather than aligning with positions of either Cartesians of behaviorists, Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind strongly resembles that of early twentieth century phenomenologists in its insistence on the redefining of subjectivity. Further, consideration will be given to the method of enquiry Wittgenstein employs, and how the consistency of its usage results in his identifying of similar issues of intuition in the propositions of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics.

Wittgenstein and Phenomenology [contents & contributors]

Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, 2018

This volume of new essays explores the relationship between the thought of Wittgenstein and the key figures of phenomenology: Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. It is the first book to provide an overview of how Wittgenstein's philosophy in its different phases, including his own so-called phenomenological phase, relates to the variety of phenomenological approaches developed in continental Europe. In so doing, the volume seeks to throw light on both sides of the comparison, and to clarify more broadly the relations between analytic and phenomenological philosophy. However, rather than treating the interpretation of either phenomenological philosophy or Wittgenstein as an already settled issue, several chapters in the volume examine and question received views regarding them, and develop alternatives to such views. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology will be of interest to scholars working in philosophical methodology and metaphilosophy, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and logic, and ethics.

Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological Relevance: An Overview and Alternative

I have two goals in this essay, which divide the essay into two sections. First, I will attempt a brief overview of the contributions to this discussion of Spiegelberg, Gier, the Hintikkas, and Monk; second, I will attempt to make my own contribution to the discussion. What I hope becomes clear in the first section is that the cohesiveness of this discussion through the years is largely a function of each commentator’s attempt to define when it was that Wittgenstein could be said to be doing a phenomenology, or being a phenomenologist. For Spiegelberg and Grier, the dates are 1929 to the end of his life; for the Hintikka’s, Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist from start to finish; and Monk argues that Wittgenstein did little more than flirt with phenomenology between February and October 1929. Moreover, phenomenology as a philosophical practice is generally over-defined throughout this debate—with the exception, perhaps, of Spiegelberg—either by reducing it to Husserlian methodology, or finding some other apparently essential core from which a particular understanding of phenomenology stems. In the second section, I will argue that early Wittgenstein, in particular the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, can, and indeed ought, to be considered phenomenologically. I do not mean here to ally myself with the strong position taken by the Hintikkas. Rather, I hope first to broaden the view of what phenomenology as a philosophical practice is. By positioning myself within this practice, I then make a claim that is more appropriate to phenomenology: that while Wittgenstein’s philosophy may not have been, in his own regard, phenomenological at every or any significant part of his career, but that engaging Wittgenstein’s philosophy phenomenologically is productive both to the study of Wittgenstein and to any philosophy that calls itself phenomenological. To do this, I will call particularly upon a relatively recent, although obscure, contribution to this debate from Jose Ruiz Fernandez, as well as the interpretive work of Jan Zwicky, to add my own contribution regarding the phenomenological importance of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian sensitivity to silence.