Being There: Heidegger's Formally Indicative Concept of Dasein (original) (raw)

2005, The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and …

Abstract

sparkles

AI

The paper explores Martin Heidegger's concept of Dasein through the lens of formal indication, arguing against the common interpretation that Dasein marks a departure from subjectivity. It aims to demonstrate that Dasein provides a more adequate framework for understanding traditional notions of transcendental subjectivity. By engaging with the philosophical dialogues between Heidegger and Husserl, it examines the complexities surrounding the relationship between transcendental and mundane subjectivity, ultimately asserting that Dasein encapsulates the embodied experience of being-in-the-world.

Loading...

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

References (8)

  1. Ibid., 137, notes 441-442.
  2. In John van Buren's words, "formal indication remains ontically 'non-committal'." The Young Heidegger, 337.
  3. ------ 17. These objections were brought to my attention by Steven Crowell.
  4. A more extensive argument for the claim is found in Overgaard, Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World, chapter 3.
  5. As examples of formal indications, Heidegger gives "existence" and "death," but not "Dasein," as far as I know. However, he does emphasize that all his philosophical concepts should be understood as formal indications (GA 29/30, 430), so "Dasein" is obviously in- cluded.
  6. Daniel Dahlstrom has argued that "Dasein" is a formally indicative concept, but not in connection with the points that I am pursuing here. See Dahlstrom, Heidegger's Concept of Truth, 290.
  7. ------ 24. For some corroboration of this reading, see John Sallis, Delimitations, 112-118. Similar- ly, Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 4 th edition (Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 1994), 259-260.
  8. For Husserl's "anthropological" understanding of Heidegger's concept of "Dasein," see "Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik," ed. Roland Breeur, Husserl Studies 11 (1994): 3-63, especially 12-13. 26. This expression is from Thomas Prufer, "Heidegger, Early and Late, and Thomas