Proceedings Of An Interna Tional Symposium North A Merican Economie Sin The 1990s Parte 1 Edgar Ortiz (original) (raw)
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Political Economy in Argentina: The 2002 default-causes and remarks.
the currency board. 12 2.1. What a currency board is. 12 2.2. Evaluating a currency board. 17 2.3. The currency board in Argentina. 20 3. The events which lead to the 2001 crisis. 24 3.1. 1994: the "tequila crisis". 24 3.2. The late 90's: the depreciation of Real. 27 3.3. Menem's proposal: dollarization. 28 3.4. The excessive vulnerability to external shocks. 32 3.5. 1999-2001: De La Rua's attempt to stop the crisis. 35 4. Concluding remarks. 38 References 43 left wing peronism. The nomenclature "peronism" is just a populist term to attract the masses and win the election. 1.1. From the end of WWII to 1983.
Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1994
IN THE SECOND HALF of the 1980s, after strenuous efforts, Mexico was coming to be viewed as a showcase of successful stabilization and economic reform, institutional stability, and financial predictability. Mexico was becoming what Chile already had become and what all of Latin America hoped to be. But the Chiapas uprising, the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, the ensuing muddle about his succession, and the sheer fact of an election year have raised doubts about Mexico's ability to achieve lasting stability. By April 1994, the sharp upturn in interest rates, arising from speculative attacks on the peso, suggested that a far too optimistic view may have been taken of Mexico's future. The Mexican economy had come to a virtual standstill. Per capita income is now far below what it was in 1980, as shown in figure 1, and from 1992 to 1993 it fell by 1.2 percent. Moreover, any positive growth that may occur, in 1994, will have been fueled by fiscal expansion not by strength in the real economy.
Journal of Development Economics, 1992
The range of subjects is very broad, reflecting the wide sweep of Carlos' interests in real world policy problems encountered in developing countries. The nineteen papers are grouped into seven broad subjects: the debt crisis, international capital movements, trade liberalization, stabilization and reform, macroeconomic policy, open economy macro, and trade theory. The quality of the papers while generally high is quite variable, and rather than attempting to summarize all nineteen, I will confine my comments to those I found particularly interesting. The book opens with three historical papers on the debt crisis. Sachs compares the debt experience of Latin America in the 1930s with the 1980s and makes a strong case !'or some sort of debt relief in the form of outright forgiveness for insolvent countries and rescheduling for the rest. Because investment in tradables is positively related to temporary debt relief, it could be the case that granting relief would make everyone better off. Most Latin American countries did unilaterally declare ;d moratorium in the 1930s. They then enjoyed a decade of very rapid growth and industrialization and were able to settle their outstanding debts after World War II. Flexibility paid dividends to both debtors and creditors. Both Brazil and Argentina suffered severe balance of payments shocks during the 1890s and were forced to default. Fishlow compares their experiences. Argentina responded by monetary contraction and recession; Brazil depended more on import substitution. The main point is that in both countries the crisis was over within a short period partly because debtor countries took corrective action in the belief that new capital inflows would follow cooperation, and partly because creditors were more willing to make conL&ons than they are today. The result was that adjustment recessions were: shorter and more shallow than they have been in the 1980s. In the 1920s there was no IMF to put a good housekeeping seal of
Debt stabilization and development: Essays in memory of Carlos Diaz Alejandro
Journal of Development Economics, 1992
The range of subjects is very broad, reflecting the wide sweep of Carlos' interests in real world policy problems encountered in developing countries. The nineteen papers are grouped into seven broad subjects: the debt crisis, international capital movements, trade liberalization, stabilization and reform, macroeconomic policy, open economy macro, and trade theory. The quality of the papers while generally high is quite variable, and rather than attempting to summarize all nineteen, I will confine my comments to those I found particularly interesting. The book opens with three historical papers on the debt crisis. Sachs compares the debt experience of Latin America in the 1930s with the 1980s and makes a strong case !'or some sort of debt relief in the form of outright forgiveness for insolvent countries and rescheduling for the rest. Because investment in tradables is positively related to temporary debt relief, it could be the case that granting relief would make everyone better off. Most Latin American countries did unilaterally declare ;d moratorium in the 1930s. They then enjoyed a decade of very rapid growth and industrialization and were able to settle their outstanding debts after World War II. Flexibility paid dividends to both debtors and creditors. Both Brazil and Argentina suffered severe balance of payments shocks during the 1890s and were forced to default. Fishlow compares their experiences. Argentina responded by monetary contraction and recession; Brazil depended more on import substitution. The main point is that in both countries the crisis was over within a short period partly because debtor countries took corrective action in the belief that new capital inflows would follow cooperation, and partly because creditors were more willing to make conL&ons than they are today. The result was that adjustment recessions were: shorter and more shallow than they have been in the 1980s. In the 1920s there was no IMF to put a good housekeeping seal of
Recent Experiences of Stabilisation: Argentina's Economic Policy 1976-81*
The IDS Bulletin, 1981
This (the fact that "the causal chain between money and incomes or money and prices is the reverse to that postulated by the Quantity Theory of Money") does not mean that a "monetarist' economic policy such as that of the present government is futile. Control over the 'money supply ' which has in any case been ineffective on the government's own criteria, is no more than a convenient smoke-screen providing an ideological justïfïcation for such antisocial measures (high interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate and the "consequent diminution in the bargaining strength of labour due to unemployment")'. I Lord Nicholas Kaldor 1980: emphasis added. I