Last Caliph of Islam (original) (raw)
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The ʿulamā and the Ḥafṣid caliphate
The Journal of North African Studies
The ʿulamā had many different roles and positions in the early Ḥ afṣ id period and under the Caliph al-Mustanṣ ir. Their place in the court and their authority often varied according to their family origin. Many came from Al-Andalus. They brought with them their old, Andalusi social and religious affiliations. This article traces the positions of various ʿulamā during the reign of al-Mustanṣ ir, both in peace and war. It also discusses those scholars who did not recognise the caliphate, including Abū ʿAbdallah Ibn al-Abbār, and some of the Sufi sheikhs who refused to even visit the Caliph at home, and who rejected his authority. These included the Sufi Abū-l-Qāsim Ibn ʿAjlân in Bijāya. Finally, the article will examine the role of the ʿulamā in the campaign to defend Tunis from Louis IX, including their different positions on the treaty that ended the crusade after the death of the French king in 1270. KEYWORDS H afs id caliphate; ʿulamā; loyalty; challenge
The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the Abbasid Empire by Amira K. Bennison
Early Islamic history often receives accusations of jihads and barbarism intent on conquest and intolerance. This characterization and stereotyping received new impetus with the recent history of terrorism spreading from radical forms of Islam. Even sympathetic scholars tend to paint a stark picture between the Islamic caliphs and Western culture. Amira K. Bennison presents a much broader picture of the Abbasid caliphates as a center of learning, science, and culture.
In Praise of the Caliphs: Recreating History from the Manaqib Literature
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Princeton University Press, 2017
In the United States and Europe, the word “caliphate” has conjured historically romantic and increasingly pernicious associations. Yet the caliphate’s significance in Islamic history and Muslim culture remains poorly understood. This book explores the myriad meanings of the caliphate for Muslims around the world through the analytical lens of two key moments of loss in the thirteenth and twentieth centuries. Through extensive primary-source research, Mona Hassan explores the rich constellation of interpretations created by religious scholars, historians, musicians, statesmen, poets, and intellectuals. Hassan fills a scholarly gap regarding Muslim reactions to the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad in 1258 and challenges the notion that the Mongol onslaught signaled an end to the critical engagement of Muslim jurists and intellectuals with the idea of an Islamic caliphate. She also situates Muslim responses to the dramatic abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 as part of a longer trajectory of transregional cultural memory, revealing commonalities and differences in how modern Muslims have creatively interpreted and reinterpreted their heritage. Hassan examines how poignant memories of the lost caliphate have been evoked in Muslim culture, law, and politics, similar to the losses and repercussions experienced by other religious communities, including the destruction of the Second Temple for Jews and the fall of Rome for Christians. A global history, Longing for the Lost Caliphate delves into why the caliphate has been so important to Muslims in vastly different eras and places. http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10894.html "No other book considers so deeply the afterlife of the caliphate as a literary, religious, and political theme in Islamic history. Mona Hassan provides vivid chapters on the lamentations for the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols and the murder of the last of the Baghdadi Abbasid caliphs, and gives a lucid account of the judicial theory of the caliphate in Mamluk-era Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. Hassan shows that in the world of nation states, the caliphate remains an expression of the yearning for a universal religious identity."--Ira M. Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley "How do religious communities imagine and sustain relationships with their pasts? What are the politics of cultural memory? What work do nostalgia and romance perform in the service of reimagined futures? These are the questions that the burgeoning scholarship on religion and collective memory poses. Into this field comes Mona Hassan’s Longing for the Lost Caliphate, an ambitious and sweeping exploration of the complex ways in which practices of memory and memorializing shape historical and contemporary political and communal imaginaries."--Elizabeth Castelli, Barnard College "A significant achievement, this should be the first book given to those who ask why the caliphate is important to Muslim culture."--Francis Robinson, author of The Mughal Emperors "A remarkable feat of interdisciplinary scholarship, this innovative book examines the persistence of the caliphate as a cultural symbol."--S. Sayyid, author of Recalling the Caliphate
This paper seeks to advance the existing scholarship on Persian secretary and belles-lettrist, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al- Muqaffaʿ (d. 139/757) and his Risāla fī ’l-Ṣaḥāba (Epistle Concerning the Entourage). It argues that the Risāla, addressed to the second Abbasid caliph al-Mansụ̄r, set out to tackle the political ills of the caliphate, especially the crisis of political legitimacy. As the first documented articulation of the Islamic polity, the Risāla made a series of recommendations, including a proposal for legal codification that attempted to reinvent the caliphate by reuniting the institution’s political and legal authority at the expense of private jurists (fuqahāʾ). The paper illustrates how Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s solution relied on a creative integration of Iranian and Islamic ideas of statecraft and legitimate rule. Ironically, this creative integration may have played a part in the Risāla’s failure to garner necessary support to effect change. FULL TEXT available at publisher's site: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/x36cvvtUy5UIr6BzdDIG/full
The Great Caliphs The Golden Age of the 'Abbasid Empire
Peasants and country folk • The people of the city • Women and children • The religious minorities • Beggars and tricksters 94 4. The Lifeblood of Empire: Trade and Traders in the 'Abbasid Age Routes and commodities • Merchants and pilgrims • Trade facilities 37 5. Baghdad's 'Golden Age': Islam's Scientific Renaissance The foundations of Islamic learning • The flowering of knowledge under the ' Abbasids • The ' Abbasid translation movement • Translations, translators and scientists • Knowledge and science after the translation movement 58 6. The 'Abbasid Legacy 203 Notes 26 Bibliography 225 Index 235 vii Illustrations Maps and diagrams . The Middle East and North Africa before the Islamic conquest 2 2. The 'Abbasid empire, 750-900 CE 3 3. The Islamic World c. 00 CE 4. The Round City: Plan of Baghdad. (After Lassner, The Shaping of ' Abbasid Rule, pp 86, 90) 7 5. A Simplified Family Tree of the Prophet and the Caliphal Dynasties 25 2. 'Abbasid-style Mosque of Ibn Tulun in Cairo. (Author's photograph) 73 3. Great Mosque of Qayrawan which achieved its current form under the Aghlabids who ruled Tunisia in the name of the 'Abbasids. (Author's photograph) 73 4. Umayyad royal city of Madinat al-Zahra' outside Cordoba. (Author's photograph) 75 5. Portal of the Fatimid Great Mosque of Mahdiyya which evokes the Roman arches dotted across the Tunisian landscape. (Author's photograph) 76 6. Roman arch at Sbeitla in Tunisia. (Author's photograph) 77 7. Fatimid Mosque of al-Hakim in Cairo. (Author's photograph) 78 8. Fatimid al-Aqmar Mosque in Cairo. (Author's photograph) 78 9. The Fatimid Gate of Victory and minaret of the Mosque of al-Hakim, Cairo. From David Roberts, Egypt and Nubia (London, 846-49), vol. 3, plate 3, tab.b.9. (Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library) 78 20. Minaret of the Almohad Great Mosque of Seville. (Author's photograph) 8 2. Courtyard of the Almohad Great Mosque of Seville planted with orange trees. (Author's photograph) 83 22. Portal of the hospital of Nur al-Din in Damascus showing its reused Byzantine lintel. (Author's photograph) 90 23. A caravan of pilgrims or merchants at rest near Asyut, Upper Egypt. From David Roberts, Egypt and Nubia (London, 846-49), vol. , plate 37, tab.b.9. (Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library) 39 24. Fragment of a Kufic Qur'an, probably dating to the eighth-ninth century CE. (Manuscript Add 24, p 48 verso. Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library) 64 25. A page from a thirteenth-century copy of the version of Euclid composed by the 'Abbasid mathematician Thabit b. Qurra. (Manuscript Add 075, p 43. Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library) 88 26. The entry for Cinque Foil in a Botanicum antiquum illustrating Dioscorides' botanical dictionary with captions in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Turkish. (Manuscript Ee.5.7, p 269. Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library) 99 ix x Note on Transliteration and Arabic Conventions T ransliteration of Arabic into English poses a number of problems and it is impossible to be consistent. I have used the standard transliteration system employed by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, but in order to avoid cluttering what is supposed to be an accessible text, I have chosen not to mark Arabic long vowels or emphatic letters. I have assumed that specialists know which letters are soft and which are emphatic and where long vowels fall, while the general reader does not need to be confused by a series of unintelligible lines and dots above and below letters. I have indicated the Arabic letter ayn and the glottal stop hamza with opening and closing quotation marks respectively. With respect to place names, wherever possible I have used contemporary English forms for clarity, although this does lead to some anachronisms. For instance, for the Iberian peninsula I have used 'Spain', which really only applies to the Christian kingdom established in the fifteenth century, rather than more correct but less readily comprehensible terms. The same applies to 'Tunisia', 'Morocco' and other country names which were not regularly used in pre-modern times but direct the reader to the correct geographical area. Pre-modern Arabic names consisted of several components in the form: father of (abu) someone, personal name, son of (ibn) someone, to which was often added an adjective indicating a tribe, place or profession and, for rulers, an honorific title. For example, the Prophet's full name was Abu'l-Qasim Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah, to which one could add 'al-Hashimi', meaning 'of the clan of Hashim'. In keeping with usual academic conventions, I have abbreviated ibn to b. throughout the text except when it appears at the start of a shortened name, e.g. Ibn Khaldun. It is also conventional to describe caliphs and rulers using their honorifics, e.g. al-Ma'mun, with the exception of the Umayyads of Spain, who are generally known by their personal names. 'Western' empire becomes even clearer with the transformation of the eastern Roman Empire into the Christian Byzantine Empire. This was a mostly Greek-speaking empire but the Byzantines called themselves 'Romans' and were so called by their Muslim neighbours, for whom 'Rome' was thus Constantinople and the Roman Empire a Middle Eastern rather than a 'Abbasid times was commerce. Although the most usual stereotype is of the Arab as a desert nomad, in reality many Arabs came from the villages and towns of the Yemen (known as Arabia Felix by the Romans for its green steeply terraced valleys), the settled coasts of eastern Arabia and the Syrian towns on the northern fringe of the desert. The kingdoms of old Arabia supplied and received goods to and from Greece, Rome, Persia, Ethiopia and India. Even in the vast desert interior, sacred enclaves (harams), where tribesmen were obliged to enter unarmed, dotted the landscape and hosted important commercial fairs such as the gathering held at 'Ukaz near Mecca. Islam therefore developed in a semi-commercial environment and Muhammad worked as a commercial agent in his youth. This meant that despite the initially military character of the Islamic conquests, the Muslims were not slow to exploit the commercial opportunities opened up to them. The creation of a vast empire also enabled non-Muslims, Jews especially, to strengthen and extend their trade networks across the length and breadth of the Islamic world and develop new partnerships with Muslims to the mutual benefit of all those involved. In the following pages, I shall draw a picture of the politics, society and culture of classical Islam with the twofold aim of revealing its dynamic The Great Caliphs 4 Caliph, some allowing it on the grounds that he oversees what is owed God by his creation, in accordance with His words, glorified and exalted be His name. … The majority of scholars, however, object to this view, regarding it as sinful to hold. 7 'Uthman was succeeded by 'Ali, the most tragic of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and, in many ways, the most influential in terms of later political and religious developments. 'Ali was the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law as a result of his marriage to Muhammad's eldest daughter, Fatima, who died six months after her father. Since Muhammad had no surviving sons, 'Ali, Fatima and their two sons, Hasan and Husayn, were his closest relatives, and some Muslims felt that 'Ali should have succeeded the Prophet immediately after his death and that his rights had been usurped by Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman in turn. They were known as the 'Party of 'Ali' The Great Caliphs 6 (shi'at ' Ali), which eventually developed into the Shi'i Muslim minority, and they strongly championed his elevation to the caliphate when 'Uthman was assassinated. However, others, including 'Aysha, the daughter of Abu Bakr and one of the Prophet's wives, popularly known as the 'Mother of the Believers', opposed 'Ali's choice as caliph. While no love was lost between 'Ali and 'Aysha, her vehement disapproval probably lay in, firstly, 'Ali's consistent criticism of economic, social and religious developments which he believed were against the spirit of Islam and, secondly, her fear that if he became caliph he would upset the emerging but still fragile social and political order of early Islam. In order to secure his caliphate, 'Ali had to fight a coalition led by Talha and Zubayr, two eminent and early converts who shared 'Aysha's views. He managed to defeat his opponents at the Battle of the Camel, so called because of 'Aysha's attendance in a camel litter, only to be faced by a much greater threat to his power from the governor of Syria, Mu'awiya, a kinsman of 'Uthman, who insisted that the new caliph had not avenged his predecessor's murder as he should have. The armies of 'Ali and Mu'awiya met in 657 at Siffin in northern Syria. Although 'Ali might have won on military grounds, Mu'awiya was a consummate politician and reputedly halted the battle and called for a negotiated settlement by ordering his men to wave sections of the Qur'an on their spears. This proved to be disastrous for 'Ali: the arbitration process which took place the following year was inconclusive and 'Ali had to settle for control of Iraq while Mu'awiya ruled supreme in Syria and Egypt. The Islamic empire was temporarily divided into two and 'Ali's credibility among his own supporters was severely dented. Some of them felt that as caliph he should never have negotiated with a rebel such as Mu'awiya and that his decision to do so was such a gross misjudgement that it disqualified him from the caliphate. They left his camp and formed Islam's first sect, the Kharijites, who held the view that the caliphate belonged to the Muslim best qualified for the post, even if he was a black slave, according to a very...
The Crisis of Kingship in Late Medieval Islam
This new dispensation for these four polities was, no doubt, enhanced by the stark contrast they presented with the turbulent political realities of the preceding century. The fifteenth century was the last of several centuries dominated by Turco-Mongol pastoralist politics and its uneasy tension with sedentary Islamic identities and modes of social organization. Such domination and tension in the central lands of Islam was initially precipitated by the invasions of the Seljuks from Central Asia in the eleventh century and exacerbated by the irruption of the Mongols in the thirteenth and the vast conquests of Timur (r. 1370-1405). Indeed, the life and career of Timur remained the primary point of ideological reference for all subsequent rulers of the fifteenth century, perhaps especially because the extent and impact of his conquests remained unparalleled over the course of the century. The fragile and ultimately fractured territory he bequeathed to his descendants was subjected to conquests, counterconquests, and the rapid succession of rulers that seemed to perpetuate a state of instability in Iran and adjacent lands. Even in the last decades of the century, stability within and among the four principal sultanates of West Asia remained fleeting. Of these four powersthe Ottomans of the Balkans and Anatolia, the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt, the Aqquyunlu of western and central Iran, and Timur's descendants in eastern Iran and Transoxianaonly the Ottomans would survive and thrive beyond the second decade of the sixteenth century. How, then, did this confident and expansive vision of kingship emerge in the sixteenth century? What were the conditions prevailing in this politically tumultuous, fractured world of the fifteenth century that made possible the emergence of territorially defined and ideologically assertive Muslim empires in the sixteenth century? In order to address these questions, we must immerse ourselves in the political, social, religious, and cultural contexts of the fifteenth century. Such contexts are challenging, not least, because they do not fit neatly into the historiographical categories in which historians most frequently work. These categories are informed by the legacies of the early modern Muslim empires and therefore focus upon modern notions of linguistic, religious, cultural, and national boundaries. Yet the fifteenth century was more than a period of messy transition to the more orderly and coherent geopolitical landscape of the sixteenth century. Several of its features bear directly upon a new model of kingship articulated in the fifteenth century and more expansively realized in the