Against reductivism in causation (original) (raw)
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006
The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this 'status raising' is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone. 1 Introduction 2 Variables, propositions, time 3 Induction first 4 Causation 5 Redundant causation 6 Objectivization 1 The major cycles have been produced by David Lewis himself. See Lewis ([1973b], [1986], [2000]). Hints to further cycles may be found there. 2 It is first presented in (Spohn [unpublished]). 3 See, e.g. the April issue of the Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000), or the collection by Collins et al. ([2004]). See also the many references therein, mostly referring to papers since 1995.
2006), Causation: An Alternative
2016
Abstract: The paper builds on the basically Humean general idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epis-temic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this ‘status raising ’ is best explicated not in regu-larity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and preemption. It finally indicates how the account’s
Probability-Lowering Causes and the Connotations of Causation
Ideas y Valores 151: 43-55, 2013
A common objection to probabilistic theories of causation is that there are prima facie causes that lower the probability of their effects. Among the many replies to this objection, little attention has been given to Mellor’s (1995) indirect strategy to deny that probability-lowering factors are bona fide causes. According to Mellor, such factors do not satisfy the evidential, explanatory, and instrumental connotations of causation. The paper argues that the evidential connotation only entails an epistemically relativized form of causal attribution, not causation itself, and that there are clear cases of explanation and instrumental reasoning that must appeal to negatively relevant factors. In the end, it suggests a more liberal interpretation of causation that restores its connotations.
A Non-Reductionist Solution to the Problem of Social Causation
The thesis of the causal closure of the physical world renders mental and social causation philosophically problematic. In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle offers a partial solution to the problem of the causal efficacy of social and institutional facts by an appeal to the notion of the Background, or, as I will argue, by an appeal to its physical components. Since Searle's solution refers to physical facts in order to explain social causation, it does not seem to differ from the solution offered by reductive physicalists to the problem of mental causation. In this paper, I will discuss both responses to these two problems of higher-order causation. As a result of this investigation, the paper offers an account of how and to what extent does Searle's solution solve the problem of the causal efficacy of social facts, without implying their reducibility to physical facts.
Causation: Many Words, One Thing?
How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss, 2011) or not (Williamson, 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a `weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of monism is `weak'.