A Stepkowski Human Dignity and Two Ways of its understanding (original) (raw)
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Ratio Juris, 2008
We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives.
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This paper aims at showing that Human Dignity is neither something that exists separately from human being, nor a property, or an abstract idea, but as a relation between a human being and their own knowledge of the form of human existence, which can be expressed as the form 'I.' In other words, human dignity means that a person acknowledges that they owe the formed aspect of her existence to the form 'I.' Because human beings cannot actualise the form 'I' in a self-sufficient manner, the violation of the dignity of one person derogates also the dignity of the person or the persons who are causing it. This means that if I debase someone, I debase also myself because I impair my own knowledge of the form 'I.' In other words, my dignity relation to the form 'I' obliges me to acknowledge and to respect the dignity relation of any other human being. The problems arising from the cognitivist concept of dignity disappear if one takes into account that this concept only says that in order for dignity to exist there must exist at least one full-fledged cognizing person. As long as one human being in the world is able to have direct knowledge of the form 'I' every other human is entitled to dignity, even if the rest of humanity were not in position to realise this fact. Human dignity cannot thus be determined as an individual human right, but as a duty of every person against herself and any other human being.
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This article analyses competing understandings of human dignity in two rival traditions of moral enquiry. Since the end of World War II, human dignity has played a fundamental role in human rights and constitutional law. While initially, its understanding was significantly influenced by personalism, the liberal conception of dignity has been gradually gaining on importance. Post-war personalism was an influential offshoot of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It offers a specific conceptualisation of human dignity, which can be contrasted to a liberal one. In this paper, I will show how the conflict between the two traditions still persists revolving primarily around the adequate meaning of the concept of individual autonomy, which many liberal scholars associate with human dignity. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, autonomy constitutes merely one part of a broader conception of human dignity, which is why we need to direct our attention elsewhere. The main goal of this paper is to clarify which meanings these competing perspectives ascribe to the concept of dignity; inevitably, this will lead us to analysing the clashes between their representatives over the proper interpretation of the concept. Finally, after delineating these intellectual disputes, I explore the grounds on which some agreement on the meaning of human dignity is possible between the adherents of these traditions.
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A frequented instance of the recent discourse on the animal rights is the topic of bull fi ghts. Th e aim of my contribution is to off er an analysis of a similar debate on bull fi ghts one hundred years ago, in Budapest. In the beginning of the 20th century several “road shows of Spanish toreros” had been organized in Central Europe, off ering an opportunity to meet the new needs of mass entertainment and the idea of animal rights. By my analysis, the argumentation for animal rights in these debates was based on an analogy between the “dignity of the animal beings” and he “dignity of the human beings”, rooted in a naturalised anthropology of the late Continental positivism. At the end of my paper, I will mention a parallelism between this old philosophical background and the new concept of embodied mind.
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A universal human dignity, conceived as an inherent and inalienable value or worth in all human beings, which ought to be recognised, respected and protected by others, has become one of the most prominent and widely promoted interpretations of human dignity, especially in international human rights law. Yet, it is also one of the most difficult interpretations of human dignity to justify and ground. The fundamental problem rests on how one can justify bestowing an equal high worth to all human lives, whilst also attributing to all human life a worth that is superior to all non-human animal life. To avoid the speciesist charge it seems necessary to provide further reasons, over and above species membership, for why all humans have a unique worth and dignity. However, intrinsic capacities, such as autonomy, intelligence or language use, are too demanding for many humans (including foetuses or the severely cognitively disabled) to meet the required minimum standard, whilst also being obtainable by some non-human animals, regardless of where the level is set. This thesis offers a solution to this problem by turning instead to the significance of the relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend individual capacities and abilities, and consequently does not require that all individuals in the group need meet the minimum required capacity for full moral status. Rather, it is argued that a universal human dignity could be grounded in our social nature, the interconnectedness and interdependence of human life and the morally considerable relationships that can and do arise from it, especially in regards to our shared vulnerability and dependence, and our ability to engage in caring relationships. Care represents the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects of humiliation, and other degrading and dehumanizing acts, and as a relational concept, human dignity is often best realised through our caring relationships. The way that individuals and groups treat each other has a fundamental role in determining both an individual’s sense of self-worth and well-being, as well as their perceived public value and worth. Thus, whilst species membership is not in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often shapes the nature of our social and moral relations. These relational ties between humans, it is argued, distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals and accord human relationships a special moral significance or dignity.
Dignity is understood, in the legal-philosophical context, as a determined condition of the human being that distinguishes our species from any other animal. For instance, humans share certain indisputable rights that have to be considered, in the Kant manner, as an end in themselves and not as a mean to other ends. This is the starting point left to us by Kant in his Metaphysics of Customs (Kant, 1785), when he sustains that the human being has no value without dignity, which is an intrinsic value in itself.
Philosophy and Sustenance of Human Dignity in the 21st Century
Philosophy Study
The distortion and dissolution of the concept of person has led to hideous atrocities, such as annihilation of the Jews in the previous century, the continued oppression of the Palestinian people, the massacre of Moslems in Srebrenica, the Rwandan genocide, racial discrimination, the manifold manipulations of man through science and technology, barbarous and iniquitous laws (such as the legalization of abortion, etc.), the horrendous killings by Islamic terrorists (such as ISIS in Syria and the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria), the increasing biomedical researches as in stem cell, etc. This paper seeks to make it clear that man occupies a central place in the created order. From this perspective, man enjoys a special status and should not to be treated as mere object. Thus, it is arguable that the ontological basis for a substance being denominated as person is its special dignity, which separates it from a mere thing. Human dignity, therefore, is an intrinsic quality of all human beings. Among other things, this paper will strive to investigate various violations of human dignity and the role of philosophy in sustaining the dignity of human person in the 21st century.
Faith and Philosophy, 2000
The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said that that doctrine is "speciesist to the core" and "the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics." Those of us who would defend the view that humans enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the question, "What's so special about humans?" In this paper, I argue that moral agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer. I Renaissance humanism never had a more enthusiastic spokesperson than the young intellectual, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494). According to Pico, "Man is the most fortunate creature and thus worthy of all admiration." He is "to be envied not only by the beasts, but also by the stars, and the Intelligences beyond this world." "To him it was granted to have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills. "I Pico was seldom known for restraint in his intellectual endeavors, and he may have allowed himself to get a little carried away. Indeed, Pope Innocent VIII-a human himself-suggested that Pico tone things down a bit. What this precocious young Florentine professed on paper, a younger Florentine contemporary would say just a few years later in marble. Michelangelo'S David also
Human dignity, speciesism, and the value of life
Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae, 2016
This paper deals with a discussion concerning the value of life. Specifically, it addresses the idea of speciesism, a term coined by Peter Singer, whereby human life is endowed with special significance because of its membership in the species Homo sapiens. For Singer, it is an example of erroneous thin- king. On such an account, the idea of human dignity seems to be highly problematic. In this article, the author directs a number of critical voices, both methodological and ontological, toward scepticism concerning a spe- cies belonging. He argues that natural species play quite important roles in the existing reality. The author further tries to prove that the realm of life should be associated with a so-called intrinsic value. In the light of that, any living entity possesses its axiological importance and should be considered and treated accordingly. Human dignity is a corollary of the special place accorded in such reasoning by the value of human life. The article concludes with a thesis that the stance arguing for human dignity is still unthreatened and ready for further development.
In contemporary world there are a lot of idea of dignity and we can observe many differences in the perception and interpretation of it. One can find many reasons for this discrepancy. While focusing on the most important human rights, the authors want to demonstrate that, despite the many changes that have occurred in recent decades, the idea of human rights is essential to human dignity. For these reasons, we believe that the nature of human rights require its re-examination in the prism of human dignity. Analysis of philosophical, cultural and legal contexts in which a concept of dignity occurs, may contribute to a better understanding of what dignity is and what is not. Above all, may allow reflection on the crisis of dignity of the XXI century human. Dignity is a type of value that co-creates the sense of human life, directs to a specific goal, and also regulates interpersonal connections. Here, the authors analyze dignity in the context of specific concepts of man to show the relations between dignity and the eternal question: " who am I in the light of my rights? " Secondarily, we show how crucial contextual and hermeneutical thinking is, while studying fundamental concepts of human experiences such as dignity. The analysis of the subject carried out by experts in fields of legal and philosophical sciences, based on the common foundation, which is an individual and his life, points to many critical issues that need to be thoroughly evaluated, as long as the subject is approached holistically.