Electoral Systems in the First Wave of Democracy: Accounting for Party Preferences (original) (raw)
The paper presents three empirical arguments to explain the actual preferences of the main political parties over proportional representation versus majoritarian systems in early western democracies. Those arguments attempt to complete Rokkan's classic explanation. The general argument is about coordination of groups in a space with no natural majorities. Different rules favor different ways of coordination. Some parties chose PR and parliamentary coalitions; others preferred majority rule and electoral alliances. Third dimension politics impelled religious parties towards PR. Socialist parties without clear union support had the same preference. In both cases their electorates could be insulated from "liberal" (or even conservative) opinion; that could be dealt with in a parliament. Secular conservatives and liberals, particularly after IWW, had a propensity to ally themselves along class lines against the workers, for that was the most effective way of halting their electoral growth. Yet, the territorial distribution of the vote and the rigidities of some ancient voting systems made coordination impossible in some countries, opening a different route for PR.
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