Three paradigms for the analysis of corruption (original) (raw)
The Complex Phenomenon of Corruption: An Empirical Analysis
Theoretical Economics Letters, 2022
Corruption is a complex social, economic and political phenomenon, which exists in all countries. The structural characteristics of corruption differ between countries. The deeper roots of corruption depend on the individual conditions of each country, whereas they can be detected in bureaucratic tradition, economic development and social history, among others. At the policy level, the associated reform measures are inadequate if they are not supported by the appropriate institutional framework and good governance practices. However, in case policies that are applied in order to combat corruption fail, it evolves from occasional to endemic problems impeding the efforts to limit corruption. In addition, fragile institutional environments flourish the conditions strengthening systemic corruption, which has penetrated into the value system of societies.
Challenges in the study of corruption. Approaches and policy implications
In the last decades a chain of scandals fuelled a growing popular awareness of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decisionmaking in public policies -in terms of growing ineffectiveness and inequality -not only in less developed and authoritarian regimes, but also in advanced capitalist democracies. This article offers a critical review of the three main theoretical paradigms of analysis of corruption, the economic, cultural and neo-institutional approach, focusing on the latter. A typology provides a general scheme of interpretation of the "institutional" equilibria within systemic corruption, which may provide also a guide for anticorruption policies. Reversing the neoliberal logic which recommends a reduction of the State's role, popular mobilization from below can be considered as the potentially most effective anticorruption strategy in order to break down the robust equilibria of systemic corruption, increasing politicians' responsiveness to the public expectation of stronger integrity in the public sphere.
Hidden agendas, social norms and why we need to re-think anti-corruption
In many countries high levels of corruption persist in spite of the adoption of so-called anti-corruption " best practices ". In this paper we make a call to pursue a context-sensitive inquiry into the drivers of corruption in order to substantially improve the practices and effects of anti-corruption. We discuss evidence from case studies in Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus suggesting that high levels of corruption are associated to a significant discrepancy between formal rules and informal practices. Informal practices of co-optation, control and camouflage are used by political and business elites to safeguard regime survival via a de facto redistribution of public resources in favour of informal networks of " insiders ". From the perspective of citizens, corrupt acts such as bribing enjoy social acceptability especially when they are effective in solving practical problems and protecting livelihoods. The functional relevance of informal practices clarifies the factors behind the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption law-driven reforms, short-term action plans, and technical measures that focus on particular processes, procedures and institutions. We argue for the need to ponder informality and consider how it may help us develop better anti-corruption strategies. The prevalence and entrenched nature of informal practices indicate their heuristic potential: they can tell us what we are missing in official policies, inform about resistances and can help uncover pathways to strategic, sustainable reforms.
Corruption in the Twenty-First Century Global Era: Meaning, Extent, and Prevalence
EJMSS, 2024
The term "corruption" carries both a qualitative and moral meaning. Because corruption is unethical, it must be eradicated. It has existed for all of recorded history. The corruption perennial's resilience and capacity to spread throughout almost any setting does not appear to have decreased. Every day, the media serves as a constant reminder that unethical behavior persists. It happens in all spheres of society and economic systems, from open capitalist economies like the United States (US) to centrally planned economies like the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and in both democracies and military dictatorships. In recent years, corruption has evolved from primarily being a national or regional problem to one that is a worldwide revolutionary force. The global outcry against corruption has spread over the political scene like a blaze in less than five years. Nations have collapsed. Long-standing ruling parties have faced pressure to leave power. Prosecutors have questioned and herded presidents, prime ministers, lawmakers, and once-powerful business chieftains into the docket. Hardly any nation or area has been exempted from this. This paper holds that there are several reasons for the emergence of corruption and that it is challenging to define corruption in a way that would apply to all nations. In several nations, there have been apparent and actual rises in corrupt practices. This paper investigates the allocation of government benefits, costs, and employment (which become valued when corrupt possibilities exist) to examine the motivations for engaging in corrupt actions. It also covers the variables that affect the scope and frequency of bribes, such as the advantages offered, the authorities' discretion, the dangers connected with them, and the relative bargaining strength of the two sides participating in the bribe transactions. This paper explores the financial consequences of corruption, such as increasing social inequality, diminished political legitimacy, and possible inefficiencies in government procurement and services (red tape and delay). It also looks at the utilization of bribe profits (capital flight). This paper delves deeper into potential strategies to mitigate the worst impacts of corruption, such as raising the stakes and expenses of detection and decreasing the chances and incentives for corruption. Keywords: Corruption, Bribery, Bribes, Bribers, Bribees, Social Inequity, Political Legitimacy.
Systemic and Micro Corruption Throughout the World
The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the core general principles of heterodox political economy -especially with an institutional and evolutionary emphasis -to the topic of corruption as a global, regional, and national phenomenon. I start with the principle of historical specificity, where the known history of corruption processes and concepts are examined. I follow the evolution of the corruption discourse, starting with the classical scholars of ancient Greece and numerous others, who had a systemic view of the matter. I proceed through the micro-views of Roman law, to Adam Smith and others who took an individualist view of corruption, and onto the reemergence of the corruption discourse in the period between the 1970s and the 2010s. In the process, I investigate the micro-perspective, but increasingly center on the "modern classical works" on systemic corruption. Then, I present the basics of a modern institutional and evolutionary perspective on corruption through the principle of contradiction, which defines corruption as the promotion of vested interests against the common good in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, state capture, nepotism, extortion, and others. Social dominance theory is applied to corruption vis-à-vis dominant and subordinate groups, and the styles of corruption activated by elites are surveyed as they gain resources, favors, and economic surplus against the interests of "common people." Finally, I scrutinize the principle of uneven development, paying special attention to four main stylized facts about corruption throughout the world in relation to (i) development patterns, (ii) corporate corruption, (iii) key sectors/nations, and (iv) inequality. Throughout the paper, I 280 Phillip Anthony O'Hara outline ways to reduce corruption and modify the structure of power to benefit the common good, socioeconomic performance, and the functioning of institutions.
2017
Corruption is perhaps the biggest political and economic challenge of the twenty-first century. It stands at the core of, or closely by to, endemic poverty, political instability, organized crime, international terrorism, civic disaffection, economic decline, and a number of other issues damaging the quality of government and the quality of life of billions of people around the globe. Long gone is the time when it could be swept away as an issue solely affecting poor and underdeveloped nations, or when it was proposed to be functional to certain types of bureaucracies affected by pervasive red tape. Now it is finally recognized for what it is—the cancer of society. Despite the evils its name now conjures, however, public efforts to curb corruption have largely missed the target, and more often than not they have ended up demonstrating a gross level of incompetence, or plain and sheer disinterest. Seemingly contradictorily, the crude political reality of the fight against corruption ...
A framework for the analysis of corruption
1998
The article sets out a framework within which the problem of corruption may be analysed in any specific country. It does not seek to establish the importance of such activity in a general sense, or seek to propose particular economic policy or institutional programmes that should be pursued in order to reduce the impact on the development process. Rather, the objective is to provide a structure for two distinct areas of analysis. Firstly, it considers the investigation of the determinants of corruption, emphasising the environment in which corruption evolves -whether shaped by international, national or specific institutional factors -and the manner in which the different parties to corruption interact and organise themselves in conducting these activities. Secondly, the article focusses on the importance of corruption for economic development by considering the different forms of corruption and the characteristics of these forms that are most critical for economic activity. Here, the distortions that are introduced into on-going economic activity are identified, together with the manner in which these distortions redirect activity in sub-optimal directions. In addition, the nature of the uncertainty attaching to these differing forms of corruption is considered, and especially the degree to which a form may be considered anarchic or structured in character: the former reflecting a system of intense uncertainty, and the latter one of less uncertainty -perhaps, only minimal uncertainty -as a predictable and stable set of relationships between parties is established. Finally, the article reviews the empirical work that has been undertaken in this field. This article, therefore, seeks to identify how detailed case study analysis, focussed on individual countries -and, indeed, on specific institutions or sectors within those countriescould valuably complement these existing studies, and provide a framework for those seeking to design policy that is appropriate to any individual circumstance.