Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics? Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy (original) (raw)
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Climate Ethics and Population Policy
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, human population growth is one of the two primary causes of increased greenhouse gas emissions and accelerating global climate change. Slowing or ending population growth could be a cost effective, environmentally advantageous means to mitigate climate change, providing important benefits to both human and natural communities. Yet population policy has attracted relatively little attention from ethicists, policy analysts, or policy makers dealing with this issue. In part, this is because addressing population matters means wading into a host of contentious ethical issues, including family planning, abortion, and immigration. This article reviews the scientific literature regarding voluntary population control's potential contribution to climate change mitigation. It considers possible reasons for the failure of climate ethicists, analysts, and policy makers to adequately assess that contribution or implement policies that take advantage of it, with particular reference to the resistance to accepting limits to growth. It explores some of the ethical issues at stake, considering arguments for and against noncoercive population control and asking whether coercive population policies are ever morally justified. It also argues that three consensus positions in the climate ethics literature regarding acceptable levels of risk, unacceptable harms, and a putative right to economic development, necessarily imply support for voluntary population control.
Impact of population growth and population ethics on climate change mitigation policy
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2017
Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show that how future population is valued importantly determines mitigation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a discounted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC) models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores population size and sums only each time period’s discounted average wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger population means climate change hurts more people: for example, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85% under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reductions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings ($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertility. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth entails overall improvements in wellbeing—rather than merely cost savings—again depends on the ethical approach to valuing population.
Climate ethics and population policy: A review of recent philosophical work
WIREs Climate Change, 2021
It is well-established that human population growth is a leading cause of increased greenhouse gas emissions and accelerating global climate change. After decades of neglect, philosophical ethicists have, over the past decade, taken up the issue of climate change and population policy and there are now numerous articles and books which explore the subject. Both rights-based and consequentialist approaches seek to balance reproductive rights against other human rights and interests threatened by overpopulation and ecological degradation. While biocentric ethicists have additional reasons to advocate for smaller human populations, even anthropocentrists affirm the need to balance reproductive rights against reproductive responsibilities in order to promote the well-being of future generations. There is a particularly strong consensus on the value of choice-enhancing population policies that reduce fertility voluntarily, such as securing universal access to modern contraception and promoting equal rights and opportunities for women. There is strong support for government policies that incentivize smaller families, some support for policies that disincentivize larger ones, and little to no support for punitive policies. Many ethicists warn that failure to enact reasonable population policies now may necessitate harsher policies in the future, a common theme in climate ethics generally.
2020
Population axiology concerns how to rank populations by the relation "is socially preferred to". So far, population ethicists have (with important exceptions) focused less on the question of how to rank population prospects, that is, alternatives that contain uncertainty as to which population they will bring about. Most public policy choices, however, are decisions under uncertainty, including policy choices that affect the size of a population (such as climate policy choices). Here, we shall address the question of how to rank population prospects by the relation "is socially preferred to". We start by illustrating how well-known population axiologies can be extended to population prospect axiologies. And we show that new problems arise when extending population axiologies to prospects. In particular, traditional population axiologies lead to prospect-versions of the problems that they are praised for avoiding in the risk-free settings. Moreover, we show how the axiom of State-Wise Dominance allow us to extend any impossibility theorem in population axiology to impossibility theorems for non-trivial population prospects, that is, prospects that confer probabilities strictly between zero and one on different populations. Finally, we formulate impossibility results that only involve probabilistic axioms.
Impact of population growth and population ethics\xmlpi{\\} on climate change mitigation policy
2017
aWoodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; bDepartment of Philosophy, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405; cYale–NUS College, Singapore 138527; dCenter for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; eInternational Research Institute for Climate and Society, Columbia University, Palisades, NY 10964; fDepartment of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; gDepartment of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712; hEconomics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, India, 110016; iAndlinger Center for Energy and the Environment, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; and jInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria A-2361
Population Ethics and the Prospects for Fertility Policy as Climate Mitigation Policy
The Journal of Development Studies, 2021
What are the prospects for using population policy as tool to reduce carbon emissions? In this paper, we review evidence from population science, in order to inform debates in population ethics that, so far, have largely taken place within the academic philosophy literature. In particular, we ask whether fertility policy is likely to have a large effect on carbon emissions, and therefore on temperature change. Our answer is no. Prospects for a policy of fertility-reduction-as-climate-mitigation are limited by population momentum, a demographic factor that limits possible variation in the size of the population, even if fertility rates change very quickly. In particular, a hypothetical policy that instantaneously changed fertility and mortality rates to replacement levels would nevertheless result in a population of over 9 billion people in 2060. We use a leading climate-economy model to project the consequence of such a hypothetical policy for climate change. As a standalone mitigation policy, such a hypothetical change in the size of the future population-much too large to be implementable by any foreseeable government programme-would reduce peak temperature change only to 6.4°C, relative to 7.1°C under the most likely population path. Therefore, fertility reduction is unlikely to be an adequate core approach to climate mitigation.
Does the Repugnant Conclusion have important implications for axiology or for public policy?
Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics
Formal arguments have proven that avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion is impossible without rejecting one or more highly plausible population principles. To many, such proofs establish not only a deep challenge for axiology, but also pose an important practical problem of how policymaking can confidently proceed without resolving any of the central questions of population ethics. Here we offer deflationary responses: first to the practical challenge, and then to the more fundamental challenge for axiology. Regarding the practical challenge, we provide an overview of recent literature that explores the implications for public policy of the Repugnant Conclusion and related puzzles within population ethics, and shows that there is more commonality in the implications of different population axiologies than is generally recognized. The upshot is that uncertainty about population ethics presents no important problem for policymaking, and the importance of population ethics to policymaking has been overstated. We then turn to more fundamental issues about axiology, and describe a new series of formal proofs that undermine the idea that any plausible axiology could avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, including those that are assumed to avoid it in the literature. The philosophical upshot is that the Repugnant Conclusion cannot plausibly be avoided, and so it is a mistake to assume as a constraint on a plausible axiology that it must be avoided, as is assumed by most of the literature in population ethics, including by all of the fundamental impossibility theorems.
Does Climate Change Put Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself?
2021
The purpose of this paper is to outline an intuitive ethics of climate change, one that understands our maximizing values, according to which it makes things better to make things better for people, to be tempered by our existential values, according to which existence is just different: making things better for a person by way of bringing that person into existence doesn’t, on its own, make things better. Such a reconciliation, I argue, avoids the collision course we can otherwise anticipate between population ethics on the one hand and climate ethics on the other. The work of reconciliation is commenced by reference to what we can call the person-affecting, or person-based, intuition. It’s hard to get that intuition right; we need a formulation of the intuition that avoids the many pitfalls that many earlier formulations have fallen into. The principle I propose is, however, hardly immune to objection. In this paper, I consider and reply to two such objections both of which rely o...
Moral uncertainty about population axiology
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level views, even if one's credence in those theories is low.
Some Scalar Issues in Climate Ethics
Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly, 2015
The intensifying processes of globalization have forced scholars and policy-makers to recognize the limited capacities of nation states and have reanimated interest in cosmopolitanism and in global ethics, that is, the idea that people are directly responsible to each other rather than indirectly through collective agencies such as states. This article describes problems that attend the shift from states to persons as the kinds of agents most suited to respond to climate change. It argues for more philosophical attention to the levels of organization and scales of analysis that make sense in the context of global challenges.