Parmanu Politics - Indian Political Parties and Nuclear Weapons (original) (raw)

Role of the Indian political system in shaping India’s nuclear policy

This paper attempts to examine the role played by various actors in the Indian political system in shaping the nuclear policy in India. The focus will be on the role of the parliament, political parties and prominent civil society groups in influencing the ‘nuclear debate’ and framing policy. The Indo-US civil nuclear deal and the Nuclear Liability Law are taken as case studies. While parliament had no direct say in the ratification of the nuclear deal, the government had to face a no-confidence motion in its aftermath. Similarly, the nuclear liability law was passed only after the government agreed to the demands of the parliament to hike the liability cap and also included 18 amendments suggested by the House. In this paper, we propose to delineate the capacity and influence of the key political actors in India in shaping the country’s nuclear policy.

India’s nuclear policy and Developments

Abstract The purpose of the research examines the evolution of India’s nuclear program as it developed from the 1940s by a small group of influential scientists and the current nuclear capabilities that they now posses. The Indian nuclear program continues to develop improved weapons technologies and economic development with the potential to proliferate nuclear material. India since 1947, in order to develop a comprehensive strategy that utilizes all the instruments of national power that will encourage India to become a responsible stakeholder among the nuclearized countries and demonstrate the responsibility that goes along with nuclear technology. India’s nuclear policy was also influenced by India’s international security condition as well as by domestic variables such as the vagaries of political change and the influence of bureaucratic elites. India aspired to be a nuclear state after 1962 conflict with China, particularity after China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 The role of ‘the nuclear’ in global power status however is central to being recognized as a power to be reckoned with. Despite India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, such recognition had always eluded India. Since India was not a signatory to the NPT.

REVISITING INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY: PROCESS, STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME

Mukt Shabd Journal, 2020

This paper is an attempt to explore and evaluate the success of India's nuclear policy so as to locate and to make sense of India's long march to becoming a nuclear weapons state. The nuclear programme and strategy of India has always been related to its look for appreciation and respect at the international level. India also acknowledges as a successful and responsible nuclear power along with its international security and defence policy. India's no first use, retaliation only nuclear doctrine is morally betting and culturally worthy of our civilization and heritage. India's nuclear policies are structurally & operationally sound, though the country yet to demonstrate it. Since 2016, India has been trying to access into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). For the first time, India got a decisive support in a meeting of the 48 nation bloc whose members are permitted to trade in and export nuclear technology for India. But it was the civil nuclear deal with the US in the 2008 that paved the way for India's application as a member of NSG. It also explores the compulsion behind nuclerisation and the structure of India's nuclear doctrine. Along with it, this paper will try to give a new road to mature India's future nuclear policies and its politics.

India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb

Why did India merely flirt with nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s only to emerge as a nuclear power in the 1990s? Although a variety of factors informed India’s prolonged restraint and subsequent breakthrough, new evidence indicates that India’s “nuclear odyssey” can be understood as a function of Indian leaders’ ability to secure their country through nonmilitary means, particularly implicit nuclear umbrellas and international institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s, India was relatively successful in this regard as it sought and received implicit support from the superpowers against China. This success, in turn, made acquiring the bomb a less pressing question. At the end of the Cold War, however, nonmilitary measures ceased to be viable for India. In the late 1980s, waning Soviet support and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi’s diplomatic initiatives led to the creation of India’s de facto nuclear arsenal. In the 1990s, India developed a more overt capability, not simply because the pro-bomb Bharatiya Janata Party came to power, but also because its external backing had vanished and because its efforts to improve its security through diplomacy proved unsuccessful.