Asymmetries of Language and Sight (original) (raw)

Artworks and Representational Properties

Dialogue, 2004

A sustained challenge to the view that artworks are physical objects relates to the alleged inability of physical objects to possess representational properties, which some artworks clearly do possess. I argue that the challenge is subject to confusions about representational properties and aesthetic experience. I show that a challenge to artwork-object identity put forward by Danto is vulnerable to a similar criticism. I conclude by noting that the identity of artworks and physical objects is consistent with the insight that attending exclusively to the object's individual physical properties may prevent us from grasping the nature of the work.

A Defence of the Study of Visual Perception in Art

This thesis examines the use of the science of visual perception in the study of art. I argue that this application of perceptual psychology and physiology has been neglected in recent years, but contend that it is being revived by writers such as John Onians. I apply recent scientific research to demonstrate what can be learned about depiction from the science of perception. The thesis uses the science of perception to argue that there are four main interlinked components in depiction. It argues that each of these components can be better understood by using the science of vision. Chapter 1 examines one component, namely resemblance. It uses studies of the retina, centre-surround cells, and attentional processes to examine how a picture can vary in appearance from its subject matter, yet still represent it. Chapter 2 examines a second component, namely informativeness. It applies Biederman's psychological theory of recognition-by-components to argue that the depiction of volumetric forms depends on the depiction of the vertices of such objects, as well as that of linear perspective. From this the chapter argues that the notion of informativeness, as developed by Lopes, should be combined with a notion of resemblance to create a more complete theory. Chapter 3 examines a third component of depiction, namely that pictures can include, omit, and distort the features of their subjects. The psychological theory of scales, as developed by Oliva and Schyns, is used to explain certain kinds of depictions of fabrics, and the perception of Pointillist paintings. The chapter also examines the issue of to what extent perception and depiction are dependent on culture rather than genetics, and shows how a combination of scientific methodology, in the form of cross-cultural psychology, and historiography, in the form of Baxandall's 'period eye' approach, can be used to investigate this issue. Chapter 4 examines a fourth component of depiction, namely the organisation of pictures. It uses studies by Westphal-Fitch et al., and Võ and Wolfe to analyse the patterns of Waldalgesheim art, and the images in the Book of Kells. By using the science of visual perception, I arrive at the conclusion that a combination of theories of recognition, informativeness, and order, developed in Chapters 1, 2, and 4, together with theories of visual decomposition, processing, and recomposition, developed in Chapter 3, form a basis for understanding depiction.

Perception and Depiction in the Light of Embodiment

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We can approach different depictive systems (i.e., pictorial and linguistic) from the perspective of cognitive capabilities. The difficulty that arises from the logically encoded incapability of expressing the relation between the depictive system and the depicted world within the given depictive framework can be eliminated only by stepping beyond the depictive system and taking into account its cognitive background. The notion of embodiment provides the leitmotif within this cognitive background. That is, I suggest a relation between pictorial/linguistic capabilities and the world they depict on the basis of bodily experiences and evolving cognitive capabilities. Within this framework, it becomes possible to highlight how a picture can display its pictorial form (TLP 2.172), and how propositions mirror their logical form (TLP 4.121). In this paper I will focus on pictures. I maintain that with the help of embodiment the rules of perception and of depiction, as well as their common background, come to light. Accordingly, the main pillars of my argument are the notion of embodiment and image schemas/gestalt-structures, and finally the distinction of perceiving the effect and form as it is related to depiction.

A REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF ARTEFACTS AND ARTWORKS

The artefacts produced by artists during their creation of works of art are very various: paintings, writings, musical scores, and so on. I have a general thesis to offer about the relations of artefacts and artworks, but within the confines of this article I shall mainly discuss cases drawn from the art of painting, central specimens of which seem to be autographic in Nelson Goodman's sense, namely such that even the most exact duplication of them does not count as producing the same work of art. 1 My view will be that an artwork (such as a painting) and its associated artefact are not identical, and nor is the artefact in any sense part of the painting in question, 2 but that nevertheless it is still possible to maintain the view that paintings are autographic (which view I shall call l the autographic thesis). I shall proceed initially through presentation of some counterexamples to common assumptions as to the relations of artefacts and artworks, and then present an alternative 'representational' theory of their relations. My reason for concentrating on an autographic art-form in this article is because such art-forms potentially present the hardest cases for my 'representational' theory to handle; however, I shall also provide some discussion of non-autographic arts.

Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction

Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, 2010

Edited by CATHARINE ABELL and KATERINA BANTINAKI Oxford University Press, 2010. xii þ 242 pp. £40 cloth In their introduction, the editors of this book, Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki, give an excellent account of the present state of play in the philosophy of pictures. Depiction, the mode of representation distinctive of pictures, has seen a growth in philosophical interest over the past few years, and Abell and Bantinaki think the field holds even more potential: 'While the philosophy of language has long been considered a philosophical discipline in its own right, the philosophy of depiction is usually thought of, when it is thought of at all, as a sub-discipline of aesthetics. This is like conflating the philosophy of language with the philosophy of literature' (1). That the study of depiction may grow to occupy a position comparable to philosophy of language might seem doubtful to us now, but Abell and Bantinaki are right to draw attention to the fact that the place of depiction within aesthetics is an historical happenstance. As the papers collected in this volume illustrate, there is usually only incidental concern with the aesthetic and artistic in the literature on depiction. The big issue addressed by that literature in the past is symptomatic of this unconcern with art and aesthetics: it has centred on finding a definition of depiction, one that applies equally to snapshots and Signorellis. This collection largely avoids the problem of definition to focus on issues that are only now beginning to attract substantial attention. It is telling of the state of the field just how much one such issue, the experience of pictures, dominates: it is the central topic of five of the book's eight chapters. But let me say something about the other three chapters first. The first of these, by John Kulvicki, investigates the commonplace that there are many different ways-styles and systems-of picturing. Kulvicki argues that the situation is, in some ways, simpler than this suggests: there are many different ways of producing a picture, but rather fewer ways of interpreting it. The key is to recognize that it is not the multitude of different styles and systems of picturing that are significant for interpretation, so much as the representationally salient properties they instantiate-and these present much less diversity. Kulvicki goes on to argue, with some justification to my mind, that the constraints on interpretation are explained by the fact that pictures resemble what they depict, a central plank of his own (2006) theory of depiction. Abell includes a paper of her own, investigating the epistemic value of photographs. Photographs are generally superior to handmade pictures as sources of knowledge about what they depict. Abell argues, in the face of opposing views, that this fact has its roots in the reliability of the standardized, mechanical processes of photography. Abell's position has the appeal of common sense, and it does seem to me that this is one instance where common sense has it pretty much right. Dominic Lopes's chapter begins with a less commonsensical proposal. Looking at a picture of X, it often seems natural to say 'That's X', rather than 'That's a picture of X'-something we would never do in the presence of a description of X. Lopes holds that this 'image-based demonstrative'-'That's X'-is literally, and not just figuratively, true. He argues that this is so because pictures perceptually ground such reference through deixis, an aspect of visual experience usually associated with actually being in the presence of

From perception to art: how vision creates meanings

Spatial Vision, 2009

This article describes the relationship between Art, as painting or sculpture, and a new theory of perceptual meaning, which builds on and now further develops the Gestalt principles. A key new idea in the theory is that higher-order groupings principles exist which, like the spatial grouping articulated by the principle of Prägnanz, helps to associate and combine stimuli, but which, unlike the Gestalt laws, can explain combinations of dissimilar as well as similar forms of visual information in a lawful manner. Similarities and dissimilarities are put together again by virtue of another and more global grouping factor that overcomes the dissimilarities of the components: it is some kind of meaning principle that perceptually solves the differences among whole and elements at a higher level, making them appear strongly linked just by virtue of the differences. In this way, similarities and dissimilarities complement and do not exclude each other. Such higher-order principles of groupingby-meaning are articulated and illustrated using Art, from prehistoric to modern.