EDUCATING FOR INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY AND CONVICTION (original) (raw)

Educating for Intellectual Humility

Jason Baehr (ed.), Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology (London: Routledge, 2015), 54-70.

Many contemporary philosophical virtue theorists have begun to restore the sense of an intimacy between virtue, character, and ‘the good life’, and, in turn, philosophers of education explore the ways that educational practice could contribute to the cultivation of virtuous character. Certainly many philosophers and educationalists will agree with Ben Kotzee that it is ‘obvious’ that education ought to ‘form good intellectual character’ (2013: p.163). I am sympathetic to this claim, but also sensitive to the worries of those sceptics who ask about the practical, pedagogical, and philosophical issues it raises.. My purpose in this chapter is to contribute to the revival of aretaic conceptions of education, but in a way sensitive to those sceptics’ concerns. Specifically, I offer an account of the specific virtue of intellectual humility, then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and concerns, and finally describe how certain entrenched educational attitudes and conceptions marginalise or militate against the cultivation and exercise of this virtue.

Intellectual Humility as Strenght in the Processes of the Formation and Development of Knowledge

Sabiedrība, integrācija, izglītība, 2020

The aim of the research: To describe the intellectual humility of a teacher as strength in the processes of forming and developing knowledge. Intellectual virtues presuppose the objective of deep, factual perception with a possibility to make mistakes. A lot of pedagogues lack the activities important for virtues without dependence on mood or similar supporting means (the total level of virtue). A teacher who distinguishes with intellectual humility, who belongs to the virtues of the first range (the initiation of learning process and its guiding towards the right direction) and has connection with other intellectual virtues, aims for coordinated learning relationship where the sense of equality is present, as well as broaden perspective, distinguishes with flexibility while reconsidering convictions, fear which is felt by an intellectually humble person when he/she misses information or something is not understood. An intellectually humble teacher, developing his/her knowledge, distinguishes with the constant pursuit for development, ability to self-evaluate strengths and weaknesses, seeing relationship with others as perspective for development The definition of intellectual humility is usually related with the recognition that your convictions and opinions can be wrong. This virtue is concerned with the strengths of a teacher. Being an intellectually humble person opens possibilities to the independence of a learner while forming or developing knowledge and understanding. In this process the potential of colleagues is recognized, strong and weak points are firmly pointed out, intellectual arrogance is avoided. This presupposes more possibilities for the change of learning both to a learner and the one dependant on him/her.

'Knowledge is Power': Barriers to Intellectual Humility in the Classroom

Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, 2020

How does the idea that knowledge is power play out in our schools and universities. How does it feature in our education systems and how does it impact upon the intellectual characters of students. Specifically, how does the pervasiveness of this idea in our schools and classrooms affect students’ willingness and ability to be intellectually humble. In this paper, I suggest that this idea presents itself in contemporary classrooms as a barrier to the development and exercise of intellectual humility. Simply put, when we equate knowledge with power, we make it harder to be intellectually humble. In its most prevalent manifestation, this barrier arises in the form of answer-oriented education. I spend the majority of the paper outlining the nature and impact of answer-oriented education and, towards the end, suggest one way to remove this barrier by shifting from answer-oriented to question-oriented education. The latter, I argue, warrants further attention in philosophical and educational research.

Intellectual Humility and Assertion

Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Humility (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, (London: Routledge).

Recent literature suggests that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically—viz., from a point of view where (put roughly) epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectual humility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectual humility might have implications for how we should conduct our practice of asserting. The present entry aims to rectify this oversight by connecting these two topics in a way that sharpens how it is that intellectual humility places several distinctive kinds of demands on assertion, and more generally, on how we communicate what we believe and know.

Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation

Topoi forthcoming

The last few decades have witnessed growing interest in the relationship of virtue and argumentation. In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive to the cultivation of virtues, including humility, but only if it is conceived and practiced in appropriately ‘edifying’ ways.

Intellectual Humility – a Moral Construct, an Intellectual Virtue

SERIES VII - SOCIAL SCIENCES AND LAW, 2021

The present literature review brings together conceptualizations and study results obtained from extensive work that has been done on the virtue of Intellectual Humility (IH) for the pasts 9 years. While philosophers don't settle yet to a single point of view on intellectual humility, psychologists take a pragmatic stance on the construct and evaluate possible implications IH can have on personal, social, and professional levels. The term is being extended to organizations, teams and organizational culture and studied in the intricate relationships established in the corporate culture. Studies in leadership also provide an insight of how organizations can benefit from the vision and culture a humble leader promotes.

Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory (Published in Ergo)

In this paper, I will argue in contrast with much of the existing literature, that humility and intellectual humility are interpersonal (as opposed to personal) virtues. Also in contrast with what has been said before, I will further argue that the fruits of intellectual humility are external to the virtue holder. The paper begins with a review of the literature on humility and intellectual humility. I then offer my alternative account, answer some objections, and briefly propose a compromise position to appease those who are sympathetic to traditional conceptions.

Intellectual humility: an old problem in a new psychological perspective

Current Issues in Personality Psychology, 2021

Though having been emphasised by philosophers and theologians for centuries, it is only in the last few years that the concept of intellectual humility has been explicitly defined and studied by empirical psychology. However, it has been long enough to recognise the prominent role that being intellectually humble plays for humane functioning, both at an intra- and inter-individual level. Having started with a broader philosophical and historical context, the present paper discusses the psychological conceptualisations of intellectual humility. Then the recent empirical studies are reviewed, including four strands of research referring to personality traits, cognitive functioning, social relations and religiosity. After presenting selected results, the prospects of psychological research on intellectual humility are discussed, including the limitations and challenges of measurement techniques as well as possible directions for future studies.

Open-Mindedness and Intellectual Humility

Theory and Research in Education, 2012

Among those who regard open-mindedness as a virtue, there is dispute over whether the trait is essentially an attitude toward particular beliefs or toward oneself as a believer. I defend William Hare's account of open-mindedness as a first-order attitude toward one's beliefs and critique Peter Gardner's view of open-mindedness as a non-commital posture and Jonathan Adler's claim that open-mindedness is a second-order recognition of one's fallibility as a knower. While I reject Adler's account of open-mindedness as a meta-attitude, I affirm his intuition that there is a closely related second-order intellectual virtue pertaining to the attitude we take toward ourselves as knowers. However, this trait is intellectual humility not open-mindedness. I explain why both of these traits are intellectual virtues and how they properly build off one another in the virtuous mind. With the rise of virtue epistemology in recent years, scholars have been increasingly interested in those intellectual traits that are conducive to the acquisition of knowledge, that is, which make a person a good knower. 1 One trait that has received much less attention than it deserves is open-mindedness. Though typically regarded by virtue epistemologists as an important intellectual virtue, some reject it as such, usually because they see it as incompatible with having firm convictions. Among those who regard open-mindedness as a virtue, there is dispute over whether the trait is essentially an attitude toward particular beliefs or toward oneself as a believer. In what follows I will address both of these debates, as I clarify just what open-mindedness is, discuss how it is related to the meta-attitude of intellectual humility, and show how both traits are virtues. Accounts of Open-Mindedness Scholarly discussions of open-mindedness in the last few decades have taken place largely within the context of educational theory, as opposed to virtue ethics or epistemology. This is understandable, of course, since education is not just about passing information on to others but also involves training students to adopt certain attitudes and dispositions toward particular issues and the quest for knowledge generally. Our view of what it means to be open-minded will impact the way we teach, both as we attempt to

INTELLECTUAL PRIDE AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Pride, 2017

The aim of this paper is to understand the notion of intellectual pride in contrast to the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility. In essence, we claim that pride⎯at least in one of its core senses⎯is to be understood as the vice of excess that corresponds to the virtue of humility. It is argued in turn that humility should be understood as requiring not only an accurate conception of oneself, but also as involving certain characteristic other-regarding dispositions. This is the non-egotistical account of humility. Intellectual virtue is then defined along the same lines. It follows that intellectual pride is the intellectual vice of excess that corresponds to the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility, so understood. We conclude by describing the role of the virtue of humility, intellectual or otherwise, in the good life of flourishing (and, relatedly, how the vice of pride, intellectual or otherwise, is inimical to the good life of flourishing).