Spinoza and the Two Sources of Democracy (original) (raw)
2015
Democracy is today a system that is expanding around the world or at least, was expanding in the second half of the 20th Century and moreover, is still being demanded by people who are deprived of it, although not in the countries where it is established and seen by a growing number of people as an authentic achievement. What is the cause of this dual and conflicting perception of democracy? To a great extent it is due to the fact that the principle underlying it involves something more than a political system. Throughout the centuries, this was practically the only form in which democracy was conceived and discussed. At odds with the formalist tradition, this article approaches the issue of democracy from the works of Spinoza and Marx.
Logical Polis. The Philosophical Foundation of Democracy According to B. Spinoza
Central European Journal of Politics, 2021
Benedict Spinoza, the seventeenth-century rationalist philosopher, is, according to some authors, the first theorist to offer serious philosophical arguments justifying the idea of democracy as the best (and most natural) political system. Spinoza's political philosophy is, therefore, one of the first to be examined in today's political situation, which is often characterized by the phrase "crisis of (liberal) democracy". This study attempts to capture the philosophical arguments used by Spinoza to support his pro-democratic conclusions, detects his initial assumptions, and illuminates what specifically should characterize a democratic regime in his imagination. Among the primary sources used for this purpose are both those writings of Spinoza that are traditionally understood as political-philosophical (Theologico-Political Treatise and Political Treatise) and Spinoza's most famous work (Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order). Although the latter may appear distant from the issue at hand, some of the most strongly formulated relevant positions are found in it. The intention of the present study is twofold: first, to demonstrate on the example of Spinoza's thought how inextricably the preference for a democratic regime is linked to certain philosophical premises, not only ethical and axiological but also gnoseological and ontological ones; and more importantly, second, to formulate a hypothetical answer that Spinoza would have given to the question of the crisis of democracy and the possibilities of its solution.
The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Received View of Spinoza on Democracy
Abstract On many interpretations of Spinoza’s political philosophy, democracy emerges as his ideal type of government. But a type of government can be ideal and yet it can be unwise to implement it if certain background conditions obtain. For example, a dominion’s people can be too ‘wretched by the conditions of slavery’ to rule themselves. This begs the following question. Do Spinoza’s arguments for democracy entail that all political bodies should be democracies at all times (the received view), or do they merely entail that we should only have a democracy when the right sort of background conditions are in place (the challenging view)? This paper argues that a new interpretation of one of the four versions of the rationality argument for democracy as it features in the Tractatus entails that the received view is correct. The paper also explains away part of the appeal of the challenging view by arguing that none of the other versions of the rationality argument supports the received view. It closes by arguing that a slightly modernised version of the rationality argument can be important for contemporary political philosophy.
European Journal of Political Theory, 2009
InSpinoza,whatIcall(adaptingaphrasefromJ.-L.Nancy)the‘Being Individual Multiple’ is the multitudo. Its form of life is Democracy, understood as the autonomous and conflictual organization of collective dynamics and not one form of government among others. Combining an original mode of argumentation with a critical discussion of opposing interpretations, I maintain that democracy is the translation into politics of the third and highest kind of knowledge in Spinoza, intuitive science. I argue moreover that the multitudo self-organized in a democracy has the capacity to experiment and express a different rationality with respect to the singular individual. Wisdom and democracy thus converge to give life to something unknown and original in western political modernity.
First Among Equals: Philosophers, Statesmen, and Citizens in Spinoza’s Democracy
Equality and Excellence, 2023
In chapter sixteen 16 of his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza develops his doctrine of equality in terms of natural rights and argues that such rights are rooted in God, as an extension of his power. 1 He then argues that democracy is the best and "most natural" regime because it best preserves these rights. This argument appears at first glance to be a forerunner to John Locke's argument that the purpose of government is to protect our natural rights. More recently, Spinoza scholars have found Spinoza's metaphysical and political arguments to be compatible with the contemporary version of liberalism, including ideas such as empowerment, inclusivity, and equal access. 2 However attractive it may be to enlist Spinoza's authority to support such ideas, there are a number of obstacles to presenting him as an advocate of liberal, not to say radical, egalitarianism. For one thing, Spinoza insists that we are not equal, that is, he maintains a strict distinction between the few, who are wise and rational, and the many, who are driven by their passions (cf. V, 77-80). He continually decries the multitude in blunt terms: "And those who have experienced the fast-change mentality of the masses are almost in despair about it, because the masses aren't governed by reason but only by affects. They rush headlong in all directions, and are very easily corrupted by greed or by extravagant living. Each person thinks that he alone knows everything" (XVII, 203).
Kritika Kultura, 2024
This paper presents a critical analysis of the concept of democracy in Spinoza’s political philosophy, emphasizing the dialectic of operation of democratic collectivity and the role of the multitude. It juxtaposes Antonio Negri’s radical democratic interpretation of Spinoza with Spinoza’s own detailed exposition in the Tractatus Politicus. This exploration confronts the exclusionary and discriminatory argumentation within Spinoza’s framework, especially concerning women and other marginalized groups, questioning the absoluteness of a democratic state. The democratic operation is reconceptualized as a continually dialectical process encompassing inclusion, exclusion, and the negotiation of citizenship, with the multitude as the ambivalent agent of collective power. The paper thus proposes a nuanced understanding of democracy in Spinoza’s thought, characterized by the continuous redefinition of its limits and potential, suggesting that democracy’s essence and operation lies in the multitude’s capacity for self-constitution and the perpetual re-negotiation of power structures.
Spinoza on Freedom, Individual Rights and Public Power
Praxis Filosofica, 40, enero-junio 2015: 11-34
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of Spinoza’s most conspicuous political doctrines: his rejection of classical contractualism, his doctrine of the equivalence of right and power, his description of the limits of government either as logical limitations or as restrictions, not of power, but of impotence, and his defence of democracy as the most natural and most rational form of the state. Also, two alleged paradoxes that permeate Spinoza’s political thought are solved: the conflict between a naturalistic approach and a discourse whose purpose is to shed light on the grounds of political legitimacy, and the tension between the dynamics of freedom and the dynamics of power. Far from obsolete, Spinoza’s political philosophy comes to light as able to meet the demands of the contemporary world.
The Fickle Multitude: Spinoza and the Problem of Global Democracy
Constellations, 2010
Hardt and Negri have drawn on Spinoza’s concept of the multitude to formulate a theory of collective political action in the context of late modern global capitalism. I read the concept of the multitude as occupying a far more ambivalent place in Spinoza’s thought. Through an analysis of the three features of the multitude – singularity, constituent power, and immanence – that Hardt and Negri identify as most salutary, I demonstrate that Hardt and Negri ignore some of the fundamental features of the multitude’s structure that are necessary for both its constitution and its operation. While Hardt and Negri draw on the multitude to provide a theory of global political agency without any institutions, I contend that Spinoza’s multitude requires a strong centralized sovereign state to maximize the freedom and power of the multitude. Consequently, my interpretation of the multitude raises important questions about what global political order could and should look like.
Citizens and States in Spinoza's Political Treatise
Mind, 2021
In his Political Treatise, Spinoza repeatedly compares states to human beings. In this interpretation of the comparisons, I present a progressively more restrictive account of Spinoza’s views about the nature of human beings in the Ethics and show at each step how those views inform the account of states in the Political Treatise. Because, like human beings, states are individuals, they strive to persevere in existence. Because, like human beings, states are composed of parts that are individuals, states’ parts also strive to persevere in being. Finally, because in states, as in human beings, a change to the power of striving of a part can be at the same time a change to the whole that differs in kind, strong states can be bad for their citizens and states that serve their citizens well may nevertheless be weak. Spinoza’s principal project in the Political Treatise is to design states that are stable and good for their citizens. This account of the comparisons shows why that project is so difficult: one cannot design a good state simply by designing a stable state.