Epistemology's search for significance (original) (raw)

Epistemology is supposed to guide our reason. This means that episte-mology is practically important because our beliefs so often play a decisive role in how we decide to act. We argue that in order to be effectively action-guiding, traditional epistemological theories must be supplemented with an account of significance of what makes one reasoning problem significant and another reasoning problem insignificant. We sketch the beginning of an account of significance that employs Signal Detection Theory. We then argue that any internalist theory of justification is not going to fit smoothly with a plausible account of significance. This calls into question the power of internalist theories of justification to effectively guide reason and action. Contemporary analytic epistemology is obsessed with justification. To many, this obsession might well seem perfectly natural and appropriate. After all, epistemology is the study of knowledge, and knowledge and justification are intimately related. Justification (or warrant) is usually taken to be that property that knowledge has but that (mere) true belief lacks. But there are many other epistemological issues and concepts that are worth exploring (and that are occasionally investigated), including rationality, epistemic virtue, epistemic excellence and epistemic significance. So, this raises the question: why the obsession with justification? Perhaps the answer is no deeper than professional intertia-but we tend to favour a different answer. The reason epistemologists lavish so much attention on justification is that it plays a particularly central role in how we ought to guide our cognitive endeavours. Justification is the primary epistemic guide to judgement. Other things being equal, one ought to hold justified beliefs rather than unjustified beliefs. This sort of response strikes us as exactly right. Epistemology is a serious business-or at least, it can and should be. But if epistemology really is a serious business, then guiding reason is less than half the battle. Guiding our reason and judgement is important primarily because our beliefs so often play a decisive role in how we decide to intervene in the world. If epistemology is to be practically efficacious, then it must be capable of doing more than merely guiding our reason.