The United States Approach to Peace building in Afghanistan: Problems and Prospects (original) (raw)

A Failed US Peace Building Project in Afghanistan: Exploring Cause–Effect Relationship

This article argues that while the concept of peace building proved beneficial to Western society, it drew flak in pre-2014 Afghanistan for its inbuilt faults, the overarching US–Taliban conflict and the state failure towards meeting the prerequisites of the coalition strategy. It also argues that peace building in the immediate future of post-2014 Afghanistan is improbable due to the existing and likely conflicts between and among the Afghan government, the Taliban and the newly emerging Daesh or IS group for power, group and ideological domination. The given predicament, the article notes, is fraught with serious consequences for the war-haggard Afghans, their fragile country and its sensitive neighbourhood.

The Fail US-modeled Peace Reconciliation in Afghanistan

Oudom Oum , 2020

This study paper is attempted to profoundly examine the post-conflict case study of Afghanistan with the main argument that the US-modelled peace-reconciliation in post-Taliban Afghan society, which has been committed to injecting since the first invasion in 2001, is unachievable. Therefore, the main contains of this paper will try to figure out the brief historical development of conflicts, how the US fails to deliver peace to Afghanistan, more especially, the identification of the main root courses of the failure. This study also extends its argument upon the three main root causes rebuffing the two-decade peace settlement process, which are the poor US aftermath strategy, the tribal variable, as well as the external variable with the belief that the US was overwhelmingly miscalculating and underestimating the post-Taliban situations in Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taliban in Kabul, thus making peace so far and so hard to be achieved. The ultimate intention of this study paper is not merely to reflect the root causes of the failure, yet, aim to make a contribution of a greater progressive peace-settlement policy, explicitly providing a guiding indication for the next following researchers.

Peace-building after Afghanistan: Between Promise and Peril

Contemporary Security Policy, 2010

Engagement in various forms of peace-building has increased dramatically since the Cold War, yet what is the future of peace-building in the aftermath of the troubled intervention in Afghanistan? This article argues that while many Western and allied governments will feel chastened by the experience in Central Asia, their impulse to ‘do good’ internationally will not altogether disappear. Instead, to avoid manage the complexity of future interventions, intervening government may be tempted to reinvoke the traditional peace-building principles drawn from the 1990s – neutrality, consent-based operations, and the minimum use of force. Such a tendency, this article argues, is based on a flawed historical understanding of the experiences of the 1990s and underestimates what it takes to build peace after war. Dissecting the peace-building principles in light of more recent experiences with counterinsurgency, the article explores the full requirements for effective intervention in war-to-peace transitions. It then concludes by discussing what these requirements mean for those states that express interest in peace-building, but whose commitment and capabilities are often found lacking.

An Enduring Lesson from the History of Peacemaking in Afghanistan

International Studies 1–13 2020 Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2020

Peace processes offer opportune moments for social and political transformation in embattled nations. There is no perfect formula or peace recipe. As per the existing literature, the 'ripeness' of circumstances and timing of a peace process and pertinence of the 'substance' of settlements to the root causes of conflict are the main components of a viable peace agreement. In the past 30 years, Afghanistan experienced two unsuccessful peacemaking episodes: first after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the second following the removal of the Taliban in 2001. While failure of the former is primarily attributed to the complexities of circumstance at the time, ineptness of the latter is linked to the primacy of imposed deadlines over inclusive consultations and inadequacy of contents of the Bonn Agreement. By briefly examining substantive characteristics of peacemaking processes in the context of Najibullah's National Reconciliation Policy and the Bonn process, this article argues that meaningful structural change in favour of an inclusive and participatory political system and institutionalization of a regional balance of interests in foreign relations remain central to enduring peace in Afghanistan.

Lessons from Afghanistan’s post-9/11 “Peacebuilding Project”

à propos | The KOFF Peacebuilding Magazine, 2021

Peace is an integral concept in the discourses and practices of International Relations (IR). There are varying definitions and "perceptions" of peace, especially when it comes to the material and conceptual divide between the Global North and the Global South. It is important to acknowledge the contributions of discursive constructions of peace, along with their operational usage in policymaking that emanates from Western scholarship. However, for those suffering from conflict and violence on a daily basis, the "reality" of peace and the desire to survive supersedes the (western) "perceptions" and operational definitions. There is also an ideological divide between the Global North and South in understanding how conflicts are "resolved" on a local level, especially in traditional societies. One such case, where these differences in the perceptions and realities of peace and justice were evident in recent years, was Afghanistan. The (western) "peacebuilding project" in Afghanistan did introduce positive initiatives, such as democracy, education for all, and the inclusion of women in governance and decisionmaking processes. As a result, Afghanistan held several elections and, in 2015, adopted its first National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) based around the pillars of participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery. However, contrary to its own WPS (2019) strategy of prioritizing women in conflict, the US and its coalition

Only an Afghan-led peace process can bring peace to Afghanistan

2021

By analysing the US-Taliban deal and the United States-Afghan joint declaration, this SADF Focus sheds light on the current and upcoming role of the Afghan government in the intra-Afghan dialogue. It is argued that the Afghan authorities need to lead the intra-Afghan dialogue and the overall peace process. If any deal is achieved that excludes them, they will lose their remaining legitimacy, resulting in a further enhancement of the urban-rural divide. This would also give regional power sharing arrangements with local stakeholders and militant groups further momentum. Moreover, the process of institution building and public services delivery by non-governmental agents, especially the Taliban in areas under their direct control, will continue. Considering the current political crisis in Kabul, the authors highlight the need for the US to maintain an oversight role in the country, particularly a 'hands-on approach' in the negotiation between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities.

Afghanistan Peace Process: A Historical Analysis

2021

This paper focuses on peace efforts that have been made to bring peace in Afghanistan. The end of the conflict to bring durable peace drives from peaceful dialogues to create a winwin situation for all parties involved in the conflict. Afghanistan is a country that is in a warlike situation for the last 40 years. Thousands of men, women, children, and soldiers have been killed during this instability. The beginning of Peace Dialogues is a key step to bring durable peace in war-affected Afghanistan. Regional and International Powers are involved in the Afghan conflict. Washington, Beijing, Islamabad, and Kabul itself are the key players in the Afghan conflict. Lack of trust among all the stakeholders is the main hurdle on the way of durable peace. Internal Afghan rifts also put a big question mark for sustainable peace in Afghanistan. Taliban wants complete withdrawal of Foreign Forces. Pakistan is worried due to the Indian presence in its western border. Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have not been friendly as it was expected. China wants to explore minerals in Afghanistan and also does not like militancy in Afghanistan due to disturbances in Xinjiang Province. Washington considers the Afghan war a burden on its economy and the people of America are putting pressure on American leadership to pull out its troops from Afghanistan. Dialogue is the only solution to bring peace in Afghanistan. Peace can only prevail through a win-win situation for all stakeholders.

Afghanistan: In Search for an Alternative Route to Stability

Global Policy, 2017

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, while there were some successes in fighting international terrorists in the region, Western attempts at state-building in Afghanistan remain a dismal failure. After years of Western military involvement, the Taliban insurgency today shows no signs of operational decay or a possible defeat. This article argues that Western engagement in Afghanistan only prolongs civil strife and makes room for more radical elements such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) to gain a robust foothold in Afghanistan. Domestic conflicts, with the past involvement of the former Soviet Union and the ongoing Western intervention, have bruised and traumatized Afghan society. What the country now needs is a different form of political process that makes peace and reconciliation a top priority. A transition to a peace process will face multiple hurdles, but given their military and economic sacrifices in Afghanistan, the US and its allies should not flinch, but rather face the challenges boldly