The United States Approach to Peace building in Afghanistan: Problems and Prospects (original) (raw)

The US-led Afghan Peace Process has achieved a partial success. On political front, the US-led international supporters have helped Afghanistan in conducting national elections to transfer power democratically in the last twelve years. However, on economic and social levels, Afghans have lost more than it has gained in more than a decade. The paper is a modest attempt to investigate and analyse if the US approach to peacebuilding in Afghanistan contradicts general objectives of peacebuilding. Few important questions are being raised with regard to the US approach. Does the US faces a dilemma while dealing with the problems in Afghanistan and the larger security concerns in the region? If yes, is it because the premises that led to the invasion in Afghanistan in 2001 contradict the outcomes that the US experiences in these twelve long years in Afghanistan? If no, why did the US take such a long time to sort out Afghan problem? Why it has been trying hard, implicitly, to get Taliban onboard in the Afghan Peace Process? Why peacebuilding has not been successful? The research attempts to answer these questions. It also looks into whether the US really has a "replacement model" in general to implement whenever it needs to intervene in any country as it did in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. If so, what is its replacement model?