Modern Administration and the Integrity of the Article III Judicial Power (original) (raw)
Related papers
On Supreme Court Regulation; The Congressional Duty in Article III (2024)
As dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court grows, and calls for its reform continue to increase, it is clear from the most commonly-proposed solutions that Congress has abandoned its own reading of the Constitution and has ceded to the Supreme Court the unlimited power to re-write, or “interpret,” the Constitution in any manner the Court sees fit. Congress has allowed the Supreme Court to do this without any accountability whatsoever for the Court, and without the Court having to follow Article V amendment processes. With Congress having surrendered virtually absolute power to the Supreme Court for over two centuries, Supreme Court decisions determine the content of the Constitution, rather than the content of the Constitution determining Supreme Court decisions. Congress simply refuses to fulfill or acknowledge its Article III duty to regulate the Supreme Court. “On Supreme Court Regulation” combines research and political theory in examining how the Supreme Court functions, analyzing how that functioning has scant relationship to the duties assigned to the Court by the Constitution, and revealing how Congress has abrogated its duty to regulate the Supreme Court and prevent the concentration of power within the Judiciary. The system organized by the Constitution is compared herein with the judicial, political, social, and economic system created by the Supreme Court, which generally functions in direct contravention of the Constitution. The research and political theories presented in this project are not readily found elsewhere. It is possible they are available nowhere else, and certainly not all together in a single document. This information demonstrates the critical importance to Americans of understanding how radically different the United States would be—far more user-friendly, free, just, and isonomic—if the Supreme Court and Congress scrupulously followed the duties assigned them by the Constitution.
Academia.edu sent me this. While I don't necessarily agree with everything Poggi states -- even some of his basic arguments -- I think he sets forth good reasons for the American People's disillusionment with Article III courts. Indeed, its the same distate that Jesus expressed for hypocritical lawyers and judges when he chased them from the Temple. Its a long article, but very historically interesting. Here's is its Abstract: Abstract: As dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court grows, and calls for its reform continue to increase, it is clear from the most commonly-proposed solutions that Congress has abandoned its own reading of the Constitution and has ceded to the Supreme Court the unlimited power to re- write, or “interpret,” the Constitution in any manner the Court sees fit. Congress has allowed the Supreme Court to do this without any accountability whatsoever for the Court, and without the Court having to follow Article V amendment processes. With Congress having surrendered virtually absolute power to the Supreme Court for over two centuries, Supreme Court decisions determine the content of the Constitution, rather than the content of the Constitution determining Supreme Court decisions. Congress simply refuses to fulfill or acknowledge its Article III duty to regulate the Supreme Court. “On Supreme Court Regulation” combines research and political theory in examining how the Supreme Court functions, analyzing how that functioning has scant relationship to the duties assigned to the Court by the Constitution, and revealing how Congress has abrogated its duty to regulate the Supreme Court and prevent the concentration of power within the Judiciary. The system organized by the Constitution is compared herein with the judicial, political, social, and economic system created by the Supreme Court, which generally functions in direct contravention of the Constitution. The research and political theories presented in this project are not readily found elsewhere. It is possible they are available nowhere else, and certainly not all together in a single document. This information demonstrates the critical importance to Americans of understanding how radically different the United States would be—far more user- friendly, free, just, and isonomic—if the Supreme Court and Congress scrupulously followed the duties assigned them by the Constitution.
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