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The imagined scientist of science governance
Social Studies of Science
In this article, we introduce the concept of ‘the imagined scientist’. It inverts previous discussions of the public as an imagined community with a knowledge deficit, to examine imagined scientists representing an actor (or group of actors) with deficits in knowledge or concern about social issues. We study how Norwegian science policymakers, on the one hand, and biotechnologists and nanotechnologists, on the other, articulate and engage with social responsibility. The article identifies what we call ‘deficit trouble’, when there is poor alignment of the deficits of different imagined scientists, which may lead to a stalemate in the communication between science policymakers and scientists. We argue that ‘the imagined scientist’ can function as sensitizing concept for further studies of science governance across a range of topics, bringing into view how different deficit logics operate in science policy.
Mapping Social Responsibility in Science
This article employs the Foucauldian notion of 'political rationality' to map discussions and ideals about the responsibility of science toward society. By constructing and analyzing an archive of 263 journal papers, four political rationalities were identified: the Demarcation rationality, which aims to exclude the social from the scientific production in order to make it objective and thereby responsible; the Reflexivity rationality, which sees it as science's responsibility to let itself be guided by problems in society in choice of research focus and methods; the Contribution rationality, which insists that responsible science should live up to public demands for innovation and democracy; and the Integration rationality, which advocates that science should be co-constructed with societal actors in order to be socially responsible. While each rationality is distinct, the article argues that all of them address the issue of a boundary (or integration) between science and society. Hence, it is not possible for scientists to avoid 'a relationship' with society. The political question is how this relationship is to be defined and regulated.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2024
There is a growing concern for the proper role of science within democratic societies, which has led to the development of new science policies for the implementation of social responsibility in research. Although the very expression 'social responsibility of science' may be interpreted in different ways, many of these emerging policy frameworks define it, at least in part, as a form of anticipative reflection about the potential impacts of research in society. What remains a rather under-discussed issue is the definition of the bearer of the social responsibility of science. In other words, it is not clear who is supposed to engage in such an anticipative reflection, whether individual researchers or research groups. In the past few years, philosophers of science have begun to use qualitative research methods to fill the gaps between normative models of the organisation of ideal scientific communities and the reality of actual scientific practices. In this article, I follow this approach to discuss the issue of the collective dimension of the social responsibility of science. I rely on a qualitative study conducted on an interdisciplinary research group and I describe how group dynamics position individuals and distribute duties and roles, including social responsibility. Qualitative descriptions of the distribution of duties within actual research groups should inform the formulation of general prescriptive theories on the collective responsibility of science.
Social responsibility of science
Journal of Education Culture and Society, 2019
This article tackles the problem of social involvement by academics and researchers. The author defines social responsibility widely as the involvement of knowledge, academics and educational institutions in solving the problems of the local community. The concept predicts that this can come about not only by disseminating research results, but also by involvement in pro-social activity without loss of autonomy. The author shows that this can be a way of building trust in science, as well as being a tool in opposing the anti-science culture. It can also be a means of rebuilding the status of science in a world of information bubbles and fake news.
Introduction: Science and public policy - relations in flux
Handbook on Science and Public Policy, 2019
This Handbook on Science and Public Policy will capture a landscape in flux: the relation between science and society has been changing in the last decades, and it has become a hot topic in the science system and in science policy studies. Even though historically the topic is not new, it seems that the roles of science and innovation are being debated more explicitly: the demand for science-based innovation is growing while the legitimation of scientific research is being questioned. Scientific knowledge is hailed as a significant societal and economic resource in global competition. Innovations emerging from science are considered to be the key to market success and prosperity. At the same time, scientific knowledge and research-based innovation are supposed to address so-called grand societal challenges and help achieve 'sustainable development goals' (United Nations 2015). Yet, there is also pressure to legitimise the increasing amounts of public funding for research worldwide. And the questions 'how does society benefit from science?' and 'which research is "relevant" and "useful"?' are raised emphatically. The changing relationship between science and society significantly challenges science policy: research is expected to foster and support innovation not only via new technologies but also in a way which is socially acceptable and sustainable. Moreover, it is expected to develop new instruments, methods and practices for its own accountability and legitimation that are accepted by the scientific community. This is where this Handbook comes in. It focuses on how science policy has changed over the last decades and raises several overarching questions: What are the consequences of changing science policies for science and the science systems nationally and internationally? How far do they go? Do they tackle the fundamental principles of science, its norms, standards and reputation systems? And what does this mean for modern science (and technology)? The chapters of the Handbook provide different answers from a broad range of theoretical and conceptual perspectives. As a guideline we assume an interlinked model between science and science policy, in which science policy influences the structures and
Speak No Evil: Scientists, Responsibility, and the Public Understanding of Science
2010
In this paper, I will discuss the responsibilities that scientists have for ensuring their work is interpreted correctly. I will argue that there are three good reasons for scientists to work to ensure the appropriate communication of their findings. First, I will argue that scientists have a general obligation to ensure scientific research is communicated properly based on the vulnerability of others to the misrepresentation of their work. Second, I will argue that scientists have a special obligation to do so because of the power we as a society invest in them as specialists and professionals. Finally, I will argue that scientists ought to ensure their work is interpreted correctly based on prudential, self-interested considerations. I will conclude by offering suggestions regarding policy considerations.
The Politics of the “Autonomy of Science”
2023
The trials and tribulations of the “autonomy of science” have a long history: from Galileo’s entanglements with the Roman Church through the short-lived “Aryan physics” to a recent episode of an American president telling scientists how to cure a viral disease. Autonomy is the ability of a profession to control every aspect of its affairs, based on rules it has authored, without external interference. In this paper, I argue three points: 1) science’s autonomy is rooted in its specialized knowledge from which it derives the norms that, in principle, govern scientific life; this cognitive means of production enables science to be in complete control of the creative phase of its work-process, its “puzzle-solving” (Kuhn) activities; 2) to understand both the limits of science’s autonomy and of the lay world’s control over science, I distinguish between the former’s expert knowledge and the latter’s common social knowledge (lay knowledge), the beliefs, values, ideologies (political, religious, social) we all acquire by growing up in a given cultural environment and on which we depend to live our daily lives; 3) science is being ‘interfered’ with when the criteria used to manage its affairs are based on common social knowledge instead of on its own specialized knowledge; thus, contrary to conventional accounts, the ‘encroachment’ need not come from some outside agent (as exemplified above), whose actions, by definition, are informed by common social knowledge, but also from within the scientific community itself. The empirical evidence used to support these arguments consists of current cases that reveal which areas of science’s activities are ‘at risk’ of being controlled by lay knowledge and which are ‘immune’ to them.
Academic and social responsibility of scientists
‘Science Agenda – Framework for Action’, a document endorsed at the International Council for Science (ICSU) and UNESCO’s ’World Conference on Science’ in 1999, recommends that ‘the basic ethical principles and responsibilities of science’ be an integral part of the education and training of all scientists and engineers. However, within this document it is not clearly defined what exactly is to be understood by the phrase ‘the basic ethical principles and responsibilities of science’. The aim of this article is to characterise a possible meaning of this phrase, emphasising the academic and social responsibility of individual scientists and engineers. In doing so, a model is presented and used. The model suggests that the ethics of science concerns three interacting levels: a normative level where ethical principles of science are set up, discussed, and justified; an individual level where the ethical principles are translated into responsible actions of individual scientists and eng...