What's Wrong with Speciesism (original) (raw)
Related papers
Speciesism, anti-speciesism and animal rights
European Federation of Animal Science Newsletter, 2019
Introduced by Ryder in 1970 1 , "speciesism" is defined as a form of discrimination based on species. This concept echoes racism and sexism. First formulated to show the superiority (i.e., the superior rights) that humans attribute to themselves compared to other animals, speciesism then took on board the differences that people attribute to other species. These species differences are based on multiple criteria such as body size, culture, proximity, utility. Whilst we mostly do not like invertebrates compared to vertebrates, we still have preferences inside this taxon, as we love bees but hate wasps 2. Another instance is based on food culture. It is difficult, and even impossible, for Europeans to eat dogs, yet they eat pork. However, these two species are comparable at multiple levels such as body size, longevity or intelligence. Developing these ideas, Peter Singer 3 questions the consideration humans should give to animals as well as the criteria that could assess whether one species should prevail over another one. Peter Singer stipulated that "all animals are equal". This is not a factual equality between animals, human included, but an equality based on rights. Indeed, humans are not factual equals among themselves, they differ in several ways, but we treat them in the same way and give them the same rights. Peter Singer is not only talking here about skin color, sexual orientation or cultural difference and body size between humans, he is talking about real human differences, for example handicapped or injured persons. These persons, despite lacking sensory awareness and consciousness, and no longer suffering continue to have the same rights as other humans. Peter Singer then asks why humans should not behave in the same way with other animals. Peter Singer's views on equal consideration Even if Peter Singer argues for an animal equality, he differentiates between equal consideration based on interests and equality of treatment or equality of lives. Indeed, animals do not all have the same interests. It is a Simple fact that a bird has an interest in flying whilst a fish has an interest in swimming. However, all animals, or at least all vertebrates, have an interest in not suffering. Following this principle, if a mouse suffers or feels pain as strongly as a human feels it, why should we make painful biomedical experiments on this mouse whilst we would not use humans for the same purpose? This is how Peter Singer defines equal consideration of interests. Equal consideration of interests (such as not suffering) is not the same as equality of lives for animal philosophers. Peter Singer suggests that the life of an animal which is self-aware, capable of complex thinking, of a theory of mind (the ability to attribute mental states-beliefs, intents, emotions, knowledge-to oneself and to others), to think about the future and to communicate, etc., is more valuable than the life of an animal without all these capacities. Peter Singer gives the argument of marginal cases. Think about a comatose human, who will never regain consciousness, who feels no pain and who unfortunately will do nothing more in his or her lifetime: why should one not do biomedical experiments on this person instead of on a conscious and sensitive macaque? Here Peter Singer does not encourage biomedical experiments on comatose humans but wants to illustrate the moral schizophrenia of humankind and to define
The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances
Animals , 2019
This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant ('species-relativism'). Third, if we adopt Singer's definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions-the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests-is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant.
Routledge Handbook of American Science, 2022
This chapter introduces topical issues in the ethical debate on speciesism. It does so against a background of the history of the debate and with an emphasis on concerns that arise at the intersection of speciesism and science. The term speciesism was coined in the 1970s by Richard Rider and popularized by Peter Singer, who defined speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” Critiques of speciesism are undergirded by the principle that comparable interests should be given equal consideration, regardless of species-membership. To what extent the interests of humans and non-humans are comparable, however, has been a matter of contention and is partly beholden to empirical findings. Diverging opinions on this matter have given rise to a variety of more and less species-egalitarian views, often paired with rivalling accounts of “moral status”. A minority of ethicists have explicitly defended speciesism or some version thereof, including Bernard Williams and, more recently, Shelly Kagan. Apart from the back-and-forths between critics and defenders, the speciesism debate has transformed over the last decade, in three respects. First, discourse on animal ethics has witnessed a “political turn”, moving away from analyses of moral status and towards discussions of human-animal relations in interspecies societies. Secondly, apart from anthropocentric speciesism, i.e., privileging humans over non-humans, there has been an increasing interest in non-anthropocentric speciesism, i.e., privileging some non-human species over others. Thirdly, speciesism has been endorsed as a prominent topic in the new, activist-leaning research field of Critical Animal Studies, and has recently garnered substantial attention from psychologists. As these disciplinary changes and conceptual refinements suggest, half a century after its coinage, speciesism continues to be an important scholarly and ethical concept whose history is still in the making.
Does Being Human Matter Morally? Five Correctives to the Speciesism Debate
This article argues for five correctives to the current ethical debate about speciesism, and proposes normative, conceptual, methodological and experimental avenues to move this debate forward. Firstly, it clarifies the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests and points out limitations of its scope. Secondly, it disambiguates between ‘favouritist’ and ‘species-relative’ views about moral treatment. Thirdly, it argues that not all moral intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. Fourthly, it emphasizes the importance of empirical research to corroborate statements about ‘folk speciesism’. Fifthly, it disambiguates between the moral significance of species and the moral status of their individual members. For each of these issues, it is shown that they have either been overlooked, or been given inapt treatment, in recent contributions to the debate. Building on the correctives, new directions are proposed for ethical inquiry into the moral relevance of species and...
Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics: A Conversation Against Speciesism
Ethics & Behavior, 1993
It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual's characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one's understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans.
Speciesism as a Variety of Anthropocentrism
In what follows I shall argue that speciesism is in fact a variety of anthropocentric prejudice. But appeals to the important bond that we share with other humans ('our shared humanity' in terms familiar from Raimond Gaita) need not always involve such prejudice. Such appeals can function as part of a rejection of practices such as intrusive animal experimentation on the grounds that we humans have (in all sorts of ways) misused and mistreated non-humans to such an extent that we have now lost any moral authority to sacrifice their interests in the name of some greater overall good. And what is appealed to here, as well as our shared humanity, is a history of our human mistreatment and its connection to the moral authority to harm for a reason. An argument constructed along these lines might not work if we regard our connection to a shared and abusive human history as an insufficiently weighty consideration when set against the utilitarian advantages of the experimental system. I do not happen to think that it is insufficiently weighty, but others might disagree. Either way, the more importance that we accord to a connection to harm that is established through our shared humanity, the weightier a consideration this connection will become.
The Scope of the Argument from Species Overlap
The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This paper intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (“the argument from marginal cases”) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The paper claims that the argument questions not only those defenses of anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities believed to be typically human, but also those that appeal to special relations between humans. This means the scope of the argument is far wider than has been thought thus far. Finally, the paper claims that, even if the argument cannot prove by itself that we should not disregard the interests of nonhuman animals, it provides us with strong reasons to do so, since the argument does prove that no defense of anthropocentrism appealing to non-definitional and testable criteria succeeds.
Animal Rights v Humanism: The Charge of Speciesism
The present article examines a concern I have had for some time about the compatibility of humanistic psychology with the emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my position, the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political purpose of bringing animal rights issues to the attention of humanistic psychologists.
THE HUMAN AND THE BEAST. Exploring the Systemic Dimension of Speciesism.
THE HUMAN AND THE BEAST. Exploring the Systemic Dimension of Speciesism., 2019
Animal welfare and the question of animal rights have lately become an unavoidable societal, cultural and political issue in many countries. The term speciesism constitutes a useful conceptual framework in the analysis of the problems related to the way most societies exclude nonhuman animals from their moral circle. However, the concept still needs further theoretical development, and no consensus has been reached yet when it comes to the definition of speciesism. This thesis contributes to the academic discussion by providing an exploration of speciesism as a system. It will argue that the dominant definitions have mostly relied on an individually-based understanding of speciesism, therefore often omitting its systemic dimension that transcends individual responsibility. After having emphasized the influence of a deeply culturally rooted speciesist value system, it demonstrates the extent to which speciesism also operates as a system nourished, supported and legitimized by cultural, institutional, and economic subsystems. The research leads to the working definition of speciesism as a system of advantage based on the species and invites to rethink the solutions against speciesism. Indeed, it will make obvious the fact that fighting against speciesism requires holistic, systemic solutions, tackling not only individual beliefs and behaviors but also the cultural, political and economic forms of speciesism.