The meaning of the transcendental in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl (original) (raw)
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Some differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of transcendental philosophy
Continental Philosophy Review, 2008
This article compares the differences between Kant's and Husserl's conceptions of the ''transcendental.'' It argues that, for Kant, the term ''transcendental'' stands for what is otherwise called ''metaphysical,'' i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed to his predecessors, who had believed that such nonempirical knowledge was possible for metaphysical , i.e. transcendent objects, Kant's contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects, but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl's phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself-reflection upon ''pure'' consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant's pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of pure subjectivity can also be called ''transcendental'' in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl's philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical work. Hence, there ends up
The Sense of the Transcendental in Kant and in Husserl
HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES, 2018
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Husserl Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology The Ethics of the Transcendental
Ferrarello, S. (2020). "The Ethics of the Transcendental". In Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. , 2020
In this paper I will investigate the ethical implications that Kant's and Husserl's notions of the transcendental exert on the meaning-giving activity of one's life. Hence, the paper will focus first on how Kant arrived at his view of the transcendental as a bridge between being and meaning; second, the paper will show the Kantian heritage in Husserl and describe how Husserl's interpretation of the transcendental facilitates an understanding of it as fully based on the ethical commitment expressed by the epoché and reduction. The aim of this comparison is first to clarify whether or not Kant's and Husserl's philosophical use of the transcendental invites an individualistic ethical attitude in relation to the constitution of meanings within the life-world; second, the goal is to see if our affective, emotional, in one word interpretive answer, to the tran-scendental rule triggers in humans a way to interpret reality that emphasizes the separation more than the interconnectedness of reality itself.
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of " the transcendental " has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl's " transcendental turn " , although significantly altering Kant's original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty's subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions — from Kant's " transcendentalism of faculties " , through Husserl's " transcendentalism of pure consciousness " , to Merleau-Ponty's " transcendentalism of the flesh " — arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist " thought style ". In the final section , we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the " truth of naturalism " , while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (" transcendentalizing ") nature.
On Kant and Husserl on transcendental logic
Synthese, 2020
It is well known that the notion of transcendental logic has a prominent role in both Kant's and Husserl's theories of knowledge. The main aim of the present paper is to study the links between formal and transcendental logic in Husserl on the one hand, and the links between general logic and transcendental logic in Kant on the other. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental logic and general logic in Kant's philosophy. By means of our definition of transcendental logic, mainly drawn from Husserl's analyses, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of Kant's view.
In the paper we have attempted to consider Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophizing and the new transcendental paradigm, which differs from both the ‘object’ metaphysics of Antiquity and ‘subject’ metaphysics of the Modern Age (transcendent — transcendental — immanent metaphysics). For this purpose we shall introduce the methodological terms ‘transcendental shift’ and ‘transcendental perspective’. The basis for such representation of transcendentalism is the cognitive and semantic reading of the Critique and theory of ‘two aspects’. While in classical metaphysics cognition is interpreted as a relation between empirical subject and object, in transcendental metaphysics (perspective) ‘possible experience’ (Erfahrung) shall be understood as a relation between ‘consciousness generally’ (transcendental subject) and ‘thing-in- general’ (transcendental object). In this, Kant’s transcendentalism, in contrast to classical contemplative metaphysics, acts as an ‘experimental’ metaphysics and the transcendentality is defined as the intermediate between the immanent and transcendent ontological area (as a “instrumental” component of our cognition).
Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism
2008
Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl's overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is 'countersensical'in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification.