TRANSHUMANISM AND THE WISDOM OF OLD GENES: IS NEUROTECHNOLOGY A SOURCE OF FUTURE HAPPINESS (original) (raw)

The Discussion about the Universality of Happiness and the Promise of Neuroscience

The main aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion about the universality of well-being by juxtaposing the theoretical and empirical arguments of the two extreme theoretical positions regarding the possibility of a universal no-tion of well-being. The article first explains that the question about the possibility of a universal notion of well-being is ultimately a matter of the (differences in the) nature of well-being. While researchers who opt for the universalist position are convinced that their empirical data show that the differences in the nature of well-being are minor enough that a universal notion is possible, the proponents of the culturalist position believe that their research uncovers more dramatic differences in the nature of well-being. Therefore, they reject a universal notion of well-being. By reading one position against the other on theoretical and empirical levels, the article illuminates and assesses the limitations, problems and possible dangers of both and considers which position regarding the possibility of a universal notion of well-being seems more convincing (and possibly less dangerous). The article concludes that currently the culturalist position seems more reasonable, as long as it remains open to a possible discovery of a more universal structure in the nature of well-being promised by the emerging field of neuroscience of happiness.

Happiness Issue -Moral Aspects of its Biochemical Enhancement

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae, 2021

The search for happiness is something that constitutes human existence from its beginning, and even though people have achieved unimaginable progress in science and technologies, they still have not found the secret of being happy. Transhumanist authors, headed by Mark Walker, believe we can reach happiness biochemically using specific drugs and without considerable side effects. They consider it to be our moral duty because it would increase the prosocial behaviour of people enhanced in that way, following research showing that the happier people are, the more useful it is for society. In this paper, we critically respond to the vision of biochemical enhanced happiness (bio-happiness). We follow the classic and modern authors in our analysis of what happiness is, and based on this analysis, we want to demonstrate why the biochemical enhancement of happiness is not a moral imperative these days. On the contrary, we offer the reasoning why such a vision of bio-happiness is not morally right, and why it bears the risk of losing the connection between happiness and finding the meaningfulness of life. We critically evaluate the absence of spirituality in the transhumanist understanding of man and the devaluation of her/his intrinsic values.

Human Flourishing, Joy, and the Prospect of Radical Life Extension

The prospect of human enhancement through the use of genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology is generating increasing interest in academic and commercial circles. Responses to human enhancement technology are derived from, and therefore may illuminate, underlying notions of what human flourishing ought to look like. Miroslav Volf's anatomy of joy is used to compare representative understandings of the good life from transhumanist and secular humanist perspectives as they correspond to attitudes concerning human enhancement, particularly the question of radical life extension. The argument is advanced that a joyful Christian vision of the good life, which answers both the secular humanist respect for creaturely finitude and the transhumanist hope for glorious transformation, possesses strong normative potential for academic teaching and discourse as we contemplate the future of human being.

Beyond therapy and enhancement: The alteration of human nature

NanoEthics, 2008

With the rapid progress and considerable promise of nanobiotechnology/neurosciences there is the potential of transforming the very nature of human beings and of how humans can conceive of themselves as rational animals through technological innovations. The interface between humans and machines (neurodigital interface), can potentially alter what it means to be human, i.e., the very idea of human nature and of normal functioning will be changed. In this paper, I argue that we are potentially on the verge of a paradigm shift in terms of the ends and goals of techno-science and its applications in the biomedical sciences. In particular, the development of brain-computer interfaces could reconceptualize the very notion of what it means to be human. Hence, we should not limit our reflections of applications in terms of therapy and enhancement but also include an examination of applications aiming at the alteration of human nature. To this end I will first delineate the potential paradigm shift and then map out four distinct clusters of concerns in relation to the brain-computer interface. Finally, I argue that our moral and philosophical reflections should follow a procedural model based on managed consensus due to our pluralistic context.

Scientific Answers to the Timeless Philosophical Question of Happiness

This chapter aims to serve as an introduction to the science of happiness, by providing a catalogue of the main questions that have been posed about the topic across millennia. I cover the various answers that have been offered to these questions, by philosophers and more recently by research psychologists. The chapter starts with the questions of what happiness is and how it can be measured, after which I turn to explore the possibility, desirability, and justifiability of happiness. The last portion of the chapter is devoted to the perennial question of how to be happy.

Title: Affectivity and the Mechanization of Living Organisms

There is a contemporary enthusiasm for the mechanistic conception of things. This enthusiasm is expressed across different domains by transhumanism, artificial intelligence, computation, mechanisms, industrialization, etc. Considering this enthusiasm, it might be assumed that an organic conception is either settled or outdated. However, it is far from being the case. When it comes to the human organism, the analogy or metaphor of a computational machine is often presupposed. In this case, what distinguishes a mechanical system from an organic system? Is cognition dependent or independent of the living world? Is there continuity or discontinuity between neurocognitive systems and living systems? My goal is to review the situation regarding the study of neurocognition in relation to the living world and to analyze the plausibility of affectivity as the feature of life. Therefore, my investigation covers the fields of neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy of mind. First, I establish an overview of the study of neurocognition with its prominent approaches. Afterwards, I analyze affectivity which seems to be a relevant proposition in order to distinguish mechanical systems from organic systems. Through my investigation, I esteem being able to provide an enlightening portrait of the field of neurocognition in connection with life.