Bernard Williams As A Philosopher of Ethical Freedom (original) (raw)
Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical '-isms'. All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought-its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum-still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons; the relativism of distance; and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously under-determine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams' ethical philosophy taken as a whole.