Russia: Putin the Historian (original) (raw)
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Transcultural Studies, 2013
In spite of its rich energy resources and strategic location, and in spite of the declared commitment to further liberal reforms by politi-cal leaders, Russia seems to be experiencing some transition and de-velopmental problems. Economic growth is uneven and relatively slow (compared with other BRICS and oil/gas exporters). The Russian state remains centralistic, controlling, corrupt and inert. Russian politics is undergoing a retrogressive ‘authoritarian turn’ accompanied by a tightening of control over the media. The political competition for the top political offices is so skewed, the opposition so restricted, and the mass media so constrained, that the Freedom House no longer classi-fies Russia as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’. State patronage, protectionism and the taxation burden remain high, corruption is endemic, access to financing is limited – all constraining Russia’s development and pre-venting the advanced modernisation of the state, economy and society. These developments in...
Since the end of the Cold War Russia has been treated as a defeated state. Western countries usually perceive Russia not only as a defeated state but also relating it to Soviet Union. Beyond that the West has Orientalized Russia, segregating it from the “western club” of developed states. But Russia’s recovery from the collapse of the 90’s made it more assertive towards the West. It’s proposed here that this assertiveness is due to it’s orientalization, it’s inferior status perceived by the West. The inferior perception by the West has triggered a process of identity’s reconstruction which will be analyzed through a perspective of ontological security. The more Russia has it’s great power status denied, the more aggressive it becomes regarding it’s foreign policy. As the international hierarchy continues to treat Russia as that of “behind” the modern states, and the more it feels marginalized, it will double down on efforts to regain its great power status it will have to dispose power. Russia’s ontological insecurity might lead it to a path of aggressiveness.
Putin had a more modest foreign policy rhetoric and seemed to be far more pragmatic than Primakov during his first term of presidency. However, such conditions did not last long and Russian government chose a more assertive stance once political stability was ensured and economic growth showed signs of improvement. In the following article we have assumed that similar patterns of thinking and acting which have not been necessarily subject to considerable changes as a result of vibrant conditions can be found in Russian foreign policy. It seems as if guiding principles of foreign policy are deeply embedded in political culture of the country. Despite some tactical changes to compensate for country"s backwardness and economic difficulties as a historical tradition, Russians have never retreated from claiming the status of a globally recognized great power and international rule maker. In this article using descriptive-analytical method we have examined the following: "Despite domestic and international ups and downs, how can continuity in the rhetoric and action of Russian foreign policy since 2004 be explained?" Our hypothetical answer to this question is that: "Russian foreign policy has very deep ideational roots influencing the nature and identity of the state, which have been shaped through centuries by natural-geographical characteristics of the land, and historical and intellectual developments."
Russia's holistic development in contemporary World Politico- economics
Russia consists of the world attention in many respect say it social, institutional, economic, Political,geopolitical,hegemonic,military,climatic and so on. Russian elite has always transgressed approach to national identity building of Russia .Gender inequality in Russia has always been the gross problem since massive loss of life in Second world war . On June 22, 1941, Hitler’s Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union to initiate what would become the most brutal and costly war between two countries in history. The surprise attack on the woefully unprepared Red Army led to devastating losses for the Soviet Union in the early phase of the war: within the first six months, the Red Army had lost nearly 5 million men – the size of the Soviet Union’s entire prewar army – and had lost territory equal to the size of the United States between the East Coast and Springfield, Illinois (Glantz 2005). Almost after fall of Soviet Union Russia lost his credential in the world and unilateral world has gone to the US directional framework, after allit’s hard to deny Russian hegemony until it has maintained its military capacity. Although Russian position has one more advantage with its territorial adjustment which always raise the discourse of Eurasian politics and only because of this Russia’s geopolitical nature rules the whole diplomatic strategy all over the world either say BRICS or any other, as I don’t see Russia’s any relevance in BRICS more than to maintain geopolitical equilibrium, through which to have the hold over even on economic forum and also of strategic public diplomacy approach which helps to sustain its domestic politics. Russian political strength in the world context even Within Russian intellectual elite has this conflict been conceptualized and resulted in confrontation of different ideological trends. One of them, the Westernizing one, considers rights of the individual to be its corner stone. The former tradition embraces universal rights, the latter cultural relativism and national particularism. The first tendency pushes Russia towards the West while the second one results in Russia pursuing a policy of self-isolation. To put it short, Russia has always vacillated between self-isolation and openness to the outer world. A key element of all Russian history, which suffuses the nation's political culture, is the idea of a strong state authority, to which our “native-soil patriots” so love to appeal. This does not mean, however, that the seeds of liberal freedoms were eradicated from the national political culture; they were always there and remain so today. Rather, they are emerging from their suppression (Chugrov, 2000, 149 - 150).
The Montreal Review, 2017
Lilias Buchanan: Series of illustrations for Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilyich" *** Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first democratically elected President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, said, "In Russian history during the 20th century, there have been various periodsmonarchism, totalitarianism, Perestroyka, and finally, a democratic path of development. Each stage," Yeltsin noted, "had its own ideology [...] but now [the stage of the democratic path of development] we have none." Yeltsin's observation was correct. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia lost not only its empire and international influence, it lost its identity. For years, the communist ideology served for legitimization of the Russian political system and expansionism, it was a source of national pride and, even more importantly, a proof that Russians were an exceptional people. Russia prided itself on being the first country in the world to adopt and apply in practice Marxism-the most "humanist," most "advanced" social theory according to the communist propaganda. The 20th century was an era of great ideologies. Political ideologies such as communism, democracy, capitalism, provided the political regimes of the epoch with an idealized identity reflecting the features, qualities and the character of individual nations. For example, the Americans were proud and "exceptional" with their freedoms and democracy; French people were proud and exceptional with their republican and democratic values; Germans with their welfare capitalism, culture, and work ethic; Russians with their socialism. Political ideologies and the related to them national mythologies were a source of creative inspiration; they were both necessary for successful governing and dangerous; dangerous because historically, when a dominant political ideology is discredited, this alsways leads to a failure or change of the entire political system and order. And this exactly is what happened in Russia in the 1990s.
Russian politics and the Soviet past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism under Vladimir Putin
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2016
Evidence drawn from the intersection of historical memory and politics in Russia underline not only on-going framing battles over the Soviet past. The evidence suggests that the Kremlin is unwilling to develop and impose on society historical narratives which promote chauvinism, hypernationalism, and re-Stalinization. Although such an agenda has some support among incumbent elites and in society, it remains subordinate in terms of political influence as of early 2016. Instead, the regime is now extending support to groups in society and the political establishment which favor a critical assessment of the Soviet era, including Stalinism. This emerging criticism of the Soviet past serves a number of important goals of the leadership, including re-engagement with the West. To this end, the Kremlin recently approved new history textbooks critical of the Soviet past as well as a significant program that memorializes the victims of Soviet repressions. Yet the regime is unlikely to usher i...
GWU Russia Program Papers, 2023
It has long been noted that when public figures and politicians start talking obsessively about their country’s great “originality,” “special path,” or “unique mission in the world,” it is a sure sign they are facing mounting problems with forging a modern democratic polity, civic nation, and respectable international identity. Contemporary Russia is a case in point. Its new foreign policy doctrine, signed into law by President Vladimir Putin on March 31, 2023, is a truly remarkable document, as it has for the first time declared at the highest official level Russia’s civilizational uniqueness.