Hegel on the Difference between Social Normativity and Normativity of Right (original) (raw)
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Hegel’s theory of moral action, its place in his system and the ’highest’ right of the subject
G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Knowles, D. , 2010
there is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegel's social and political theories, the flavour of old-style 'apology' for his liberal credentials, as though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement. the main claim made in the following pages is that the critique of 'subjective' moralities is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. this paper will look to Hegel's mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegel's own conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative in the rational state.
Unravelling Hegel's Ethical Life in 'Philosophy of Right'
Unravelling Hegel's Ethical Life in 'Philosophy of Right', 2017
This paper attempts to deconstruct the idea of freedom and ethical life, and will look parts of the introduction and the first sixteen paragraphs (§ 142-157) of Part III of the Philosophy of Right. Guided by the following research question: to what extent does Hegel’s conception of ethical life (sittlichkeit) in his Philosophy of Right allow for subjective freedom?, this paper aims to analyse the extent to which ethical life leaves room for subjective freedom. In order to understand ethical life, we must first understand the concept of freedom in terms of positive and negative freedom, and objective and subjective will. This will be discussed in depth using the first and second part of Philosophy of Right, as well as how Part III is the dialectical synthesis of the former two parts and concretises the actuality of freedom in ethical life. Next, the paper will look into the influences of this concretisation of freedom, and how this contributes to an ethical life. Lastly, I will critically evaluate ethical life with the objective formulations of freedom as described by Hegel in order to see whether his normative project is idealistic.
My purpose in this article is not to offer any original insights into Hegel's ethics, but merely to provide a brief overview that draws upon the most reliable secondary sources. In order to help organize the material, I compare Hegel's views with the communitarian critique of liberalism. Following this, there is a brief account of the relation between Hegel's ethical and religious thought. Hegel's philosophy is one of reconciliation. He is both a follower of Kant and a sharp critic of Kant. With Kant, he affirms the idea of moral autonomy, that moral agency requires us to think for ourselves and impose moral obligations upon ourselves. Unlike Kant (at least as usually interpreted), however, he does not think that this means that the only motivation for moral behavior should be the will to do one's duty. Because of the antinomy of free will and determinism, Kant concluded that agency springs from a noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world. Hegel seeks to reconcile freedom with causal constraints in a form of compatibalism that differs fundamentally from the soft determinism of the empiricist tradition.
Grounding the normative framework of personhood in Hegel's "Rechtsphilosophie"
If we are to disregard the structural-logical implications of the syllogistic conception of the will outlined in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, then how are we to understand the continuing normative relevance of Abstract Right in Ethical Life? The normative framework which derives from the imperative; "be a person and respect others as persons" offers a suitable account of the basis and limits of legal freedom in modern society, and yet it remains unclear in Hegel how we are to conceptualise the normative grounding of this imperative such that it doesn't simply 'drop out' in Sittlichkeit?
2020
My purpose in this article is not to offer any original insights into Hegel's ethics, but merely to provide a brief overview that draws upon the most reliable secondary sources. In order to help organize the material, I compare Hegel's views with the communitarian critique of liberalism. Following this, there is a brief account of the relation between Hegel's ethical and religious thought. Hegel's philosophy is one of reconciliation. He is both a follower of Kant and a sharp critic of Kant. With Kant, he affirms the idea of moral autonomy, that moral agency requires us to think for ourselves and impose moral obligations upon ourselves. Unlike Kant (at least as usually interpreted), however, he does not think that this means that the only motivation for moral behavior should be the will to do one's duty. Because of the antinomy of free will and determinism, Kant concluded that agency springs from a noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world. Hegel seeks to re...
Hegel's criticism of morality has had a decisive influence in the reception of his thought. By general acknowledgement, while his writings support a broadly neo-Aristotelian ethics of self-actualization, his views on moral philosophy are exhausted by his criticisms of Kant, whom he treats as paradigmatic exponent of the standpoint of morality. My aim in this essay is to correct this received view and show that Hegel offers a positive argument about the nature of moral willing.
The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, + Addendum.pdf
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally self-given principles and maxims. Hegel also responds to the dichotomy between the individual agent and the social whole within which agents act. Hegel argues that this dichotomy is specious because human beings are fundamentally social practitioners and because neither social practices nor individual agents have priority over the other. There are no social practices without social practitioners and there are no social practitioners without social practices. Hegel’s response to this second dichotomy allows him to respond to the first one as well. The elaboration and specialization of natural needs and desires through exchange relations and the social division of labor transfigures the contents of those needs and desires into collectively self-given ends. The social practices producing this transfiguration and meeting these ends form the contents of implicit principles of right. These implicit principles are collectively self-given because they result from the social practices collectively developed to meet these needs. Only acts that are executed and accepted by an agent are free acts. This strong condition requires that an agent’s intentions correspond to the actual nature and consequences of his or her act. Since the aims, the principles, and the means of action are fundamentally social, these strong constraints entail that free action is possible only within a community which makes known its structure and the role of its members within it and their contribution to it, so that its members can act on the basis of that knowledge. Hegel’s theory of the state is a theory of a communal structure that makes such explicit, free action possible. In briefest compass, Hegel holds that laws are legitimate only insofar as they codify those practices that have been developed in order to achieve human freedom, and laws are obligatory only insofar as they are necessary for achieving human freedom. Hegel’s government is designed to codify and promulgate such laws. Hegel’s legislature is designed to make known to the citizens at large, through their corporate representatives, that laws have such a basis and how individual roles and actions fit within the community as a whole.
Inter-Subjectivity and Objective Spirit: Reciprocal Recognition in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
Hegel’s later works, such as the Philosophy of Right, are commonly argued as presenting a monological and self-relational concept of Spirit, a Spirit that no longer constitutes a form of inter-subjectivity. My aim in this article, contra this view, is to demonstrate that the dynamic of reciprocal recognition is not only present in the Philosophy of Right, but actually underlies most processes of actualization of Spirit in the spheres of abstract right, morality, and ethical life.
Hegelian Conscience as Reflective Equilibrium and the Organic Justification of Sittlichkeit
Hegel's Philosophy of Right: A Critical Guide, 2017
In this essay I analyze two of the major conceptions of justifi cation in the Philosophy of Right and unpack the relation between them. I argue that we should link Hegel's conception of conscience to the account of refl ective equilibrium introduced by John Rawls because Hegel's view of conscience contains the holism, as well as the back and forth between universal principles and individual judgments, that are central to the refl ective equilibrium account. In the transition from 'Morality' to ' Sittlichkeit ', Hegel switches the locus of justifi cation from the moral individual to the whole ensemble of social institutions of modern life. Th is system of institutions is justifi ed because of its organic, living structure characterized by the productive interplay of universal and particular ends. In contrasting these two models, my goal is to fi gure out just what Hegel thinks is wrong with the refl ective model and what is gained in the move to organic justifi cation. Th e main diff erence hinges on Hegel's orientation by action rather than by judgement , where the action-based organicism proves superior because it includes a public feedback process that supports a dynamic, self-correcting model of political justifi cation.