Greek-Turkish Relations (original) (raw)
Related papers
Turkish Studies, 2022
This paper aims to evaluate the state of Greek-Turkish relations in light of recent developments leading to the reconfiguration of Turkish foreign policy. Following twenty years of détente and relative calm in bilateral relations, the year 2020 witnessed two escalations in Greek-Turkish relations, one in March 2020 involving refugees and immigrants on the Greek-Turkish land border and another in August 2020 involving military vessels of the two countries. The refugee crisis and energy exploration and monetization efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean have raised tensions at a moment the political and institutional tools for the promotion of conflict resolution between Greece and Turkey linked to Turkey's EU membership perspective appear to be obsolete. This paper seeks an answer to the question whether structural or ideational factors played the most prominent role for the recent escalation of the Greek-Turkish disputes and which analytical framework can be more useful in light of the recent shifts in Turkish domestic and foreign policy and Turkey's relations with the West, as well as Greece's post-crisis ambition to reemerge as a regional actor in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
FROM GREY ZONES TO BLUE HOMELANDS: TALES OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS
Conference Proceedings - International Congress on Security, Peace and Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean - Çağ and Çukurova Universitities, 2022
The latest persistent period of tension between Greece and Turkey that has started effectively in 2019 is the first such period after the 1999 Helsinki EU Summit that ended a difficult decade. The 1990's tension built-up that resulted in a series of crises, 'hot' incidents and widespread mutual suspicion between the two states, was effectively annulled by the rapprochement that paved a difficult-albeit realistic-road for a final solution to the bilateral disputes, including the Cyprus issue. The long-term success of the venture, however, was heavily dependent on bold politics in both sides of the Aegean Sea and mutual concessions from all parties to the disputes. Less than twenty years later, the Aegean Sea and the east of the Mediterranean Sea are once again brewing new tensions, triggered by the old unresolved issues. In addition, as recent energy discoveries have put the area in the European energy map, a number of new problems have risen, and with the active involvement of several more players, including the area's regional powers, as well as western European states with regional interests, the situation has become significantly more complicated. The failure to follow through commitments in the post-Helsinki years, has resulted in the re-emergence of the Aegean Sea disputes and reinforced the deadlock in Cyprus. Today, the key parties are called upon handling the disputes, under far more complicated conditions than in 1999.
The recent thaw in bilateral Greek-Turkish relations is promising, yet insufficient for future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. The main reason lies in the prevalence of instrumental-strategic thinking on the part of both states. Neither Greece nor Turkey has approached the settlement of their disputes from a perspective that would imply an eagerness to build a collective identity based on the institutional norms of European international society as represented by the European Union. On the contrary, Europeanisation has not been an end in itself but a means for the materialisation of their preconceived national interests. The underlying motivation behind their attempts to reach a solution appears to have arisen from instrumental concerns vis-à-vis both the EU and each other. The dynamics of their independent relations with the European Union seem to have compelled them to come to a modus vivendi over these issues, since otherwise their relative status vis-à-vis the EU would likely deteriorate. This article will discuss the main aspects of the latest Turkish-Greek cooperation process within the framework of rationalist instrumentalist and sociological institutionalist debate in international relations theory. It will be contended that a lasting and long-term cooperation between the two countries can only follow the formation of collective identities and common national foreign policy interests, particularly as they relate to the European Union framework. The recent thaw in bilateral Greek-Turkish relations is promising, yet insufficient to ensure future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. In the middle of 1999, the two countries set into motion a cooperative interaction process and since then have succeeded in sorting out several thorny issues. Not surprisingly, the main platform on which they have undertaken this
BRIDGING THE GAPS: AN ALMANAC FOR GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION
Bridging the Gaps: An Almanac for Greek-Turkish Cooperation , 2021
This book is a labor of love inspired by the continuous interaction between young Greek and Turkish participants in numerous forums that the two editors have nurtured for close to a decade. In an international order dominated by hostility, distrust and negative stereotypes, dialogues across borders are a positive response. The conflict between Greece and Turkey is considered one of the most complex conflicts in Europe, and possibly beyond. For decades, the bilateral strife has repeatedly led insecurity as well as periodic violence and war. Also, in this part of the world, the past weighs heavily on the present. What happened long ago determines what happens today and may stand in the way of a peaceful future, or even in imagining one. Conflicts bedevil the bilateral relationship on multiple fronts. As in other cross-border rivalries, we are witnesses to dynamic developments as new contentious issues have emerged to complicate the agenda. With an eye on what the two sides can do together; this book presents original research co-written by at least one Greek and one Turkish scholar with the objective to provide policy recommendations that could help in bridging the gaps to enhance Greek-Turkish dialogue and cooperation.
How Encouraging is the Latest Turkish-Greek Reconciliation Process
The main contention of this article is that the recent thaw in bilateral Greek-Turkish relations is promising yet insufficient for future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. To the surprise of commited observers of Turkish-Greek relations, the two countries set in motion a cooperative interaction process in mid-1999 and since then have succeeded in sorting out some problematical isssues. Unsurprisngly however, the main platform for this painful exercise has been Turkey's EU accession process as well as Greece's continuing efforts to catch up with the latest stage of the EU integration process. Taking stock of these processes of Europeanisation in the two countries, some observers have rushed to conclude that these are irreversible and that as long as both countries maintain their aspirations to further 'Europeanise', neither the Cyprus dispute nor the Aegean problems would remain unresolved. However, as this article will argue below, there is little justification for this vague optimism about the future, which reflects the prevalence of instrumental-strategic thinking on both shores of the Aegean Sea. Neither Greece nor Turkey has approached the settlement of the disputes from an ideational perspective, whereby their resolution would be seen as a legitimate and appropriate goal in the age of globalisation. On the contrary, they appeared to regard the resolution of these disputes as necessary within the context of their relations with the European Union. Turkey has implicitly threatened to embroil Greece in conflicts in and around the Aegean sea, in order to discourage any Greek attempts to block Turkey's route to Brussels by constantly Europeanising Turkish-Greek disputes. Greece on the other hand has adopted a facilitative conditionality policy towards Turkey by appearing to support Turkey's EU membership on the condition (and in the hope) that Turkey would show greater flexibility on resolving the Aegean and Cyprus disputes in ways more favourable to Greece.