What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and "Kinding in Progress" (original) (raw)
Related papers
Looking for episodic memory in animals and young children: Prospects for a new minimalism
Neuropsychologia, 2009
Because animals and young children cannot be interrogated about their experiences it is difficult to conduct research into their episodic memories. The approach to this issue adopted by Clayton and Dickinson [Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays. Nature, 395, 272-274] was to take a conceptually minimalist definition of episodic memory, in terms of integrating information about what was done where and when [Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving, & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory (pp. 381-403). New York: Academic Press], and to refer to such memories as 'episodic-like'. Some claim, however, that because animals supposedly lack the conceptual abilities necessary for episodic recall one should properly call these memories 'semantic'. We address this debate with a novel approach to episodic memory, which is minimalist insofar as it focuses on the non-conceptual content of a re-experienced situation. It rests on Kantian assumptions about the necessary 'perspectival' features of any objective experience or re-experience. We show how adopting this perspectival approach can render an episodic interpretation of the animal data more plausible and can also reveal patterns in the mosaic of developmental evidence for episodic memory in humans.
Elements of episodic-like memory in animals
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2001
A number of psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon and, until recently, there was little evidence that animals could recall a unique past experience and respond appropriately. Experiments on food-caching memory in scrub jays question this assumption. On the basis of a single caching episode, scrub jays can remember when and where they cached a variety of foods that di¡er in the rate at which they degrade, in a way that is inexplicable by relative familiarity. They can update their memory of the contents of a cache depending on whether or not they have emptied the cache site, and can also remember where another bird has hidden caches, suggesting that they encode rich representations of the caching event. They make temporal generalizations about when perishable items should degrade and also remember the relative time since caching when the same food is cached in distinct sites at di¡erent times. These results show that jays form integrated memories for the location, content and time of caching. This memory capability ful¢ls Tulving's behavioural criteria for episodic memory and is thus termed`episodic-like'. We suggest that several features of episodic memory may not be unique to humans.
2014
Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating Tulving's chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion.
Memory: An Extended Definition
Frontiers in Psychology
Recent developments in science and technology point to the need to unify, and extend, the definition of memory. On the one hand, molecular neurobiology has shown that memory is largely a neuro-chemical process, which includes conditioning and any form of stored experience. On the other hand, information technology has led many to claim that cognition is also extended, that is, memory may be stored outside of the brain. In this paper, we review these advances and describe an extended definition of memory. This definition is largely accepted in neuroscience but not explicitly stated. In the extended definition, memory is the capacity to store and retrieve information. Does this new definition of memory mean that everything is now a form of memory? We stress that memory still requires incorporation, that is, in corpore. It is a relationship-where one biological or chemical process is incorporated into another, and changes both in a permanent way. Looking at natural and biological processes of incorporation can help us think of how incorporation of internal and external memory occurs in cognition. We further argue that, if we accept that there is such a thing as the storage of information outside the brain-and that this organic, dynamic process can also be called "memory"then we open the door to a very different world. The mind is not static. The brain, and the memory it uses, is a work in progress; we are not now who we were then.
The Evolution of Episodic-Like Memory: The Importance of Biological and Ecological Constraints
Biology & Philosophy, 2021
A persisting question in the philosophy of animal minds is which nonhuman animals share our capacity for episodic memory (EM). Many authors address this question by primarily defining EM, trying to capture its seemingly unconstrained flexibility and independence from environmental and bodily constraints. EM is therefore often opposed to clearly context-bound capacities like tracking environmental regularities and forming associations. The problem is that conceptualizing EM in humans first, and then reconstructing how humans evolved this capacity, provides little constraints for understanding the evolution of memory abilities in other species: it defines "genuine" EM as independent from animals' evolved sensorimotor setup and learning abilities. In this paper, I define memory in terms of perceptual learning: remembering means "knowing (better) what to do in later situations because of past experience in similar earlier situations". After that, I explain how episodic memory can likewise be explained in terms of perceptual learning. For this, we should consider that the information in animals' ecological niches is much richer than has hitherto been presumed. Accordingly, instead of asking "given that environmental stimuli provide insufficient information about the cache, what kind of representation does the jay need?" we ask "given that the animal performs in this way, what kind of information is available in the environment?" My aim is not to give a complete alternative explanation of EM; rather, it is to provide conceptual and methodological tools for more zoocentric comparative EM-research.