Stoic Providence: Cosmology and Ethics United (original) (raw)
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Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2022
Providence is an important idea in Stoicism, but modern scholarship overlooks this topic because of its historical association with theology. The modern scholarly debate focuses more on fate because of its relevance in philosophical debate. Bernard Collette aims to study this important concept in Stoicism and argues the importance of providence for the Stoic philosophers since it is found in all three parts of Stoic philosophy: physics, logic, and ethics.
Review of Sharon Weiss on B Collette the stoic doctrine of providence
The Classical Review, 2022
Everyone recalls Protagoras' story in Plato's eponymous dialogue: it relates Epimetheus' failed repartition of features to each animal species, followed by Prometheus' attempt to correct his brother's negligent design. This story, albeit relating an absence of thoughtful design, as human beings are notably left without any attributes, lays out some central features of the ancient notion of providence. As the story tells, the planned repartition of powers to different animal species aims at ensuring their survival. The idea is thus of an intelligent force which, by dint of its ability to plan in advance, ensures (or at least should ensure) the survival of the world and of the species it contains. If we were to rewrite the story according to C.'s reading of the Stoic contribution to this vast topic, the gift of the planning-ahead intelligence to human beings would have been that of an impulse towards themselves (oikeiôsis), in addition to the special status granted by their sharing in reason. The stress on the linkage between providence and oikeiôsis, i.e. appropriation or familiarisation, constitutes C.'s most original contribution in this study that aims at retracing the development of the Stoics' notion of providence from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. Oikeiôsis not only constitutes the necessary condition for the preservation of life, as it accounts for human beings' and other animals' tendency towards their own preservation, but it also applies to God and, as such, accounts for the way in which providence extends down to the world and to each individual human being. Eight chapters (from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius) lead to the discussion of this twin thesis concerning the relationship between providence and oikeiôsis. C. first identifies in Hierocles an argument to the effect that self-preservation in all animals, including the most repulsive ones, is the product of providence, which endows them with adaptation towards themselves. This argument, he claims, is an attack launched against the Epicurean account of life preservation. As providence delegates its own power to human beings in the form of a daimôn, the individual care of the self ultimately goes back to the providential governance of the world. Next, C. shows that cosmic oikeiôsis applies not only to the world but also to individual human beings. Since individual human souls are perceived as detached parts of the world, god not only perceives what happens in the soul of individual human beings, but he also has a natural impulse and concern towards each of them. C. starts the history of Stoic providence with Zeno's identification of Plato's demiurge with nature and his refusal of conceiving god separated from the world, which resulted in a biological model of creation. Next, C. presents Cleanthes as departing from Zeno in holding that god is not the only causal factor in the cosmos. With a view to shielding god from the responsibility of evil doings, Cleanthes restricted god's providence. Chapter 3 discusses the extant fragments of Chrysippus' On providence. According to C.'s reconstruction, the first book defended the idea that conflagration does not imply that god is the cause of destruction, as it consists in a withdrawing of Zeus into providence and Book 4 focused on the problem of evil, maintaining the inseparability of good and evil and viewing non-moral disadvantages as necessary consequences of a well-planned order. The next two chapters embark on Middle Stoicism. C. accounts for Panaetius' denial of the destructibility of the world, for his view on divination and his rejection of astrology.
The Early Modern Legacy of the Stoics
Forthcoming in N. Powers and J. Klein, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press).
This article examines the reception of Stoicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Justus Lipsius to Immanuel Kant. It considers topics often associated with Stoicism during the period, notably the interconnected concepts of fate, necessity, and providence, as well as the rise and development of scholarship on Stoicism during the period. While this was an especially rich period for the reception of Stoicism, more often than not the Stoics found themselves drawn into contemporary disputes, such as the potentially atheistic conclusions of Spinoza's philosophy. At the same time, it saw a shift away from seeing Seneca as the pre-eminent Stoic and towards the systematic philosophy of Zeno and Chrysippus.
The Stoics and their Philosophical System
The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, 2020
An overview of the Stoic philosophers and the main elements of their system. A chronological presentation of brief biographies of the Stoics with the most notable contributions of each individual is followed by a sketch of their philosophical system divided into the branches of logic, physics, and ethics. Logic includes topics in rhetoric, dialectic, and epistemology. Physics is the account of physical reality, including ontology, cosmology, and theology. The synopsis of ethics includes the Stoics’ version of naturalism, the doctrine of oikeiōsis, the virtues, emotions, the sage, moral progress, and cosmopolitanism.
Stoic Philosophy: Its Origins and Influence
Much has been written as of late on the characteristic and influential philosophical school of thought called Stoicism which was originally founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens in the second century BCE and further fleshed out and promulgated by Cleanthes and then subsequently by his student Chrysippus, collectively referred to in modern classical studies as the Old Stoa. This work intends to try and provide a succinct overview of the philosophical tenets which were characteristic of the school in the early period as well as identify some unique contributions of the later Stoa which are represented by the Roman/Latin intellectual and politically elite such as Seneca, Cicero and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. The paper also reviews some of the earlier Hellenic philosophical traditions from which it Stoicism drew some of its primary tenets and evolved in conjunction with, as well as in the Summary provide an overview of some of the lasting contributions Stoicism has made to the development of the philosophical and theological tradition in the West. Although none of the complete writings and treatises written by the Old Stoa are extant, much of their philosophical tenets are covered by later authors and philosophers whose work is and this article draws on some of these what you might call pseudo-primary sources (in particular Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius) as well as various secondary, more contemporary sources who draw not only on these sources but also extensively from Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta which is an invaluable collection of fragments and quotations of the early Stoa composed in the early part of the 20 th century and from which much of what we know about specific tenets of at least early Stoic philosophy come from.
The Piety of the Determined Will: A Critique of Stoic Freedom
The Stoic's were aware of the problem of reconciling a deterministic view of the universe with a preservation of the responsibility and freedom of an individual's will. Stoic philosophy does not adopt a traditional conception of libertarian freedom, where individuals can act freely with respect to multiple different actions in the world1. Instead, the individual is fated to act in a specific way, but is free to assent, or not assent, to the validity of impressions which are presented to the mind2. The Stoic doctrine of determinism states that the universe as a whole is God, and that the will of God determines the entirety of this universe. Reconciling the doctrine of a determined universe with the idea of free assent is imperative to the Stoic philosophy, but brings about significant problems. In this paper, I examine the concept of assent in Stoic philosophy. Assent is intended to help the Stoic reconcile determinism with individual freedom and responsibility. Specifically, I aim to critique Chrysippus' distinction between principal and auxiliary causes, and its implications on the relationship between the individual and God. I conclude that Chrysippus' notion of assent as an auxiliary cause does not avoid the problem of reconciling determinism and individual responsibility. Furthermore, the conception of the individual as free places the individual's volition outside of the will of God. Any attempt to reserve a space for individual freedom from fate, as is the case with the freedom to assent or dissent to given presentations, comes at the cost of the Stoic claim that the universe as a whole is 1 Also known as the principle of alternate possibilities, or PAP for short (O'Keefe, 11). 2 Different Stoics differ on the degree of freedom attributed to the mind. Chrysippus did not think the mind was as free to alter its own beliefs and desires as did the earlier Stoics. Instead, he aimed to reconcile the concepts of assent and causation with the deterministic nature of the world, including the mind (Hellenistic Philosophy, II-90.39).
Providence in Plotinus (Neoplatonism) and Seneca (Stoicism)
academia.edu, 2013
Extensive Stoic and middle platonist influence in Plotinus’ thought has been amply documented; we are told by his pupil Porphyry that ‘’his writings are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines’’ (Henry lvi); a paper by P.A. Meijer has convincingly argued for an important degree of stoic influence in Enn. VI, 9, 1 citing similarities with Seneca, for example. This paper aims to examine possible Stoic influences in Plotinus’ treatise “On Providence” (Enneads 3.2 & 3.3). Notions and arguments that seem strongly Stoic abound. Bréhier has pointed out the numerous Stoic borrowings, especially in chapters 5 and 6 (22). For concision’s sake, fourteen will be listed and compared with similar stoic passages from Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius (who like Plotinus lived in Rome) , with a particular emphasis on Seneca’s De Providentia.