DV2 The Battle of Britain - a ground-eye view (original) (raw)
Related papers
Indefensible? A Reassessment of the Part Played by RAF Personnel in the Battle of Crete 1941
The German invasion of Crete in 1941 and subsequent loss of the airfield at Maleme led, almost immediately, to the acceptance of a narrative that suggested significant RAF failure. Criticism, reinforced by the New Zealand official history, bemoaned the lack of fighter aircraft cover and questioned the fighting prowess of RAF ground crew. This article examines the New Zealand commanders’ errors of judgment, which resulted in inappropriate positioning of their soldiers to face the main thrust of the German attack, and argues that RAF airmen became convenient scapegoats for the failings of others. Further, Winston Churchill’s motives in questioning the ability and willingness of airmen to defend airbases are analysed, as is the ensuing political maelstrom, which led to knee jerk reactions and unnecessary reorganisation of RAF ground defence training.
Wiltshire's World War I Airfield Landscape: a focus on the landscape of aircrew training
Wiltshire Archaeological and Natural History Magazine, 2018
The 'twenty minuters', a phrase immortalised through the BBC TV programme Blackadder goes Forth, may well have been fiction, however, it does contain an element of truth. During the first day of the Battle of the Somme over 300 aircrew were lost. The impact of these losses was so great that it forced a review of the method of flying training; a training regime that was, to a great extent, developed in Wiltshire. This paper introduces the landscape and legacy of Wiltshire's pioneering involvement in early military aviation. It also serves to remind the reader that war in the air during World War I was constantly developing, and has left substantial landscape and archaeological evidence of enormous potential to the researcher.
British Journal for Military History, 2017
Either side of the end of the Second World War Britain’s airborne forces were increasingly employed in what today would be termed stabilisation operations. This paper examines the utility and experience of British airborne forces employed in Greece in 1944, Norway in 1945 and Java in 1946, and highlights common features across the three operations. This paper suggests characteristics and traits within airborne forces that enhanced their suitability for successfully contributing to complex stabilisation operations.
2012
"The failure of Operation Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially been attributed to the failure of the RAF to provide the bomber support needed to support the landings. This fallacious argument, based on hindsight and a lack of understanding of the RAF’s capabilities at this point in the war, requires revision. This article examines the doctrinal and operational context of the RAF forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar combined operations doctrine stated that the key role for air power was the maintenance of air superiority. The absence of heavy bombers at Dieppe did not doom the operation. The RAF contributed significantly to the operation by seeking to battle the Luftwaffe in the manner that it did during Jubilee, and as such, it provided the most appropriate protection that it could for the assault forces."
2016
This article is an examination of the operational record of the World War Two German Panther tank during the Normandy Campaign of summer 1944. Challenging its perception as mechanically unreliable, this article argues Allied combat action was responsible for a large percentage of Panthers that were out of action. Secondly, the inferior resources of the German tank replacement and repair program were no match for superior Canadian Army practices during 1944. To support these arguments the author examines Canadian and German wartime primary documents as well as multiple secondary sources. D the summer of 1944 in Normandy, the German Panzerkampfwagen V medium tank, the Panther, was one of the most dangerous armoured opponents of the Anglo-Canadian armies. Its design is often described in postwar writing as having the best mixture of speed, armour, and weaponry on the Second World War battlefield. Due to this successful formula, some writers have held up this late war German panzer as t...
An Analysis of Factors Affecting the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Raid on Dieppe, 1942
The paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the RAF’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in RAF doctrine, a naïve willingness to belief pilots kill claims and a refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft. The paper rejects claims that the raf’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable.