THINKING ABOUT RADICALIZATION AFTER SO CALLED ISLAMIC STATE: AN INTRODUCTION (original) (raw)
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De-radicalisation of Terrorists: Theoretical Analysis and Case Studies
This article argues that terrorists can be de- radicalised through holistic approaches that focus on a diverse range of factors, including disengagement and reintegration. While narrowing on individual focused de- radicalisation instead of group de- radicalisation programmes, definitional considerations and theoretical models are discussed. Through observations of programmes in Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, the author proposes a three-tiered de-radicalisation model: (i) re- education and ideological intervention, (ii) vocational training and financial support, (iii) and viable environment for reintegration.
De-radicalization Programs in Muslim Countries: A Critical Analysis
De-radicalization Programs in Muslim Countries: A Critical Analysis
This research critically analyzes the De-radicalization program in Muslim countries. Muslims have faced extremism and terrorism in many forms due to religious intolerance, economic crisis, and hatred. Some of the Muslim countries have launched de-radicalization programs to neutralize the views of extremism and to maintain peace in society. The study critically analyzes the steps taken by Muslim states to de-radicalize that including the process of De-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. This study also offers the possible steps that can be taken to eliminate radicalization. This study also highlights the need for more de-radicalization programs to maintain peace and prosperity all around. The countries that have been studied in this research are Turkey,
WHY WE WENT TO FIGHT AND WHY WE RETURNED Radicalisation and Deradicalisation – Learning from Foreign Terrorist Fighter, 2021
This research was based on interviews with 38 foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) who are alleged to have gone to fight in Syria, mainly with the Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat an Nusra (JN), and, to a lesser extent with ISIS and other terrorist groups. These inter- views were supplemented by interviews with families of FTF and analysed in consul- tation with civil society experts. The use of a rapport building style of interviewing by trained and experienced research staff, who had previously gained the confidence of prison officials, allowed researchers to sit alone with prisoners resulting in candid responses to questions. The research found that: • There was virtually no evidence of self-radicalisation. Almost all FTF were radica- lised and mobilised into violence through contact with others, though there was significant evidence that social media was used in that process. • Family influence was significant in both radicalisation and in disengagement. • Radicalisation hotspots appear to exist in certain regions such as Osh that are associated with particular ideologues or terrorist leaders. For example, these in- clude the Sirozhiddin Mukhtarov (also known as Abu Salah). • The idea of resurrecting the ‘Caliphate’ appears to have been socialised amongst the communities researched before the advent of ISIS. Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) had been indoctrinating their congregations with an Islamist (political Islam) agenda for several years before ISIS gave this idea physical form through establishing its state. • Apostasy is an idea that has been empowered by versions of Islamist thinking and was the primary element in radicalisation narratives. The idea of apostasy has survived the Syrian conflict and will potentially pose a threat to social cohe- sion and freedoms of belief in Kyrgyzstan unless actively countered. • It was likely this idea motivated these ideologues and some of their followers in the early days of the conflict to move freely between Kyrgyzstan and Syria, thereby establishing the FTF phenomena within their country, probably around 2013. Elaborate covert networks were developed to recruit, radicalise, train and transport FTF to Syria, mostly from countries where Kyrgyz citizens were migrant workers. • Kyrgyzstan’s migrant worker communities played a significant role in radicalisa- tion, both directly and indirectly. • The vast majority of FTF had been immigrant workers, mainly in Russia and Turkey and to a lesser extent in Kazakhstan. One individual was recruited in South Korea whilst working there. His family allege that he was one of many Central Asians being recruited, indoctrinated and mobilised there. This Kore- an network was also alleged to raise significant terrorist funding. • A proportion of the FTF had been affected by one or more parent being an immigrant worker when they were growing up and some were brought up by grandparents or other family members. • While playing a background factor in the decision of some to become FTF, families also played a role in the decision of many FTF to disengage from terrorism and return to Kyrgyzstan. Some families indicated a willingness to help deradicalise • • • • • these FTF. However, there is currently no support to these families in the form of information, advice and resources to help them address the challenges involved. The predominant narrative used by recruiters, graphically echoed in online vide- os, adopted a twofold approach. The first provides a sense of duty that all Mus- lims are a family and must help protect each other. The second creates a sense of moral outrage at those deemed responsible (Shiites) for murdering and raping women and children. The appeal of curiosity and adventure, especially the prospect of participating in a real war, was also exploited in the recruitment of young men. The individuals’ decision to engage was triggered primarily by the narratives’ emotional appeal. These narratives did not make a rational choice appeal. • Consequently, the primary motivations for being a FTF were a desire to help Muslims (42%). A minority (8%) went purely because of curiosity or a desire for adventure. News via mass media first aroused the interest of recruits in the Syria conflict. This interest was then effectively mobilised by radicalisers to recruit young men. • Criticism or counter narratives against extremism and ISIS seem to have been ineffective. Indications suggest they actually heightened awareness of the Syrian conflict and extremist groups, and thus may have facilitated the re- cruitment of individuals when recruiters presented an alternative version of events. There was evidence that escaping the perceived injustices of their home environ- ment was also a motivating factor in becoming an FTF. • Most Kyrgyz of Uzbek origin outwardly claimed that there was harmony bet- ween them and ethnic Kyrgyz, but indirectly they highlighted perceived po- lice corruption and state level discrimination as major causes of grievances against life in Kyrgyzstan. • These grievances may have increased the attraction to the idea of an ideal (caliphate) state abroad. Religious identity was a significant motivator during radicalisation and recruiters scouted mosques in Kyrgyzstan and other countries for potential recruits. Ideologues who influenced the FTF used brief scriptural references in their narra- tives to give themselves credibility. • Religion was primarily used as a source of identity to define in and out groups, to create a crisis environment and to provide specific justifications for vio- lence to counter the generic scriptural teachings against it. • Cultural religiosity also played a role – Many recruits and their families were effectively religious novices, making them vulnerable to the indoctrination of radical preachers who advocated a mythical and politicised version of religion. • There are indications that ‘mainstream’ Islamic institutions lacked credibility and failed to provide effective religious counter narrative or alternative role model. • • 6 7 • Most FTF who experienced Syria ended up being disillusioned with the reality of life there and the corruption of the people they went fight alongside. This and other factors highlighted by the research could provide effective counter narra- tives if exploited soon. • There are indications that most FTF, together with family members, may have undiagnosed mental health issues relating to the trauma of the FTF experience. Left unaddressed, these could present a future criminal or terrorist threat. • Corruption within the state, judicial and policing systems is a major contributor to radicalisation and a barrier to countering radicalisation and terrorism. This cannot be seen as merely an infringement of best governance practice and hu- man rights. It has significant counter terrorism implications. There is a possible causal link between abuse, including torture, and deradicalisation. It is, therefore, a state security issue which undermines the state’s investment in counter terro- rism and could be a future motivator for domestic anti-state terrorist action. • The underlying economic, social and political issues, especially corruption, that led to individuals’ vulnerability to radicalisation remain unaddressed. • The absence of a recognised and effective deradicalisation policy for these FTF potentially represents a future security threat to both Kyrgyzstan and the inter- national once they are released from prison. • Conditions in prisons which involve inactivity and cohabitation of extremists are likely to strengthen the radicalisation of current FTF rather than reform them. • Released FTF are likely to receive effective support from some families to prevent recidivism, but indications are that communities may be hostile. • Those FTF who are not successfully absorbed within a strong family and support group are likely to be vulnerable to recidivism and further recruitment into vio- lent extremism.
Nigeria has recently joined the many states which have established de-radicalisation programmes with the aim of re-integrating former combatants and reducing the risk of recidivism. The study engages with debates on how the success of de-radicalisation can be ascertained through the Islamic perspectives. The study argues that re-integration into ideational contexts which are influenced by a radical milieu risks rendering de-radicalisation efforts as counter-productive and being a cause of recidivism. Conversely, de-radicalisation programmes in ideational contexts which are influenced by a referent milieu aligned with state forces, such as in Nigeria, function to overcome community resistance to re-integration. De-radicalisation programmes provide former combatants with ‘scripts’ of disengagement and function as a brand, signalling to communities that former combatants have repented and are ‘better citizens, imbued with genuine nationalism’ that resonate with local communities. Thus community resistance to re-integrating former combatants in Nigeria is the context in which de-radicalisation programmes can be, paradoxically, more successful as communicative strategies of resolving community tensions. The article makes a conceptual contribution to de-radicalisation studies by broadening what constitutes success in de-radicalisation away from recidivism reduction and by placing greater focus on the implications of social relations with radical milieus and referent milieus on the efficacy of de-radicalisation. This study adopted mixed method. This is the combination of qualitative and quantitative approached. The study found that the concept of de-radicalisation is still new and this can be achieved through the collaboration of Islamic scholars by teaching and preaching to the ex-combatants.
Political de-radicalization: why it is no longer possible in the wilāyāt system of the Islamic State
The emergence of the Islamic State as a regional and ideological player deeply affected the mechanisms of radicalization witnessed worldwide. The article will compare a former instance of jihadism, the Egyptian al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG), with the phenomenon of the Islamic State and its wilāyāt system. The Islamic Group, which has been active during the last three decades of the Twentieth century, constitutes an ideal case study because it performed a process of political de-radicalization and disengagement that led its members to abandon violence. The hypothesis underlying the paper is that a similar process could no longer take place in the case of the Islamic State. Indeed, the transnational project of the Caliphate is likely to exclude every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization and/or disengagement process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state, and this difference is likely to represent one of the major counter-terrorism challenges arising from the Syrian-Iraqi scenario. In order to complete its de-radicalization process, the IG issued four books of murāğa'āt, " recantations " , in January 2002, under the general title of The Correcting Conceptions Series. The major one was titled The Initiative for Ceasing Violence: a Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective. It was authored by two Shura Council members 2 and it generally addressed the practical and the ideological reasons behind the initiative. Unquestionably, this gradual process has been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. By contrast, the a-national nature of the Islamic State obstructs this process. Indeed, after the local-oriented attitude of the first gam'iyāt and the emergence of al-Qa'ida as the premium brand of global terror, aims, push factors and geographical horizons of jihadism deeply changed. It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it unquestionably is. The fundamental issue is whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and prudent means and it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the national jihadi movements from the Islamic State. As an internal Islamist critique-one that relies on a common Salafi substratum-the gam'iyāt refutation of global jihad may shed a light over the role of Da'ish in the contemporary jihadi panorama.
Crime Law and Social Change, 2011
When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against civilians, and when, why, and how might they de-radicalize and draw back from such action? The empirical basis for understanding the background factors and trigger events pushing or pulling people towards Islamist militancy is very limited. Moreover, there is no consensus within the research community as to which theories and approaches offer the most promising avenues for further exploration". -A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, DIIS WP no. 2008/3:17.
Briefing Paper, 2008
The ad hoc briefing paper “Preventing violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the EU - The threat to Europe by radical Islamic terrorist groups” provides an original analysis and evaluation of the different strategies that are meant to deal with such phenomena, as well as their effectiveness. This perspective takes into account the dynamics of actions/reactions between the various parts involved in violence and its repression, thus going beyond recommendations mainly aiming at controlling the networks through which individuals enter the radicalizing dynamics, in a “worst-case scenario” perspective. The core point of the paper is to transgress the different forms of self-censorship that exist in the field of the counterterrorist public policies, by insisting upon the fact that some of the measures taken can contribute to the radicalisation, or more accurately, to the dynamics of escalation. The priority is then to move the focus, while widening the angle of the problem, to highlight the interactions not only between clandestine organisations and reference fields but also public authorities, journalists and others. The question of the radicalisation must be reconsidered and redefined as a subsidiary of the questions on escalation and de-escalation dynamics of the conflicts. The ad hoc briefing paper is thus structured as follows: the first part aims at understanding the radicalisation processes; the second part deals with the questions of clandestineness, radicalisation and recruitment; the third part deals with the dilemma faced by authorities and their policies, that can either lead to an escalation or a de-escalation, depending on whether they tend to mimetic rivalry or distanciation. Finally, the paper provides certain policy recommendations, mainly based on favouring distanciation, taking into account the pernicious effects of intensified measures of control, repression or war on violent radicalisation, and controlling and supervising counter radicalisation.