Who ran that war?”: David A Charters, Whose Mission, Whose Orders? British civil-military command and control in Northern Ireland, 1968–1974 (original) (raw)
Related papers
Counter-Insurgency against ‘Kith and Kin’? The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1970–76
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2015
This article argues that there was considerable divergence among infantry units during the early years of Operation Banner (1969-1976). The Army struggled to adapt to soldiering in the UK-the British government quickly made clear that colonial measures were unsuitable in a domestic context. Some units accepted this new logic; others engaged in deviancy, determined to punish the local population from which the IRA drew its support. The Army's senior leadership failed to prevent such divergence.
Counter-Insurgency Against Kith and Kin? The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1970-1976
This article argues that state violence in Northern Ireland during the period 1970-1976 - when violence during the Troubles was at its height and before the reintroduction of the policy of police primacy in 1976 - was on a greatly reduced scale than that seen in British counterinsurgency campaigns in the colonies after the Second World War. When the Army attempted to introduce measures used in the colonies – curfews, internment without trial – these proved to be extremely damaging to London’s political aims in Northern Ireland, namely the conciliation of the Catholic minority within the United Kingdom and the defeat of the IRA. However, the insistence by William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (1972-1972), on ‘throttling back’ – the release of internees and the imposition of unprecedented restrictions on the use of violence by the Army – put a serious strain on civil-military relations in Northern Ireland. The relatively stagnant nature of the conflict - with units taking casualties in the same small ‘patch’ of territory without opportunities for the types of ‘positive actions’ seen in the colonies - led to some deviancy on the part of small infantry units who sought informal, unsanctioned ways of taking revenge upon the local population. Meanwhile, a disbelieving and defensive attitude at senior levels of command in Northern Ireland meant that informal punitive actions against the local population were often not properly investigated during 1970-1972, until more thorough civilian and military investigative procedures were put in place. Finally, a separation of ethnic and cultural identity between the soldiers and the local population - despite being citizens of the same state - became professionally desirable in order for soldiers to carry out difficult, occasionally distasteful work.
2014
In 1990 when I began graduate school at Yale, few anthropologists had any interest in armed conflict. Faculty and fellow students suggested that my research might fit better in the political science department. I found this suggestion disconcerting - why should war be excluded from anthropological inquiry? How human beings fight is as much a matter of culture as table manners, death rituals, or transgendered prostitution. And, after visiting Northern Ireland for the first time, it was clear to me that Republicanism was not just a political philosophy; it was a unique culture with its own norms, narratives, symbols, rituals, and language. Decades of war (or hundreds of years, depending on who is counting) had destroyed neither Republican culture nor Republican political philosophy, but rather had strengthened, clarified and deepened it. It was impossible not to empathize with these selfdisciplined, courageous people who continued to fight British forces despite the fact that the consequence was likely to be death or imprisonment; despite the fact that they had neither the manpower nor the firepower to secure a military victory; and despite the fact that their political goal of unification of Ireland’s 32 counties was absent from the political agenda of the Republic of Ireland.
This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) - employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil-military relations - were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.
These books, based on doctoral theses, represent the fresh interest among postgraduates in the early years of state building on the island of Ireland. Both works are well researched and contain impressive documentary evidence. Bryan Follis deals with the preparations for and consolidation of the Northern Irish state based mainly on sources from within the new administration. On first glance Follis' work is a neutral and fascinating insight into the problems of setting up a government in a torn society. However, a major deficiency of his work is revealed by its bibliography which contains virtually no recent works on Nationalists. His discussion of the republican position relies heavily on coloured accounts by contemporaries. For the IRA campaign we are referred to W. A. Phillips' work dating from 1926, and a lot of his discussion of the republican perception of Northern Ireland goes back to Dorothy Macardle's book first published in 1937, while events in the Civil War are accounted for by Ronan Fanning's booklet on Independent Ireland, disregarding much more comprehensive monographs. These defects in its bibliography are unfortunately not coincidental, but expose an often subtle but sometimes blatant unionist perception of developments and a serious disregard for the position of Nationalists living within the six counties. In Follis' view Northern Ireland was to be a " Unionist State for a Unionist People " in which there was no place for Catholics who were disloyal by definition. The first fleeting reference to Catholics appears on page thirty-six and a serious treatment of their position has to wait until the conclusion. This denial of the Catholic presence in Northern Ireland is further witnessed by labelling all IRA activity in the North as an invasion from outside. Follis consistently and uncritically equals the interest of northern Unionists with that of the new state. He admires and identifies with the unionist leadership who displayed an "iron will" and under Craig's "resolute leadership" made the surprising establishment of a stable state possible. Any less than admirable behaviour on the part of the unionist leadership is defended by their assertion that they had to be radical to control their grass roots. However, no source material is presented to account for the mood of ordinary Unionists. All reports of rising pressure come directly from the Northern government itself. It is remarkable that a publisher feels obliged to warn the reader on the dust jacket for the biased nature of the work: "if a particular standpoint emerges at its conclusion it is the result of an extremely lucid piece of research ". This book is indeed based on sound scholarly research of much relevant source material, and correctly challenges some of the unsubstantiated criticisms of the Northern Ireland Government. However, Follis' particular standpoint is unfortunately not limited to his conclusion which is in fact quite balanced, but permeates his language and most of his argument. If given recognition such a bias, which cannot be avoided by any historian, is not necessarily a problem, but in this case it leads to a one-sided assessment of the available evidence and many unfounded conclusions. The fact that the author uses imprecise terminology is confusing but only a minor irritant. When, for instance, he labels the thousands of catholic workers which
A DIRTY WAR? THE RESPONSE OF UK SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND DURING 'THE TROUBLES'
This dissertation aims to determine whether the response of the British security forces to insurgency and terrorism in ‘the Troubles’ was legal, or whether the response constitutes a ‘dirty war’ – a conflict in which illegal practices are widespread, systemic or politically sanctioned. It examines both the legal actions and the illegal practices undertaken by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the British Army and the other involved security agencies, and forms an analysis of the nature, reasoning, prevalence and outcome of these practices. It is accompanied by an assessment of the responsibility and accountability of the British government and security community during the post-‘Troubles’ years. This study draws upon a wide variety of sources, including very recently published evidence, which sheds new light into the willingness of these agencies to admit guilt for illicit practices.
The role of the British Army in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner (1969–2007) is an instructive case study of counterinsurgency operations as well as an important chapter in recent British military history. Given troops deployed to the province as aid to the civil power, it is particularly useful in discussions about the principle of minimum force. This article seeks to explore the issue of minimum force through the example of Operation Motorman, the Army’s successful attempt to remove the barricades, which had established so-go areas for the security forces in Northern Ireland.