Freedom, passions and moral causation: Metaphysical and ethical complications of Descartes’s dualism (original) (raw)
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A Critique of Descartes' Mind-Body Dualism
In this enterprise, I shall present Descartes' theory of 'methodic doubt,' moving systematically as he (Descartes) himself would suppose we do, from the establishment of the being of his thinking self (his soul), through the existence of a non-mischievous, infinitely, perfect Being, God, to the existence of a corporeal, extended substance (his body), as distinct from his mind; and the ultimate interaction of the two distinct and separate substances: mind and body. Also, I shall give a critical evaluation of Descartes' method, bringing into focus the alternative theories of other philosophers aimed at resolving the Cartesian dualism. The scientific standpoint on the issue shall also be considered. Through these analyses, I shall establish the thesis that, the interaction of mind and body is only probable.
In this paper I discuss Spinoza's objection to Descartes's physiological explanation for the interaction between the mind and the body, otherwise known as the pineal-gland theory. The discussion has three parts: the first lays out Descartes's pineal-gland argument and assesses the main points of Spinoza's critique. What, exactly, in Spinoza's eyes, is so bad about the Cartesian model? Why does Spinoza think that Descartes's physiological theory is so obscure? The second investigates Spinoza's own model of mind and body interaction, namely, the idea that the power of the mind over the body is determined by the understanding alone. The final part considers, too briefly to be sure, a particular implication of Descartes's position: the freedom of the will. According to Spinoza, Descartes's model holds that the soul (or the mind) has absolute control over the passions. For Spinoza, however, the control of the passions is possible not through the freedom of the will, but through proper knowledge of God or Nature. By going over these matters I hope to indicate what I take to be a misinterpretation of Descartes's whole project.
Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism
1969
After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, and I think quite rightly, that his claim to be "entirely and absolutely distinct" from his body is not justified by the reasoning which he offers in its support. Nevertheless, I also believe that the proffered criticisms of Descartes' sketchy defense of his position fail to provide us with a full understanding of either the force of his argument or the errors which he commits in reaching his conclusion. In what follows I propose to explain how his arguments may be filled in with certain reasonable premises which make his reasoning concerning his nature" appear less implausible and his mistakes more interesting than his critics have acknowledged. I
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 1985
The problem of explaining the interaction of mind and body has been a central issue in the human sciences since the time of Descartes. However. a careful re-examination of Descartes' epistemological procedure in the Medirations (1641/1960) reveals the "fallacious origin" of the classic mind-body division. In fact, the mind-body problem is not a genuine ontological split "discovered" by Descartes' method, but rather an artifact of using a method already laden with ontological preconceptions about mental being. Furthermore, Descartes inadvertently shifted from his original (epistemological) goal of establishing certain knowledge to an implicit (ontological) investigation of mental being, which then compelled him to investigate his own mental existence. Unfortunately, this phenomenological investigation was severely biased by the exclusive attentive state of reflective thinking that is generated by the method. Consequently. Descartes' inadequate phenomenological analysis further exacerbated the illusory "insight" that mind is separable from body.
Descartes's Passions of the Soul
Philosophy Compass, 2006
While Descartes's Passions of the Soul has been taken to hold a place in the history to human physiology, until recently philosophers have neglected the work. In this research summary, I set Descartes's last published work in context and then sketch out its philosophical significance. From it, we gain further insight into Descartes's solution to the Mind-Body Problem -that is, to the problem of the ontological status of the mind-body union in a human being, to the nature of body-mind causation, and to the way body-caused thoughts represent the world. In addition, the work contains Descartes's developed ethics, in his account of virtue and of the passion of générosité in particular. Through his taxonomy of the passions and the account of their regulation, we also learn more about his moral psychology.
Passionate Descartes A Reinterpretation of the Body's Role in cartesian Thought
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, 2020
The usual reading of Descartes' “anthropological” perspective classifies it as a radical dualism with a distinction between two substances, mind and body, which experience major interaction difficulties. Through a contextualization of Descartes' physiological and psychological thought as well as through a less fragmented reading of his work, we intend to review this traditional interpretation, thereby showing its distorted character. When we pay attention to passion, a new Descartes’ image as a sort of phenomenal monism appears, which is markedly different from the legendary image typically associated with him, even today
2018
Urban's interesting paper on Descartes' dualism between mind and body misses the radical shift that occurred with his thought. Although the distinction between mind and body goes back to the Greeks, as the mental and bodily dimensions of a unified being-in-the-world, Descartes jettisoned the body into the "outer world" of matter, subject to natural law, and located mind as an interior place of experience, radically separate from the world in which experience takes place. This brief paper, a reply to Urban, sets out Cartesian dualism, its Galilean roots, its significance for psychology, and introduces the uninformed reader to the phenomenological critique, particularly in the Jungian literature.