Managing Deterrence and Escalation on NATO's Eastern Flank. (original) (raw)
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Colonel Robert M. Klein, USA (Ret.), was a Senior Military Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist, Ph.D., is a Researcher and Faculty Board Member at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). Colonel Ed Sumangil, USAF, is a Senior Military Fellow in CSR. Ulrica Pettersson, Ph.D., is assigned to SEDU and is an Adjunct Faculty Member at Joint Special Operations University.
Current study aims to assess the credibility of the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding Russia’s potential aggression against the Baltic countries; what could the aggression scenarios look like; what should be done to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy and the ability of the Baltic countries to employ additional deterrence instruments. The focus of the analysis is on four components: capability (both nuclear and conventional military capabilities), communication, cohesion, and interdependence/acceptance of norms. In this way, the authors build-up their own framework to cover both the physical capabilities of potential parties to the conflict and behavioural ethical aspects related to the current security environment. The article demonstrates the challenges for the Alliance’s deterrence strategy and makes several suggestions of how to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy to avoid Russia’s potential aggression.