Jordan: Islamic Action Front Presses for Role in Governing (original) (raw)
Pénélope Larzillière. Political commitment under an authoritarian regime : professional associations and the islamist movement as alternative arenas in Jordan. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2012, 6 (1), pp.11-25. How does political commitment develop when actors are confronted with authoritarian processes? Under a liberal authoritarian regime, even the creation of democratic institutions may mean authoritarian stabilization (contradicting classical transition theories) rather than open an arena for political protest. However, alternative contentious arenas may appear, where resourceful organizations can be partially transformed into a basis for protest with challenging frames of reference. In the Jordanian case, the professional associations (in contravention of corporatism theory) and the Islamist social movement have thus gained oppositional capacity. However, apart from repression, their own economic and social roles, and their integration in the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between challenging and integrated positions and when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role, radicalization processes appear. Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas and their relational characteristics. These political arenas are also the places where alternative ideologies are produced. At that level, the Islamist movement has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power and position. The case thus supports an analytical separation between power position and ideology and confirms the need for less state-centred definition of ideology.
The Political Survival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: From Participation to Boycott
uea e prints, 2015
This thesis explores the development of relations between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian regime from 1945 to 2010, in which a distinction is made between the pre- and post-1989 eras that demarked a significant shift from partnership to crisis. Utilising an historical approach, the first era is defined by both parties’ mutual pragmatism, establishing a unified understanding of the Palestinian issue, and what the nature of politics in Jordan would be. However, the post-1989 era is analysed within the context of the regime’s shift in interests from internal to external issues, subsequently changing its pragmatic discourse towards the Brotherhood and Islamic movements. This study suggests that the shift in the regime’s focus, teamed with the implementation of policies such as the ‘one vote system’ and the peace treaty with Israel, left a space for radical voices to rise within the Brotherhood. To understand if the Brotherhood is compatible to Jordan’s parliamentarian system, the research identifies circles of division within the Brotherhood between Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb’s ideologies in the wake of regional conflict and poor regime-Islamist relations. This bifurcation is exacerbated in Jordan, as seen with the opposing fronts of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s Shoura Council: Hawks of Palestinian origin vs. Doves of Jordanian origin, claiming a new division: the ‘new’ Hawks, or, the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’. Supported by exclusive personal interviews with Brotherhood leaders, this thesis argues that allowing Islamist movements’ limited political participation in Jordan is essential for the country’s stability and religious modernity as since the 2007 boycott, increasing numbers of al-Bannaist Doves have converted into Qutbist Hawks. This has empowered the Hawks to demand fundamental reforms regarding the monarchy’s existence, initiating the Brotherhood’s final 2010 political boycott, and positioning the once-allied movement outside the political process and indefinitely removed from accountability.
Assessing Jordan’s National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism | The Washington Institute
2021
In considering terrorism’s current threat to Jordan, this attack should not be considered an isolated incident. According to studies by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), nearly 4,000 Jordanian fighters joined the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other locations since 2011. Now that IS has shrunk, the possibility of returning fighters pose a major concern for Jordan, as they bring back their military, combat, and organization experience to the country. Therefore, the Jordanian government amended its counterterrorism law to criminalize joining the Al Nusra Front, IS, or any other terrorist groups, and made promoting them in any way, including on social media, illegal as well. The amended law also allowed for the monitoring of mosques and religious sermons at an unprecedented level.return
Jordan's New "Political Development" Strategy
Middle East Report, 2005
We have a problem here. There is no real [opposirion] party except for the Muslim Brotherhood." 1 So an official of Jord an's new M inistry of Political Development and Parliamentary Affairs summed up the raison d'etre of h is place of employment.
Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2011
Jordanian politics has seen decades of pro-reform and pro-democracy political activism, but with little effective change on the Jordanian political system itself. This analysis explains how and why the regime has resisted more than cosmetic reform and democratic change. It also examines in detail old and new avenues of opposition reformist activism in the kingdom, from leftist political parties and the Islamist movement to new forms of pro-democracy activism in the form of grassroots coaltions, youth movements and social media activism. As both government and opposition in Jordan are affected by the 2011 Arab uprisings, this analysis examines the past and present possibilities for democratic political opposition and for an effective and unifed coalition for reform in Jordan.
Boycott or Not? Islamist Electoral Politics in Jordan
This dissertation was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc Middle East Politics of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Despite the framing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as the regime’s ‘loyal’ opposition, the regime-Brotherhood relationship’s present state is quite different. Rather than playing its part as the monarchy’s favoured partner in Jordanian society, the Brotherhood now has emerged to openly contest regime primacy, if not its overall legitimacy. This dissertation seeks to disentangle the events and themes that have led to the relationship’s deterioration and will situate this discussion within the context of Brotherhood participation in Jordan’s political system. As such, this dissertation also introduces a number of theoretical points intended to shape the discussion of Islamist groups, the Jordanian state apparatus and power relations within the state, the opposition and between the two. Furthermore, this dissertation draws on a number of themes visible throughout the process of ‘liberalisation’ in Jordan, including the effect of neoliberal economic policies on Brotherhood discourse and manipulation of the electoral system. It holds that the relationship between the state and the Jordanian Brotherhood has all but ended, with new relationships forming between the state and opposition and within the opposition itself.
Middle East Law and Governance, 2020
This article focuses on how and why some Jordanian Muslim Brothers have engaged in relatively exclusive, Islamist ways of confronting the regime during the "Arab Spring," while others adopted a more inclusive, national strategy in the same period. As such, this article not only contributes to our knowledge of divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but also shows how this can impact Islamist-regime relations in the Arab world. It argues that the organization as a whole initially wanted to exploit the uprisings in the region through a relatively exclusive, Islamist approach to the regime, but that others within the organization disagreed with this method as the "Arab Spring" proved mostly unsuccessful. Aware of the dangers of provoking the state from a position of increased isolation, these members advocated a more inclusive attitude toward the regime and others. While both groups were ultimately unsuccessful, the latter at least survived as a legal entity, while the Muslim Brotherhood lost its official presence in the kingdom because the regime was able to exploit the existing divisions within the organization.