Duterte's Gambit: How the Two-Level Game Theory Explains the Odds of Terminating the US Visiting Forces Agreement (original) (raw)
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In his much-acclaimed historical account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides concluded that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this event inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable. The probability of conflict ensuing between the emerging and established powers has been referred to by war scholars as the ‘Thucydides’ trap’. In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to this trap can be attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a ‘war of all against all, as the world tumultuously shifts from one superpower to another.’ Against this backdrop, this paper examines President Rodrigo Duterte’s foreign policy and strategic doctrine using a neoclassical realist model. The doctrine has four main elements: cultivating a more favorable image for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society relations supportive of ‘sinicization’; and overhauling the country’s Western-based institutions to better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. At this watershed moment in the history of international politics, does Duterte’s China-centric approach give the Philippines an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and opportunities of the impending new order? Do the president’s differing rules of engagement toward Beijing and Washington reveal a calculated and forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist and naïve stance? The paper answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics underpinning the creation and implementation of the Duterte doctrine.
NDCP Executive Policy Brief, 2020
Using a theoretical understanding of small power behavior, this paper examined the national security challenges posed by a potential abrogation of the VFA. Cognizant of their relative weakness, small powers favor the status quo order in order to, among others, broaden the diplomatic space for maneuver and choice, and expand the resources upon which they can use in times of stress. Terminating the VFA would further unleash the remaining restraints to China’s maritime expansionist agenda and would help facilitate Beijing’s efforts to alter the status quo to its favor. Moreover, the decision also produced a cloud of uncertainty over the trajectory of the security relations with the Philippines’ strategic/comprehensive partners as the VFA termination raises the issue of reliability and credibility. Hence, this paper concludes that the decision to abrogate the VFA is at variance with Philippine national security interests as a small power. While the Manila-Washington alliance is far from perfect, supporting continued US presence through the implementation of the VFA is consistent with the Philippines’ efforts in mitigating its geopolitical vulnerabilities. The Philippines must always act with foresight, prudence, and flexibility in the realm of foreign policy because, as Kenneth Waltz argued, “[w]eak states operate on narrow margins. Inopportune acts, flawed policies, and mistimed moves may have fatal results.”
This article examines the shifts in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte Administration, and how these changes impact 21st century Philippine–US alliance. Unlike the Aquino Administration that challenged China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, the Duterte Administration keeps silent on this maritime dispute in exchange for Chinese trade concessions, aid, and investments. President Duterte fosters closer economic and diplomatic relations with China and distances the Philippines from the US Specifically, he seeks China’s assistance for the building of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In consideration of this largess, President Duterte has degraded the country’s strategic security ties with the US by terminating the joint Philippine–US naval patrols in the South China Sea, and limiting the scope and number of US military interactions with the AFP. These moves, which are a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of maintaining close security ties with the US, have strained the Philippine–US alliance. This article addresses this central question: How do the foreign policy changes under the Duterte Administration adversely impact the Philippine–US alliance? It also raises the following questions: (1) What are the foreign policy goals of the Duterte Administration? (2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? (3) In what ways does the pursuit of these goals affect Philippine–US alliance? (4) What is the future of Philippine–US alliance in the light of the Duterte Administration’s shifting foreign policy goals? I would have alliances on trade and commerce with China. Russia has
The Philippine Pivot to China and Russia: Duterte's Foreign Policy Revisited
Asia Review, 2022
Reexamining Rodrigo Duterte’s tirades against Western power blocs and the results of his diplomatic efforts to obtain Chinese and Russian assistance has never been more relevant, considering the measures his successor adopted to reinforce or reconfigure his foreign policy. To this end, the article revisits Duterte’s pivot to China and Russia, refining the discussion of their rationale and providing a qualitative assessment of their outcomes. Through a critical review of presidential speeches and news reports, the article unpacks the connection of the strategy to the following: first, Duterte’s anti-colonial narrative; second, his drug war; third, the desire to improve the country’s military, trade, tourism, and infrastructure; and fourth, the management of the South China Sea conflict. While the foreign policy considered the country’s geopolitical and economic realities, the article found that it failed to achieve its desired outcomes. With mounting pressure at home to demonstrate the gains of his Beijing-friendly policy and the political and economic repercussions of transacting with Moscow, Duterte appeared to have recalibrated the strategy before he left office. The policy’s failures should offer lessons to international relations researchers, the administration that succeeded Duterte, and, more importantly, to less powerful nations engaging with competing major powers.
Michael Magcamit, 2019
In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to the Thucydides trap can be attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a war of all against all. Against this backdrop, this article investigates how a small power re-evaluates its foreign policy and strategic behaviour using neoclassical realism theory. In particular, I examine President Rodrigo Duterte’s method which is characterized by four key elements: cultivating a more favourable image for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society relations supportive of ‘Sinicization’; and reorienting the country’s Western-based institutions to better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. Does a China-centric approach give a small power an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and opportunities of the impending new order? Do the Philippines’ shifting rules of engagement under the Duterte administration represent a forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist and na ̈ıve stance? The article answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics underpinning the conception and construction of the Duterte method, as well as its implications vis-a-vis a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour.
Duterte's foreign policy confusion
2016
President Rodrigo Duterte has ushered in a new chapter in Philippine foreign policy: one lacking in continuity, coherence and direction. Previously acrimonious relations with China have drastically improved and creative solutions are now being found to disputes in the South China Sea. At the same time, Duterte's fiercely critical rhetoric toward the United States has placed the country's longstanding security alliance in question. These events herald an uncertain time for the Philippines and for Southeast Asia. Disciplines Arts and Humanities | Law Publication Details L. Bautista, 'Duterte's foreign policy confusion' (2016) 25 November 2016 Australian Institute of International Affairs 1-5. This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/2664 Site Navigation Australian Outlook Analysis The Burning Question Issues Brief Fresh Perspectives Interviews Reading Room Global Wire About Australian Outlook Publications Australian Journ...