'Saving the Mind': Toward a New Etymological Understanding of Σωφροσύνη (original) (raw)
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Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2021
Sōphrosynē is a word with deep cultural significance. Genres as diverse as epic, tragedy, history, and philosophy speak about it as an ideal of human behavior. Yet, the traditional etymology (‘soundness of mind’) overemphasizes its cognitive or intellectual aspects, at the expense of its behavioral or emotional aspects. Drawing on linguistic, anthropological, and psychological studies of archaic Greek culture, I here propose a new etymological understanding of sōphrosynē that also accounts for its ancient association with emotions and behavior. I find support in the language of Homer and hitherto neglected evidence from personal names beginning in Sō-. I conclude that sōphrosynē is best explained not as a normal cognitive state (‘sanity’), but as a cognitive-behavioral achievement: namely, the verbal action of ‘saving the mind’. This prototype accounts for both the word’s meanings ‘sanity’ and ‘self-control’: the self-controlled person ‘saves her mind’ (action), whereas the sane person ‘has a safe mind’ (state). Each meaning represents, so to speak, different sides of the same linguistic coin. The results of this investigation are far-reaching. By abandoning an intellectualist account of the Greek word sōphrosynē, we are in a better position to understand the idea or value denoted by it. The interpretation ‘soundness of mind’ is quite symptomatic of our own cultural distance: it seems to be dictated by a culture that gives preference to the cognitive or intellectual (‘mind’) and sees it as susceptible of health (‘soundness’). In other words, our common sense has freely assumed that the archaic Greeks shared the same model of the mind as we do. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that they located mental activity not in the head but in the chest: more specifically, in the lungs and the heart. This pulmo-cardiac theory of the mind is based on the observation that a variation in mental activity corresponds to a variation in respiration. Since breath moves briskly within those organs in moments of emotional unrest or cognitive indecision, it was identified with the thought-impulse of the thinking and feeling person. If so, the word sōphrosynē testifies to a holistic conception of human and animal consciousness, where body and mind are regarded as such an interdependent unity that ‘self-control’ entails a real psychosomatic achievement.
Gr. ἄφρων [adj.] ‘senseless’: a Reassessment
Philologia Classica, 2021
The present article offers a reassessment of Hom. ἄφρων [adj.] ‘unreasonable, senseless, foolish’, which is traditionally accounted for as an ablauting compound (of the type πατήρ : πάτωρ) based on the simplex φρένες [f.pl.tant.] ‘midriff, diaphragm’ (+Il.). This archaic ablauting pattern (viz. °φρων vs. simplex φρήν*) is totally unparalleled for body parts; besides, the Ancients’ interpretation of φρένες as ‘diaphragm’ is flawed. Φρονέω ‘to have (good) understanding or intelligence’ is a back-formation coined after φρονέω ‘to act senselessly, to be foolish’. From zero-graded φραίνω (via a synchronic reanalysis of -αίνω as a deverbative suffix of the type °φαίνω), an adverb * φρα-δόν ‘senselessly, foolishly’ was eventually coined, which was the starting point of a whole new group. From this group was reanalyzed a “new” synchronic root √φραδ- ‘to heed, to consider’, reflected by Hom. φράζω. The lack of comparative evidence for this sprawling word family leads the author to assume ...
At the lexicon-syntax interface: Ancient Greek constructions with ἔχειν and psychological nouns
Στο άρθρο αυτό μελετώνται συγκριτικά τρία δομικά σχήματα της αρχαίας ελληνικής στα οποία το ρήμα ἔχειν συνδυάζεται με ένα ονοματικό κατηγόρημα ψυχικού πάθους. Οι τρεις δομές διαφοροποιούνται ταυτοχρόνως από τη θέση του ονόματος που εκφράζει το ψυχικό πάθος (υποκείμενο, άμεσο αντικείμενο και προθετική φράση) και από τον αριθμό των ορισμάτων (είτε μόνο ο φορέας εμπειρίας είτε ο φορέας εμπειρίας και το θέμα/εξωτερικό ερέθισμα). Η μελέτη που έγινε με βάση ένα σώμα κειμένων της αρχαϊκής και κλασικής περιόδου αφορά την λεξικο-συντακτική ανάλυση των τριών δομών και την κατανομή τους. * I would like to thank Elisa Ghia for her linguistic review of the contribution and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on a previous version of this paper. Many thanks also to Sophie Vassilaki, who translated my abstract into Greek. 1 Abbreviations of Greek texts and authors follow Liddell, ). English translations of Greek texts are taken from the Loeb Classical Library editions, with minor changes.
This article argues that the meaning of σύνεσις in the classical period has been inadequately understood, and consequently its historical significance has likely been misplaced. The traditional view is that the word possessed two basic meanings. First and foremost, σύνεσις meant a general ability to understand. Second and less frequently, it meant moral conscience or some such ability to judge the morality of human choice and action. However, by considering anew the attestations of σύνεσις and its grammatically related forms, it will be shown that σύνεσις never meant moral conscience, but instead often denoted a hermeneutic virtue by which we interpret the deeper significance of things said and done.
On the Significance of Kephalē (“Head”): A Study of the Abuse of One Greek Word
Priscilla Papers, 2016
There has been, and continues to be, a great deal of confusion, consternation, and perhaps grief, over the meaning of the Greek word kephalē (" head ") in the NT. Some claim that the word means " source " ;2 others claim that it means " authority over " ;3 still others have different ideas regarding the meaning of this Greek word.4 A great deal of ink has been spilled defending this or that position while attacking the others, yet the debate continues. There are many issues related to the understanding of words in general (semantics), and to kephalē in particular, that have either been ignored, downplayed, or misconstrued by various proponents of the meaning of kephalē in the NT. Essentially, traditionalists argue that kephalē means " authority over " whereas egalitarians argue that the meaning of this Greek word is " source. " Authors on both sides of this debate have committed errors in the form of arguments used, in the method of semantic analysis, as well as in the citation of their primary Greek sources.5 In this article, I will review some general principles of semantic analysis and some other related background issues which bear on the meaning of kephalē in the NT. I will also discuss how the Septuagint (the translation of the Hebrew OT into Greek in the third to second centuries BC) and some other Greek authors (notably Plato, Plutarch, and Philo) have been misappropriated in the discussion of kephalē. Because there are so many various passages in Greek literature which have been invoked as " proof " for this or that side in the debate, I cannot possibly review them all. Rather, I have selected only certain passages for discussion in order to illustrate the points I wish to make.
The vocabulary of madness from Homer to Hippocrates. Part 1: The verbal group of µαίνοµαι
In Part 1 of this two-part paper, I examine the evolution of the concept of madness expressed by the various forms – verbal and nominal, simple and compound – of the verbal group of µαίνομαι in the archaic and classical periods. I point out how the divine madness is contrasted to pathological madness considered as a psychic and mental disease and foreseeable by doctors as well as curable by medications. This new procedure highlights rational knowledge of the Greeks about the cause and the medical care of madness. In Greek thought, madness represents an abundant source of tragic events. In this two-part paper, we will study the terms belonging to the verbal groups of μαίνομαι and βακχεύω, as well as the noun λύσσα and its nominal and verbal derivatives, from Homer to Hippocrates. Firstly, we will single out the meaning of the various forms, verbal and nominal, simple and compound. Secondly, we will compare them in the totality of their usages in order to bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between them. This synchronic and diachronic study of these terms is the first to be undertaken and will enlighten our understanding of the evolution of the concept of madness from the archaic to classical period.
Ἔρως and γυμναστική in the platonic corpus: The quest for the Form of Κάλλος
2019
The role of Ἔρως in the Platonic dialogues It has been sufficiently demonstrated by J.-P. Vernant that many divinities in the Greek pantheon were named after psychological functions, mental attitudes, intellectual qualities and above all passions or sentiments. 2 In this context, the presence of Ἔρως in this specific category of divine entities comes as no surprise. Despite the fact that we could examine a plethora of interesting forms, figures and roles of Ἔρως in the ancient Greek literary tradition, 3 in this paper, I focus on the concept of Ἔρως in the Platonic corpus and its relation to the technē of γυμναστική. In fact, Ἔρως seems to be ever-present in Plato's philosophical work, influencing his thought. The two dialogues that discuss this particular notion extensively, however, are the Symposium and