Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne- Moreland Argument from Consciousness (original) (raw)
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Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind known as Functionalism, it is quite possible to construct a model of pantheism which is not as implausible as restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism. The aim of this article is to explain how this might work, but also to say why, in the end, it will not do the same job as restricted theism, even if it turned out to be true. The article does not aim to defend its premises, such as pantheism or functionalism, in more than a cursory way; the conclusions of the article are tentative and conditional: if functionalism is true, then physicalist pantheism may be true. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02580136.2016.1209922
Arguing to Theism from Consciousness
Faith and Philosophy, 2020
I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first give a form of the argument which ultimately, I think is difficult to evaluate. As such I move on to provide what I take to be a stronger argument, where I claim that consciousness given our worldly laws of nature offers rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter point the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections.
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Critical notice of JP Moreland's Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument
2011
This book divides naturally into three parts. The first part consists of two chapters, the first of which sets out what Moreland takes to be ‘the epistemic backdrop’ against which ‘the argument from consciousness’ is properly assessed, and the second of which presents several ‘versions’ of ‘the argument from consciousness.’ The second part consists of five chapters, each of which is devoted to a close analysis of the work of a particular theorist: John Searle, Tim O’Connor, Colin McGinn, David Skrbina, and Philip Clayton. The third part consists of two chapters, the first of which develops and defends ‘the Autonomy thesis’—roughly, the claim that, where central questions of philosophy have answers, those answers do not substantively depend on science—and the second of which argues that it is fear of God that drives ‘current and confident acceptance of strong physicalism and naturalism and rejection of dualism’ (176). I have discussed much of the material in the first two chapters of this book elsewhere—see my chapter on arguments from consciousness in C. Meister, J. P. Moreland, and K. Sweis (eds.) (forthcoming). In this review, I propose to focus more attention on the final two chapters. However, I shall begin with a discussion of the presentation of ‘the argument from consciousness’ in Chapter Two.
Neural Correlates of Consciousness and the Nature of the Mind
In Mihretu Guta (ed.), Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties (New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2019)
It is often thought that contemporary neuroscience provides strong evidence for physicalism that nullifies dualism. The principal data is neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC). In this chapter I argue that NCC are neutral vis-à-vis physicalist and dualist views of the mind. First I clarify what NCC are and how neuroscientists identify them. Subsequently I discuss what NCC entail and highlight the need for philosophical argumentation in order to conclude that physicalism is true by appealing to NCC. Lastly, the simplicity argument for physicalism that appeals to NCC is presented, analyzed, and found wanting.
The fine-tuned universe and the existence of God
HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, 2017
Recent research in science indicates that we are living in a fine-tuned universe. Only a very small parameter space of universal fundamental constants in Physics is congenial for the existence of life. Moreover, recent studies in Biological evolution also reveal that fine-tuning did exist in the evolution. It seems that we are so lucky to exist as all universal fundamental constants and life-permitting factors really fall into such a very small life-allowing region. This problem is known as the fine-tuning problem. Does this phenomenon need an explanation? Can the fine-tuning problem point to the existence of God? Modern Science invokes the idea of multiverse to address the fine-tuning problem. Some scientists suggest that each universe in a set of infinitely many universes contains a typical set of fundamental constants. We should not be surprised why our universe is fine-tuned because we would not exist if the constants are not the life-allowed values. Some suggest that the existence of God can explain this fine-tuning problem. The naturalistic multiverse theory and the existence of God are the two most robust proposals to address the fine-tuning problem. Moreover, some argue that the fine-tuning problem is not real because we are just subject to observational selection effect. In this thesis, I will provide a comprehensive discussion on the fine-tuning phenomena in our universe. In particular, I will use the confirmation principle and the inference to the best explanation simultaneously to evaluate different hypotheses in a more systematic way and give some of the new and updated scientific and philosophical arguments to respond to the recent criticisms of the fine-tuning arguments. I conclude that the theistic hypothesis is the best among all to address the fine-tuning problem.
Retiring The Argument From Reason: Another Reply to Reppert
Philosophia Christi , 2019
In C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, edited by Gregory Bassham, Victor Reppert and I debated Lewis’s argument from reason (which claims that naturalism is self-defeating).1 I took the con. Since the publication of our debate, Reppert wrote an additional reply to my arguments—a reply that directly precedes this article in the fall 2018 edition of Philosophia Christi.2 The journal graciously offered me the opportunity to reply to his article before it went to print. With that opportunity I will evaluate Reppert’s argument logically and explain why it ultimately fails
Philosophia Christi , 2014
As a contribution to the discussion over ramied natural theology, I put forward a some lines of thought for a distinctively Cartesian variation of natural theology that points in the direction of the Christian God as a mind and as personal. I propose that Cartesian natural theology, as commonly seen in the literature on substance dualism, see the soul as a “sign” or “pointer” to God such that we, as human persons, seem to have access to God’s nature and existence via the soul (mind) as a rationale for the world full of persons. On this basis, I respond to a common anti-Cartesian charge(s) from subjectivism and suggest that this approach deserves further consideration concerning theological prolegomena.