Dialectics of Qualia (original) (raw)
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Qualia
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term 'qualia' (singular 'quale') to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term 'qualia'. The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories of qualia, qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties, relational theories of qualia and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.
Qualia in the Science of Consciousness
Qualia in the Science of Consciousness, 2021
The article demonstrates the ability of the science of consciousness to offer solutions to scientific problems that are unsolvable in other fields of knowledge. The problem of qualia, the complexity of which is recognized by most researchers, is chosen as an example. This choice can be considered accidental, given the variety of philosophical and scientific questions that only the science of consciousness can answer. Any interested reader can learn the basics of this science by reading my previous article The New Science of Consciousness.
International Journal of Arts, Humanities, and Social Studies, 2016
In Daniel Dennett’s “Quining Qualia”, 15 intuitional pumps are used to argue that qualia cannot be founded on four commonly assumed features. Dennett’s aim is to eventually make anyone uncomfortable when trying to sensibly talk of qualia. We will go over Dennett’s stance as well as several of the intuitional pumps he uses. We will reject that the considerations he raises does not give us reason to doubt that qualia is ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness. Moreover, by rejecting that Dennett’s stance and intuition pumps gives us reason to doubt qualia in the pre-theoretical sense, we argue that we should not abandon sensible talk of qualia.