Dialectics of Qualia (original) (raw)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Qualia
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term 'qualia' (singular 'quale') to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term 'qualia'. The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories of qualia, qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties, relational theories of qualia and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.
1998
One of the major concerns for the contemporary philosophy of mind involves the problem of qualia. The word qualia refers to our subjective experience of the world and includes the properties of our experience that cannot be located in the world external to our minds. For example, the ineffable feel of a blue experience when one looks at the sky, or the pain one feels when one is stuck with a pin. These sensations are the essence of our experience and yet cannot be pointed to in the external world.
2007
This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and 'ordinary' grounds. I distinguish my representative realism from sense-data theories and from recent 'representational' or 'intentional' theories, and I argue that there is no good reason to adopt a physicalist stance that denies the reality of qualia as phenomenally available intentional contents in Brentano's original sense of 'intentionality'.
Qualia in a contemporary neurobiological perspective
Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: 1) Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. 2) The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including cultural infl uences, and is individually unique. Part of the cerebral neuronal processing is molded by individual memories and previous experiences. 3) Biological processes underlying the realization of qualia, including neural activities, escape conscious control. The temporal expression of qualia is in part consciously channeled by, for instance, actual situations and cultural habits. 4) Neuroscientifi c explanations refer to general principles of nature, rather than to individual phenomena. Hence, future neurobiological approaches might aim to identify which neuronal processes are involved in qualia and how. It seems illusory to explain each quale.
2009
The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern 'phenomenal concept strategy' is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitly endorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I therefore suggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, by whatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that we adopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties which cannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible 'propositional attitude' mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on, where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accounts have the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitions discussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science. 1 Qualia are the characteristic properties of phenomenal consciousness: something is a state of phenomenal consciousness if and only if it has such properties.
2014
In his paper “Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems?”, Daniel Dennett argues that philosophers and scientists should abandon Ned Block ’s distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. First he lays out why the assumption of phenomenal consciousness as a second medium is not a reasonable idea. In a second step he shows why beings like us must be convinced that there are qualia, that is, why we have the strong temptation to believe in their existence. This commentary is exclusively concerned with this second part of the target paper. In particular, I offer a more detailed picture, guided by five questions that are not addressed by Dennett . My proposal, however, still resides within the framework of Dennett ’s philosophy in general. In particular I use the notion of intentional systems of different orders to fill in some details. I tell the counterfactual story of some first-order intentional systems evolving to become believers in qualia as bui...
Beaton, M. (2009). Qualia and Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(5): 88-110.
Qualia and Introspection, 2009
The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has beenendorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right:we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitlyendorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I thereforesuggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, bywhatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that weadopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties whichcannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible‘propositional attitude’ mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on,where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accountshave the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitionsdiscussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science.
Phenomenal properties [microform] : the epistemology and metaphysics of qualia /
This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical (e.g. Nagel, Chalmers, Jackson), and those who implicitly or explicitly treat qualia as contentful but nonphenomenal physical properties (e.g. Dretske, Lycan, Armstrong, Tye).