EDITORIAL 2Compulsory Voting, Compulsory Talking. (original) (raw)
Related papers
Democracy's duty: The history of political debates on compulsory voting
PhD Dissertation, 2011
My doctoral dissertation examines the political and conceptual arguments on compulsory voting in French, Belgian and Greek parliamentary debates from 1848 onwards. The constitutional, legislative and scholarly discussions under consideration feature a mélange of ideological views and party interests, which bridge the gap between formal political thought and everyday political practice. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (1870-1926), growing electoral abstention, caused partly by the extension of franchise, led to the search of an effective tool of political inclusion. More specifically, compulsory voting was meant to integrate mainly the demotivated conservatives, but also to prevent forced abstention of workers, organized election boycotts and other problems specific to the historical context. Proponents of the reform in the three countries drew on ideas such as the organic principle of voting function, the ideal of 'mirror' representativeness (Belgium), the educative aspects of electoral participation, civic responsibility, political solidarity and the need for parliamentary stability (France), as well as the ancient ideal of participatory self-government (Greece). Opponents, on the other hand, emphasized the involuntary nature of such a binding obligation, their contempt for disinterested citizens and the manipulative potential of such a measure. Moving forward to the late 1990s, contemporary debates have underlined the tension between, on one hand, the individual freedom to abstain and, on the other, the need for democratic inclusiveness and effective equality of voting chances, especially with respect to disadvantaged groups in society. The question of compulsory voting remains a matter of endless political and ideological dispute: from a theoretical point of view it is linked with the inherent liberty-versus-equality paradox of democratic representation, while in practical terms it relates to electoral-system design and partisan interests, which are embedded in their specific political and social contexts.
Anthoula Malkopoulou DEMOCRACY'S DUTY: THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL DEBATES ON COMPULSORY VOTING
One of the most controversial solutions proposed to counter voter apathy is compulsory voting. Early variations of the idea and practice have existed since ancient times, but a more systematic consideration began in the second half of the nineteenth century. A long series of legislative proposals in the French Third Republic (1870-1940) and a constitutional reform in Belgium (1893) opened the path for thought-provoking parliamentary debates. In the 1920s, other countries followed suit and, in particular, Greece, where the different historical context gave the discussions a new perspective. In general, the discourse on the legal obligation to vote has been transformed with new rationales and adapted to pragmatic concerns up to the present day. This thesis focuses on the multiple rhetorical justifications used for or against compulsory voting since the advent of modern representative democracy. Attention is given to the content of arguments, the intentions of speakers (including their political objectives and moral assumptions), the interaction with other institutions and the overall effects of the discourse on political life. Thus, my methodology brings a particular style of comparative history of political concepts to the study of electoral institutions.
Democracy and Compulsory Voting
Political Research Quarterly, 2019
In this article I aim to show that compulsory voting cannot be defended on democratic grounds. In pursuing this task, I first offer a generic account of the democratic argument in favour of compulsory voting, drawing on some of the most salient recent defences of a moral duty to vote. I then offer an overarching objection which defeats both the generic form of the democratic argument for compulsory voting and its various operationalizations. The crux of the objection is that the democratic justification of a moral duty to vote is parasitical upon the existence of a moral duty to vote well. This decisively undermines the democratic argument for compulsory voting, since the latter can only be deployed as an enforcement mechanism for a duty to vote, regardless of the substantive content of that vote.
Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory, Vol. 15, 2011
In the late 1990s, the debate on compulsory voting came back again, after almost a century of silence. Postwar democratic theory had focused on the dangers of demagogic manipulation of mass participation and often portrayed citizens as ignorant and self-interested. This elitist critique of elections has been coupled with arguments from the side of participatory democracy, which describe elections as a ritualistic formality that is unfrequent and insufficient in capturing the will of the people. Drawing on this original pool of arguments against elections, opposition to compulsory voting has been dominating in the last decades. To challenge the status quo, this article presents the normative arguments in support of the idea through the discussion of four main principles: 1) political liberty 2) equal representation 3) civic literacy and 4) democratic legitimacy. At the core of each of these categories lie certain concepts whose content and relevance are challenged from opposing viewpoints.
The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting
American Journal of Political Science, 2019
In this article, I defend compulsory voting on the grounds that it reinforces the distinctive and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democracy. Some scholars have suggested that mandatory voting laws can improve government responsiveness to members of poor and marginalized groups who are less likely to vote. Critics of compulsory voting object that citizens can participate in a wide variety of ways; voting is not important enough to justify forcing people to do it. These critics neglect the importance of voting’s particular role in contemporary democratic practice, though. The case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit, but widely shared, understanding of elections as special moments of mass participation that manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. The most prominent objections to mandatory voting fail to appreciate this distinctive role for voting and the way it is embedded within a broader democratic framework.
compulsory voting: a critical perspective
British Journal of Political Science 40.4 (2010) 897-915
Should voting be compulsory? This question has recently gained the attention of political scientists, politicians and philosophers, many of whom believe that countries, like Britain, which have never had compulsion, ought to adopt it. The arguments are a mixture of principle and political calculation, reflecting the idea that compulsory voting is morally right and that it is will prove beneficial. This article casts a sceptical eye on the claims, by emphasizing how complex political morality and strategy can be. Hence, I show, while there are good reasons to worry about voter turnout in established democracies, and to worry about inequalities of turnout as well, the case for compulsory voting is unpersuasive.
VOTING: A CITIZEN’S RIGHT OR DUTY? THE CASE OF COMPULSORY VOTING
Compulsory voting is a law, enacted against low turnout rates in elections in modern democracies and political inequality in society. However, the fact that voting is closely related to nature of sovereignty has brought questions about whether it is a right or a duty to vote at this point. It is expressed that it is not democratic to force an individual to use something that his or her right, and therefore it is an interference with the freedom and will of the individual and compulsory voting is being opposed. On the other hand, it is argued that voting is a duty and responsibility, such as payin taxes, and that compulsory voting is justifiable in democracies when considering its role in educating individuals, democracy and legitimacy. This study deals with compulsory voting which has not been examined in Turkey itself, as far as known. In this context, the definition and historical development of compulsory voting, and the arguments for and against it will be analyzed comparatively. It will also be discussed compulsory voting in the world, how it is enforced and what sanctions are foreseen, what alternative practices are envisaged instead of compulsory voting. In addition, the development of the electoral system and compulsory 1 This study was produced from a section of master's thesis titled " Voting: A Citizen's Right, or Duty? Legitimizing Compulsory Voting " written by Murat Kaçer under the supervision of Prof. Adem Çaylak
As a democratic institution, compulsory voting has its origins in the oldest European democracy, Athens. Greek philosophy is known for the significance it attaches to political engagement, which forms the backbone of the classical republican tradition. Despite the widely held view that political participation in Athenian democracy was mostly voluntary, ancient sources do provide evidence that such participation was in some cases legally enforced. Similarly, an institutional obligation to participate directly in the decision- making of small-scale political units survived in medieval and early modern communities. Later on, as modern democracies grew larger and became more representative, participation in indirect structures of decision-making contin- ued to be thought of as enforceable, or at least as a moral duty.
'Should Voting Be Compulsory? Democracy and the Ethics of Voting'
The ethics of voting have received relatively little attention from philosophers and political scientists, though they are far more complicated than one might have supposed. It is hard to draw a sharp line between the principles that might justify adopting or rejecting compulsory voting, and the evaluation of individual and collective behaviour within those rules. Resolving disputes about compulsory voting, therefore, requires us to decide when, if ever, people are morally entitled to vote on sectarian identities and interests, rather than for the ‘common good’ of their fellow citizens; when, if ever, they are morally entitled to vote on altruistic, rather than self-interested, concerns; and when, if ever, they may vote strategically, rather than sincerely. We do not yet have good answers to these questions. Above all, it is difficult to resolve disputes over the ethics of voting in general, and compulsory voting in particular, without relating the conceptions of rights, duty, freedom and equality involved to those in other areas of moral and political philosophy, and to more empirical work on voting, on comparative public policy and political economy. This chapter explains why this is the case.