The Phenomenology of Morals (original) (raw)
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A Nietzschean Account of Valuing
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2020
I give an account of Nietzsche's conception of valuing that builds on Katsafanas' 2016 account. Katsafanas argues that an agent values X iff the agent (1) has a drive-induced positive affective orientation toward X, and (2) does not disapprove of this affective orientation. I object to condition (2) by showing that Nietzsche thinks we can disapprove of our values and still count as holding them. On my view, an agent values the aim of one of their drives when the drive is strong enough to generate an abiding positive affective orientation toward its aim. I argue that my view can address the four objections Katsafanas levels against Richardson, Poellner, and Clark and Dudrick's accounts, without neglecting the Nietzschean thought that we can feel intensely conflicted and uneasy about our values.
PREFACE 1 We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" [Matthew 6:21]; our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are constantly making for them, being by nature winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit; there is one thing alone we really care about from the heart—"bringing something home." Whatever else there is in life, so-called "experiences"—which of us has sufficient earnestness for them? Or sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us "absent-minded": we cannot give our hearts to it—not even our ears! Rather, as one divinely preoccupied and immersed in himself into whose ear the bell has just boomed with all its strength the twelve beats of noon suddenly starts up and asks himself: "what really was that which just struck?" so we sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, "what really was that which we have just experienced?" and moreover: "who are we really?" and, afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas! miscount them.—So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law "Each is furthest from himself" applies to all eternity—we are not "men of knowledge" with respect to ourselves. 2 My ideas on the origin of our moral prejudices—for this is the subject of this polemic—received their first, brief, and provisional expression in the collection of aphorisms that bears the title Human, All-Too-Human. A Book for Free Spirits. This book was begun in Sorrento during a winter when it was given to me to pause as a wanderer pauses and look back across the broad and dangerous country my spirit had traversed up to that time. This was in the winter of 1876-77; the ideas themselves are older. They were already in essentials the same ideas that I take up again in the present treatises—let us hope the long interval has done them good, that they have become riper, clearer, stronger, more perfect! That I still cleave to them today, however, that they have become in the meantime more and more firmly attached to one another, indeed entwined and interlaced with one another, strengthens my joyful assurance that they might have arisen in me from the first not as isolated, capricious, or sporadic things but from a common root, from a fundamental will of knowledge, pointing imperiously into the depths, speaking more and more precisely, demanding greater and greater precision. For this alone is fitting for a philosopher. We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity
The peculiar (social) objectivity of moral values
Even within the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition of moral philosophy, fertile ground for many subjectivist, “non-cognitivist,” and “emotionalist” accounts on moral phenomena, some philosophers, including Iris Murdoch, Philippa Foot, and John McDowell have adopted various forms of realism in their theories. The subjectivism vs objectivism debate in moral philosophy turns out to be so acute since moral values and norms have a dual character —they are objective realities in the sense that do not depend on our will and consciousness, but also subjective realities in the sense that are products of our activity as social subjects, unable to exist independently of this activity. In other words, they possess a peculiar form of objectivity that differs from the strictly natural form of objectivity. From a Marxist point of view, this essay tries to uncover the nature of this particular form of objectivity, while showing, through a critique of some ideas advanced by John McDowell on the subject, the resultant mistakes of not taking its peculiarity into account.
Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality and Revaluation of Values
2018
One of Nietzsche’s main projects was to critique morality and to invite a revaluation of our values. Neither secular nor religious interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique of morality do it justice. Each support their own interpretation by appealing to certain aspects of his writings. The former appeal to Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity and Christian morality; while the latter appeal to Nietzsche’s anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian remarks. In actuality, Nietzsche was neither of the two: he argued that Western secular moralities are a modern manifestation of Christian morality, and that Christian morality is a manifestation of what he comes to call “Slave Morality.” On this account, this thesis is a humble attempt to bring forth a philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche’s critique and historical analysis of morality, and how we can incorporate his critique and revaluation of values into our lives so we can live a better life. I hope that my contribution will be a meaningfu...
A Philosophically Appealing Nietzschean Theory of Value
2016
This thesis is an attempt to bring forth a novel and philosophically appealing reading of Nietzsche, especially as it pertains to his theory of value. I define philosophically appealing as the view with the least amount of inconsistencies that still reaches a simple and logical conclusion. I explore questions regarding Nietzsche’s nihilism, his normative and metaphysical claims, as well as his view on human nature. I aim to satisfy sophisticated readers by investigating complex philosophical issues related to my interpretation of Nietzsche. I also aim to satisfy less sophisticated readers by explaining how my view is applicable, and beneficial, to one’s life. Given that there’s no widespread agreement as to what reading of Nietzsche is correct, the goal of my thesis is to contribute meaningfully to this ongoing debate.
The Missing of Moral Entity in Modern Civilization: Values and Social Aspects 1
2012
Modernity and the modernization process are generally accepted as favourable phenomena. While on one side of the coin we see how modernity has greatly benefited mankind in areas of science, technology and economics, the other side of the coin -the costs of modernization -has often been intentionally left unnoticed or put within footnotes as inconvenient afterthoughts. One such thorny issue that has been the source of debate between pro-modernists and anti-modernists is the effect modernization has on the values and social aspects of society. Modernity and morality are deemed to be separate concerns; one can exist without the other, or, as some believe, in place of the other. The dilemma -modernity without morality, or morality without modernity -is one that can be answered through a scrutiny of the values themselves that are held by modern societies. This research note is an attempt to compare and contrast the conventional Western approach to ethics, values and social concepts, to t...
Moral Theory in the Western Tradition and Its Application within Modern Democratic Societies
Open Journal of Philosophy Vol.14 No.4, 2024
There are three main moral theories: virtue ethics, the deontological approach and utilitarianism. The concern here is how they interrelate, why they come into focus at different times and places, and how they are configured in their application to a modern democratic society. Person-oriented virtue ethics was the dominant understanding in Ancient Greece but within the Western tradition this was later subordinated to the monotheism of Ancient Judaism as modified by Christianity. Of growing importance by the eighteenth century was rights theory which was often still situated religiously. Kant’s principle of the categorical imperative has been highly influential but was challenged by the emerging nature of industrial and capitalist society. Utilitarianism, within which the moral rightness of activity resides in its tendency to promote happiness or unhappiness, represented the decisive move from the transcendental to the immanent approach. Although all three approaches to moral theory continue to be relevant to identifiable situations and aspects of modern society, there has been a substantial turn towards a heavily modified utilitarianism associated with parliamentary democracy and market economies founded on property ownership. The root cause of this is the ability of utilitarianism, as opposed to the other approaches, to handle considerations of number and probability. The concept of utility is fundamental in economics but the idea has evolved away from its origins to mean “preference”. There is a sense in which the straightforward appeal of basic utilitarianism has been “leased out” in modified form to a set of institutional arrangements. Certain “pressure points” in a modern society are noted which pose particular problems pertinent to moral theory. Bernard Williams argues persuasively for an appropriately modified form of virtue ethics.
Philosophy of values and ethics in Ayn Rand's axiological objectivism
Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2024
The paper presents an analysis and interpretation of axiology and ethics as seen by the writer and philosopher Ayn Rand. The author follows the assumption that, in a situation where indifference is observed with regard to values (cf. Simmel, Sloterdijk), a return of philosophical reasoning to the idea of objectivity of values could be worthwhile. Therefore, he examines a specific type of axiological objectivism that can be found in Rand's work. In the present paper, the suggested comparison with Baden neo-Kantism as well as phenomenological axiology serves to capture the specifics of Rand's axiological approach. These lie in placing emphasis on such a relationship between facts and values in which values result from the facts of reality, as well as in the very understanding of the objectivity of values that Rand identifies with long-term life goals and identifies them as an objective necessity for an individual's life. Following the analysis of Rand's axiology, the author focuses on her understanding of ethics, which he places in contrast to Kant's deontology, as well as morality, which he views through the prism of a business relationship based on the exchange of values. The aim of the paper is to, by means of an analysis and interpretation of Rand's ideas, show that objective values can be understood as a necessary prerequisite for consequential ethics and an individual living a happy life without being anchored in transcendence or social consensus.