Forgiveness, Resentment, and Intentional Agency (original) (raw)
Related papers
Philosophical accounts of forgiveness ordinarily emphasize three components: i) the overcoming of hostile emotions toward the wrongdoer; ii) a change of heart toward the wrongdoer, which goes beyond the cessation of hostile emotions and involves the acquisition of a more positive attitude toward him or her; iii) a willingness to restore the relationship and proceed toward reconciliation. In this paper, I examine these three presumed components, endorsing the first but rejecting the second and the third as unnecessary features of forgiveness. I thus argue that forgiveness is, first and foremost, a unilateral , intra-psychic process that does not necessarily lead to reconciliation or to the fostering of friendly relations. The paper has three parts. In the first part, I argue that overcoming resentment toward one's assailant by coming to view oneself more favourably lies at the core of forgiveness. In the second part, I show that one need not be able to view one's assailant in a different and more favourable light to be able to overcome one's resentment and forgive one's assailant. Furthermore, in the third part, I argue that a wholly negative view of the wrongdoer, moral hatred and a refusal to be reconciled with him or her are compatible with forgiving him or her.
Why Must We Forgive? (2013, 2015, 2016)
Final version published in "Compassion and Forgiveness: Religious and Philosophical Perspectives from Around the World." Edited and introduced by Edward J. Alam. Louaize: Notre Dame University, 2013. The present version (2015) is slightly revised.
The paper tries to show that personal forgiveness is an act of overcoming resentment, among others, to open up to possibilities of accommodating the Other. Such an act is spiritual in nature in the sense that to forgive is an act that goes beyond being human. The paper identifies the components of personal forgiveness, identifies what forgiveness is not, distinguishes the different kinds of forgiveness, and argues that personal forgiveness is a form of enlightened self-interest.
Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is a paradoxical phenomenon. I here examine two of the most widespread ways of dealing with the paradoxical nature of forgiveness. One of these ways, emblematized by Aurel Kolnai, seeks to resolve the paradox by appealing to the idea of repentance. Somehow, if a wrongdoer repents, then forgiving her is no longer paradoxical. I argue that this infl uential position faces more problems than it solves. Th e other way to approach the paradox, exemplifi ed here by the work of Jacques Derrida, is just too obscure to be by itself helpful. Yet, I argue that what I take to be its spirit is on the right track. I recommend distinguishing between (1) the defi nition and the justifi cation of forgiveness, and also between (2) forgiveness understood as (a) a mental phenomenon and (b) an overt, communicative act. Th ese distinctions are not given their due in the specialized literature, and I expose the nefarious consequences of this neglect. By focusing on forgiveness as a mental phenomenon I seek to analyze the root of the talk of paradoxes which surrounds the discussion of forgiveness. Finally, I present an analysis of forgiveness as a pure mental phenomenon, and argue that this analysis is the most important step in understanding forgiveness in any other sense. While my analysis reveals interesting aspects of forgiveness, it reveals, too, that forgiveness is not quite as paradoxical after all.
Introduction: Forgiveness and Conflict
Philosophia, 2016
The papers collected in this volume are a selection of papers that were presented-or scheduled to be presented-at a workshop entitled Forgiveness and Conflict, which took place from 8-10 September 2014, as part of the Mancept Workshops in Political Theory at the University of Manchester. Some of these contributions are now compiled in this volume. The selected papers draw from different philosophical traditions and conceptual frameworks, addressing many aspects of contemporary philosophical debates on the nature and normativity of forgiveness, including its political aspects. The result is a rich collection of essays which covers a wide variety of philosophical issues, displaying cutting edge scholarship in this area. This introduction provides a brief overview of some of the central themes discussed in the volume with a particular emphasis on their innovative aspects.
A Change of Heart: Essays in the Moral Philosophy of Forgiveness
2012
List of papers Paper 1 Gamlund, E. The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 18 (5) 651-671 (2010) DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2010. 528602 Paper 2 Gamlund, E. Supererogatory Forgiveness. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 53 (6) 540-564 (2010) DOI: 10.1080/0020174X. 2010.526320 Denne avhandlingen tar for seg noen sentrale problemstillinger knyttet til tilgivelsens etikk.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014
Forgiveness is closely related to emotions. Bishop Butler’s “forswearing of resentment” is still the definition most take as their point of departure. The negativity of this approach is striking. Can we say more about the positive features of forgiveness? This paper aims to contribute to such a “non-privative” characterization of forgiveness. I argue that we should take seriously the thought that forgiveness is a sui generis emotion type. Forgiveness may be classified as an emotion because it displays a sufficient number of the generic features by which we distinguish emotions from other mental attitudes and episodes. But forgiveness is also clearly distinguishable from other emotions in terms of its core evaluative concern, phenomenology and empirical characteristics. I also make a case for the claim that forgiveness is the positively valenced counterpart of resentment. The suggestion is that the relationship of resentment and forgiveness is similar to that between other emotions of opposite valence such as envy/admiration, thrill/fear, or lust/disgust. The overcoming of resentment, which is generally assumed to be distinctive about forgiveness, consists on this proposal in the reversal of resentment’s emotional valence.
Recognizing contingency. A philosophical reflection on forgiveness
Forgiveness has apparently to do with either the individual-psychological sphere or with a religious/political dimension. It does not seem to be a philosophically relevant topic and, in fact, there have not been many remarkable philosophical investigations about it. One of the most significant is made in the last pages of the Spirit chapter of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit , where forgiveness is given a philosophically decisive function. In a first step I sketch the features and the role of forgiveness in Hegel's text. However, my aim is not a faithful reconstruction of Hegel's argument, but rather, starting from its categories, the development of an idealistically-inspired and systematically-attractive philosophical reflection on forgiveness. In a second step I interpret the Hegelian concepts to work out four main aspects of forgiveness, developing a partial philosophical definition of it as a) activity, and not simple re-activity or passivity; b) rehabilitation of the meaningfulness of the linguistic act; c) integral concreteness; and d) recognition and acceptance of contingency.
The Possibilities of Forgiveness
Journal of Religious Ethics, 41.3, 2013
Perhaps the best way to challenge anodyne popular conceptions of forgiveness is to highlight the ways in which “forgiveness,” like “justice” and “freedom,” is a rich and deeply contested term that relies for its content on divergent convictions about who we are and who we should seek to be. The essays in this focus issue articulate some of the many possibilities for practicing and thinking about forgiveness.
2016
This thesis discusses the nature of two interrelated moral phenomena, blame and forgiveness. The two main questions this thesis addresses are: What is it to blame someone? What is involved in forgiveness? I begin by offering an account of blame which fits well with the attitudes of apology and forgiveness, as responses to wrongdoing. I introduce the idea that we blame wrongdoers for the disrespect and lack of consideration expressed in their actions and behaviour. I use the broad Kantian idea that whenever people wrong each other there is a failure of respect involved. Following this idea, I propose to understand wrongdoing as expressing disrespect for the victim and therefore creating a deficit of respect. I argue that there is something corrective about the expression of blame. Wrongdoers create a deficit of respect when they wrong us and blame expressively makes good that disrespect. I then develop an account of earned forgiveness through apology. I argue that apologies have reas...
On Forgiveness and the Deliberate Refusal to Punish
In a recent article in this journal Brandon Warmke argues against my account of forgiveness. I here offer answers to his objections, and suggest ways in which I think he has misinterpreted my views. This exchange with Warmke also gives me the opportunity to insist on my general thesis that it is advisable to study punishment and forgiveness together. It is precisely the conceptual proximity of these two phenomena which make my account of forgiveness uncommon, and which make it more promising than other accounts.