In Defense of Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine (original) (raw)
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A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being
Ergo
According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right motivation for it is the 'experience requirement' (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one's pleasures.
Hedonistic Values: The term 'Hedonism' derives its origin from the Latin word hedone which means pleasure. This implises that hedonistic values subsists in pleasure,i.e, pleasure is the highest good.This is how man augments his actions with a view to derive maximum pleasure. The exponents of hedonism are J.S. Mill, James Bentham, David Hume andEpicurians. These thinkers assert that pleasure if the ultimate objective or SummumBonum of life. So it is an obvious phenomenon that according to these thinkers man always hankers after pleasure and avoid pain. Again according to these thinkers pleasure is that quality of mental process which man gets after the successful completion of an action entailing pleasurable perception with regard to a stupendous fortune.1 In view of the above we shall quote here the views of Bentham and Mill which are elucidated as follows. ``Bentham observes``Nature has placed mankind under the sovereign masters, viz , pleasure and pain; that man always seeks pleasure and pain.''2It is because of pleasure and pain only we do what we ought to do and what we shall do, i.e, our prospect is always some pleasure for which the action is facilitated as a means to produce pleasure thereby some pain are prevented with fruitful actions. Our motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure and pain acting in a particular manner. It is evident the , according to Bentham, actions are to be carried on keeping in view of pleasure /pain considerations. J.S. Mill also expounds``desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful are phenomena are entirely inseparable, rather two aspects of the same phenomena3''. The statement of Mill holds that attaining pleasure is the main objective of every action to which we are going to materialize. Hedonism emphasizes supreme importance to the heretic aspect of human nature. This revels that feeling or perceptual knowledge is the vital action of mental process.``Reason and will are good only as means of procuring and maintaining feeling; but feeling itself is good only in so far as it is pleasurable.''4 All that are not withstanding hedonistic values are basically perceptual or sensualistic by nature. In view of the above we may quote the aphorism of a British poet which are elucidated as follows.
Prudential Value or Well-Being
Well-Being or prudential value is one of the things we typically consider when figuring out what options, experiences, pursuits, or kinds of lives to pursue or choose. What’s best for me or in my best interest, the life of pleasure or the pursuit of knowledge? In this chapter I begin by introducing the linguistic contours of prudential value. I then present a sceptical challenge to the effect that well-being is not a sui generis kind of value but rather always reducible to absolute value. I argue that well-being cannot be an absolute value and is best understood as a relational value, and explain how this view connects and is compatible with views that assign to well-being radically different places on the subjectivity/objectivity spectrum. I then show how philosophy most broadly systematizes well-being claims in two main theoretical families, formal and substantive. Formal theories individuate those properties that purportedly determine whether something is good or bad for one (the prudential value-makers), while substantive theories individuate those things that purportedly make someone’s life go better for them (pleasure, friendship, virtue, etc.). I then illustrate the main players from both theoretical families, namely, hedonism, desire satisfaction theory, perfectionism, objective list theories, and happiness theories. Finally, I show how recent work in psychology and affective science should be viewed as the more or less explicit empirical articulation of these philosophical theories.
Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily. 1 INTRODUCTION The term 'hedonism' is used in several contexts. In moral philosophy it denotes the view that a good life should be a pleasurable life. In psychology it stands for the theory that pleasure seeking is a main motivator of human behaviour. In this paper I use the term for a way of life in which pleasure plays an important role. Hedonists are people who are positive about pleasure and who pluck the fruits of pleasure when possible. The reverse is asceticism, which involves the moral rejection of pleasure and abstinent behaviour. There is a longstanding discussion about the merits of this hedonism. Some praise it as natural and healthy, but others equate hedonism with overindulgence and moral decay. The mixed feelings about hedonism are reflected in the connotations surrounding the word. On one hand hedonism is associated with good taste and the art of living well, on the other hand with addiction, superficiality, irresponsible behaviour and shortsighted egoism.
Hedonism: Considering the Options
The idea of hedonism is almost as old as western society itself. During the Hellenic era, Epicureanism, the forerunner of modern hedonism, was a popular and widespread belief system. However, in the following centuries, it suffered a decline that has continued, with very little exception, to the modern day. Some of the most infamous characters in history have been accused of being "hedonists" and have, by acting in ways generally held to be morally unconscionable, created hatred and mistrust for hedonistic philosophies. In the popular mind, the term hedonism conjures up images of sexual excess and overindulgent spending. Although the philosophic community claims to be above these basic popular misconceptions, the body of literature dealing with hedonism shows that, for the most part, they are not. Many philosophers, like most members of the general public, are deceived by the seeming simplicity of hedonism.
Critically evaluate the position termed “Experiential Hedonism”.
Universally intrinsic value is theorised to only be possible through Experiential Hedonism; affective experiences dictate goodness and badness, and meaning. This theory is vulnerable to objections from the likes of Moore’s Open Question, as well as extreme reductionist and evolutionary debunking arguments. The basis of affective experiences in this position intensifies the plausibility of moral naturalisation, so long as it is not a result of basic moral intuitions, and that it has sufficient relation to goodness or badness. To even establish that positive affective experiences are not intuitions, and are connected, goodness would not prove it to be a plausible naturalisation of morality. As Nozick argues, this would create a situation where, if experience governed meaning, then imagining an experience without a physical occurrence would be sufficient to our consciousness (1974, p. 44). Since this is not the case for many humans, it seems that experiential hedonism takes caution to human desire to contact reality, and that the position is a “philosophy of swine”, and does not explain morality in a natural way. However it is this very desire that humans wish to make contact with reality that separates them from less sentient beings. Affective experience is more than simple emotion and behaviour, or instinct, but an explanation that makes hedonistic utilitarianism one of the strongest moral naturalisation theories to date.