Against Critical Realism (original) (raw)
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Studies on Ontological and Methodological Foundations of Critical Realism
This study analyses and evaluates the ontological and methodological foundations of the critical realist tradition in the social sciences. It is argued that the Kantian transcendental arguments used by Roy Bhaskar and some other critical realists in the justification of the critical realist ontology are problematic. The study indicates that critical realists fail to demonstrate how it is possible to acquire knowledge of the structure of reality, which is thought to exist independently of human knowledge and/or activities, by means of using a priori forms of argumentation. The concepts of causal power, emergence and social structure, which are all fundamental to critical realist social ontology, are also examined and evaluated. It is argued that these concepts are used ambiguously in Bhaskar’s early works and that their uses in the context of social ontology contain certain problematic presuppositions. In addition to critical evaluation of certain critical realist arguments and positions, this work seeks to develop scientifically realist and emergent materialist alternatives to the arguments and doctrines criticized. It is contended that a naturalistic method of argumentation in the context of ontology avoids the problems associated with the employment of Kantian transcendental arguments by critical realists. Furthermore, the non-transcendental and moderately non-essentalist interpretation of the concept of causal power is outlined and contrasted with Bhaskar’s essentialist and transcendental version of this concept. It is also argued that causal relations may not be open to single ontological definition. A systemic interpretation of the concepts of social system and social structure, which is largely based on Mario Bunge’s works, is provided as an alternative to the critical realist “depth-relational” social ontology. It is argued that a combination of Bunge’s systemic social ontology and William Wimsatt’s gradual notion of emergence provides a promising alternative to Bhaskar’s ambiguous concept of social emergence.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2010
Critical realists argue that the condition of possibility of the sciences is that they are based on a correct set of ontological assumptions or definitions. The task of philosophy is to underlabor for the sciences, by ensuring that the explanations developed are congruent with the ontological condition of possibility of the sciences. This requires critical realists to justify their claims about ontology and, to do this, they turn to ontological assumptions that are held to obtain in natural scientific knowledge and social agents’ lay knowledge. A number of problems with this approach are discussed and a problem-solving alternative is advocated. http://pos.sagepub.com/content/40/4/579.full.pdf+html
2005: Critical realism in the social sciences: an interview with Roy Bhaskar
Critical realism is gradually gaining ground in the social sciences. In this interview the founder of the critical realist philosophy of science, Roy Bhaskar, gives an account of the overall developments in his thought. Having briefly accounted for his background and reasons for becoming a philosopher and having explained how he took reflections on certain natural scientific practices as his starting point in the development of his philosophy, Bhaskar moves on to outline the main differences between the natural and the social sciences and to discuss his attempt to transcend the dualisms of the social sciences. The critical realist approach to the agency-structure dualism is contrasted with Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration, and Bhaskar explains what he sees as the main difference between critical realism and poststructuralist discourse theory. Towards the end of the interview, Bhaskar deals with the latest developments in his thought, and he reflects on the state of crisis in today’s world.
A tale of two ontologies: an immanent critique of critical realism
Sociological Review, 2004
In this article is it argued that critical realism has two mutually exclusive definitions of ontology. Ontology is defined as both a fallible interpretation of reality and as a definitive definition of a reality beyond our knowledge claims. A slippage in meaning occurs from the former to the latter, as critical realists try to justify the claim that their ontology ought to supply the terms of reference for all scientific research. Rather than defend an alternative ontology, it is argued that ontology needs to be defined in terms of fallible interpretations of social reality. This necessitates the revision and replacement of ontological theories in the course of an on-going critical dialogue about reality, and precludes the use of one fixed ontology to supply the terms of reference for the sciences.2 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2004.00496.x/full
Introduction to the special issue: applied critical realism in the social sciences
Journal of Critical Realism
The aim of our initial call for papers was to encourage the submission of exemplars of applied work, reflections on the use of critical realism, and metatheoretical developments. We were not disappointed, and we are therefore pleased to present this collection of five articles which advance our understanding of critical realism in practice. The book review in this issue further extends the collection, as it summarizes several examples of applied critical realist work. As one would expect of such a collection, there are a variety of disciplines represented, from business studies, to marketing, psychology, law and education. In this editorial, we provide an overview of the (concrete universal) trends of current applications of critical realism of which these articles are (concrete singular, and therefore unique) instantiations. Finally, we provide a brief introduction to each paper. We expect that the audience for this issue may be broader than, though still include, the usual readership of Journal of Critical Realism. Specifically, we expect to attract early career researchers who are new to critical realist ideas, and people whose primary interest is directed at one of the disciplines represented, rather than critical realism per se. For this reason, at the risk of repetition, we have allowed several of the authors to outline the aspects of critical realism that are relevant to their paper.
Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology
"This important book provides detailed critiques of the method of transcendental argumentation and the transcendental realist account of the concept of causal power that are among the core tenets of the bhaskarian version of critical realism. Kaidesoja also assesses the notions of human agency, social structure and emergence that have been advanced by prominent critical realists, including Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer and Tony Lawson. The main line of argument in this context indicates that the uses of these concepts in critical realism involve ambiguities and problematic anti-naturalist presuppositions. As a whole, these arguments are intended to show that to avoid these ambiguities and problems, critical realist social ontology should be naturalized. This not only means that transcendental arguments for ontological doctrines are firmly rejected and the notion of causal power interpreted in a non-transcendental realist way. Naturalization of the critical realist social ontology also entails that many of the core concepts of this ontology should be modified so that attention is paid to the ontological presuppositions of various non-positivist explanatory methods and research practices in the current social sciences as well as to new approaches in recent cognitive and neurosciences. In addition of providing a detailed critique of the original critical realism, the book develops a naturalized version of the critical realist social ontology that is relevant to current explanatory practices in the social sciences. In building this ontology, Kaidesoja selectively draws on Mario Bunge’s systemic and emergentist social ontology, William Wimsatt’s gradual notion of ontological emergence and some recent approaches in cognitive science (i.e. embodied, situated and distributed cognition). This naturalized social ontology rejects transcendental arguments in favor of naturalized arguments and restricts the uses of the notion of causal power to concrete systems, including social systems of various kinds. It is also compatible with a naturalized version of scientific realism as well as many successful explanatory practices in the current social sciences. By employing the conceptual resources of this ontology, Kaidesoja explicates many of the basic concepts of social ontology and social theory, including social system, social mechanism, social structure, social class and social status.""
Economics Discussion Paper, 1999
This paper argues that 'new dialectics' provides an adequate methodology for economics and social science. The argument is advanced via a critique of 'critical realism', an important rival to new dialectics. Critical realism holds that the root mistake underlying orthodox methodology, termed the 'epistemic fallacy', is a failure to sustain adequately the distinction between ontology and epistemology, resulting in the relative neglect of ontology. By overcoming the fallacy, critical realism claims to provide an adequate methodology for economics and social science. The paper argues that critical realism goes too far in the opposite direction to the epistemic fallacy. Critical realism neglects the intrinsic links between ontology and epistemology so fails to provide an adequate methodology. However, critical realism must not, according to the argument, simply be rejected in toto if an adequate methodology is to be achieved. Instead it must be surpassed or transcended. The recent resurgence of a 'new dialectics' is argued to provide just such a supersession because new dialectics affirms the intrinsic links between ontology and epistemology without reducing the former to the latter. The implications of this transcendence are illustrated via a comparison of the respective interpretations of Marx's Capital offered by critical realism and new dialectics. 20-3-99 Comments welcome.
Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology
Journal of Social Ontology, 2015
This article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.
This essay seeks to present the ontological perspectives of Margaret Archer and Andrew Sayer on social reality. Archer and Sayer represent two key sociologists who have taken advantage of philosophical school of critical realism for explaning the social world. Methodology is based on descriptive-analytical method. Archer introduces two notions of morphogenesis (dynamic aspect of society) and morphostasis (stability and continuation of society) and offers a new type of theoretical conflation relying on morphogenesis. Accordingly, she propounds some differences between culture, structure and action and this distinguishes her efforts from the ideas of other conflationary theoreticians, especially Anthony Giddens. Besides paying attention to the existing complexities in the nature of social reality, Sayer struggles to introduce a specific model with which one can come up with a new formulation of the process of knowledge of social reality. Sayer believes that his model provides a clearer ontology of social realities. Sayer's thought is based on the dialectical relation between the researcher (subject), research topic (object) and other researchers who work in a common linguistic community and this dialectic is among the mechanisms that give rise to the complexities of the social world.
A Critique of the Philosophical Underpinnings of Mainstream Social Science Research
The progress of the social science disciplines depends on conducting relevant research. However, research methodology adopted and choices made during the course of the research project are underpinned by varying ontological, epistemological and axiological positions that may be known or unknown to the researcher. This paper sought to critically explore the philosophical underpinnings of the social science research. It was suggested that a "multiversal" ontological position, positivist-hermeneutic epistemological position and value-laden axiological position should be adopted for social science research by non-western scholars as alternative to the dominant naïve realist, positivist, and value-free orientation. Against the backdrop of producing context-relevant knowledge, non-western scholars are encouraged to re-examine their philosophical positions in the conduct of social science research.