Germany and Europe: The History (original) (raw)
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German Europe: Strategies of Power in the Euro Crisis
2014
This article delivers a contribution to the debate about the Euro crisis. With that purpose, our starting point shall be the book German Europe by the renowned sociologist Ulrich Beck. Analyzing the main ideas expressed in that book, we shall discuss more deeply the future perspectives of the European Union and its common currency, the Euro. In doing this, we shall consider different elements, in order to offer a complete overview of the situation: in particular, we will discuss economic, social and political themes. It will be interesting comparing Beck’s ideas with those of other important thinkers, especially with regard to themes such as the role of the EU in the world politics and the ways in which it could become a more democratic institution. A significant part of this work shall be dedicated to the predominant role of Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel. According to Beck, she is the undiscussed leader of Europe, as with her peculiar political decisions and way of acting she influences and directs the functioning of European Union decisively.
Germany and Political Union in Europe: Nothing moves without France
This working paper attempts to understand why after two decades proposing the creation of a political union to make European monetary union (EMU) sustainable, Germany has not utilised the ‘window’ offered by the Eurozone crisis to pursue more vigorously this goal. Using the conceptual devices of the Chartalist understanding of money and hegemony, three possible explanations are explored. 1) Germany is slowly becoming a ‘normal’ European power and has started to favour the intergovernmental to the community method. 2) The German public has lost its enthusiasm for European integration, especially after realising how the proposed banking union has brought the spectrum of a ‘transfer union’ closer. 3) Germany remains a reluctant hegemon and once it has seen that France is still not ready for political union it has refrained from actively promoting this ideal. The conclusion of the paper is that the first two explanations have some merits, but that the third one continues to be the most convincing. The zeal by which the German political elites, supported by their public opinion, have pushed through the Spitzenkandidaten logic in the 2014 European elections confirms that Berlin is still determined to build a more federal Europe. The question is rather whether Paris is ready to participate in this endeavour.
(030) the New German Question: How Europe Can Get the Germany It Needs
2011
Rarely has Germany been as important in Europe – or as isolated – as it is today. Germany has had Europe’s biggest economy since integration began, but since the beginning of the euro crisis last year, there has been a kind of “unipolar moment” within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was possible without Germany or against Germany. At the same time, from Greece to Libya, Germany has been seen as increasingly evasive, absent and unpredictable. Although Germany has now signalled that it will do whatever it takes to save the euro, much of Europe is worried about the way that this will be done and is even resentful about where Germany seems to be heading.1 To many, it appears that an increasingly powerful and independent Federal Republic is renegotiating the two fundamental principles that have guided its foreign policy for decades: European integration and the western alliance. Some even suggest that Germany is laying the foundations for a new Sonderweg, or special path. While G...
The good European? Why Germany's policy ambitions must match its power
CER Policy Bried, 2018
Germany’s politicians are at last debating the country’s role in Europe. They should pursue a clear European agenda that overcomes ‘small nation’ thinking: Berlin needs to acknowledge that because of Germany’s weight, its domestic economic policy has consequences for its neighbours. It also needs to take more responsibility for European security. By outsourcing European security to the United States, and closely co-ordinating with France and Britain on European affairs, Germany has long enjoyed the luxury of not having to think strategically about economics or foreign and defence policy. In economics, Germany has been unwilling to give up its partial and self-serving euro crisis narrative; in defence and foreign policy, German politicians have long avoided engaging voters in a debate about the country’s responsibilities for international security. But the election of US President Donald Trump and, to a lesser extent, Brexit, has focused minds in Berlin: if Europe is to meet its many challenges, Germany needs to question some of its longstanding assumptions. This paper examines German political narratives and priorities and outlines an ambitious but realistic strategy in the areas of European trade policy, economic governance, migration management, and defence, and looks at Germany’s relationships with its main strategic partners. First, Germany needs to think more strategically about trade. Under Trump, the US has given up its leadership role in setting the standards for global trade, leaving a void which the EU can fill. Germany has the chance to lead a European push for greater emphasis on social rights, environmental protection, fair taxation and political standards. Berlin needs to develop a trade policy that understands and is willing to use the EU’s considerable economic pull for its strategic goals, such as supporting reforms and social standards, or spreading market economics and the rule of law in its neighbourhood. Second, Germany must take steps to strengthen the eurozone. Berlin is unlikely to support eurozone reforms like debt mutualisation, or a sizeable common budget. But there are other things it can do: Germany could agree with – and even promote – the idea that fiscal policy could do more to lean against the economic cycle at a national level. Berlin should stop dragging its feet on the banking union and make the capital markets union a political priority. Germany could also raise investment at home and abroad by setting up a public wealth fund. Third, after its leading role in the EU migration crisis in 2015, Germany must help develop a long-term European strategy to manage migration. Berlin should be pragmatic about working with Turkey and Libya to stop irregular migration, while also leading the way in ensuring that the use of development aid from European countries is co-ordinated at an EU level. Here, Berlin should go beyond just economic assistance: it could help develop a neighbourhood policy that ties investment support, development aid, full trade access to EU markets, and legal migration routes, to clear standards on the rule of law, democracy, social and minority rights. Fourth, in light of the deteriorating security situation in Europe’s neighbourhood, and in order to become less dependent on the United States’ protection, Germany has no choice but to invest in defence and modernise its armed forces. The government must tackle Germany’s inability to deploy at scale and the low availability of crucial weapons platforms, as well as the domestically controversial subjects of German arms exports, and participation in NATO’s nuclear deterrence arrangements. While Berlin should continue to be a leading voice for the EU’s efforts to rationalise its defence market, it should defer to the operational experience of France and Britain and work with them to increase the readiness of European troops. Finally, Germany must rethink its working relationships with its main strategic partners. Berlin should not make the mistake of assuming that the Trump administration will be replaced in 2020 by a more traditional US leader, and instead invest in rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. It must enter into a constructive debate with Warsaw about migration, and the rule of law. And it should seize the opportunity that Emmanuel Macron’s presidency provides to work constructively with France on eurozone reform.
Levy Economics Institute WP series, 2018
There is no disputing Germany’s dominant economic role within the eurozone (EZ) and the broader European Union. Economic leadership, however, entails responsibilities, especially in a world system of monetary production economies that compete with each other according to political and economic interests. In the first section of this paper, historical context is given to the United States’ undisputed leadership of monetary production economies following the end of World War II to help frame the broader discussion developed in the second section on the requirements of the leading nation-state in the new system of states after the war. The second section goes on further to discuss how certain constraints regarding the external balance do not apply to the leader of the monetary production economies. The third section looks at Hyman P. Minsky’s proposal for a shared burden between the hegemon and other core industrial economies in maintaining the stability of the international financial system. Section four looks at Germany’s leadership role within the EZ and how it must emulate some of the United States’ trade policies in order to make the EZ a viable economic bloc. The break up scenario is considered in the fifth section. The last section summarizes and concludes.
Germany cannot and will not save the European Union; but Berlin can save Germany through Eurasia
As the economic crisis that started in 2009 underwent different stages, the role of Germany in saving the European Union has been highlighted. Several remedies were therefore invented in order to worthlessly keep countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy within the untenable union. Germany was greatly involved in the effort, because the successive Berlin administrations imagined that, by solving these ‘problems’, everything would return to normalcy and Germany would continue enjoying the locomotive-role that others invented for Europe’s no 1 economy. Unfortunately, this system of thought does not bode well for Germany’s future. There has never been in post-WW II Germany a creative vision about what or how Germany should be after half a century or after one century, about Berlin’s role in Europe, Eurasia, and the world, and about Germany’s predestination as this has been indicated or rather prescribed by History. All this is due to the defeat-complex. That this situation happens in a defeated country for some time is normal. That this situation is manipulated by other countries in order to be prolonged as long as possible is not normal. The idea of an economic union of all the European countries could be normal at any moment of Europe’s History; but it would then be a loose union with no customs and with intense commercial exchange. You don’t need any common identity, religious uniformity or political affinity to achieve this. The idea of a ‘political’ union of all the European countries could be possible in the past only by means of military invasion and forceful occupation; it was actually attempted by Napoleon Bonaparte with abominable results for him, his country, and Europe. The idea, so intriguing and so fascinating, of the re-establishment of the Roman Empire does not signify any ‘political’ union of all the European countries, because simply the Roman Empire never envisioned, never needed, and never attempted to achieve such a target. The aforementioned statement entails something very important, i.e. a reality that few people have understood; however, this reality functions by itself as a catalyst in today’s politics. If one confuses the concept of a ‘political’ union of all the European countries with the vision of the re-establishment of the Roman Empire, one will certainly bring about unprecedented division, seismic-level destruction in the continent (or rather sub-continent), and a dark future for many centuries. The reason is very simple; the aforementioned concept and vision are two theorems that are diametrically opposed to one another. They consist in two contradictory elements that will definitely tear down every effort to base one territory on these two centripetal dynamics. The modern project of a political – economic unification of Europe through multifaceted and multilevel deception proved to be even more misplaced. As vision, it was sick and inhuman. As materialization, it corrupted the people and the elites; it always included a myriad of contradictory elements that in numerous cases heralded its very bad end. First published on 7th October 2014 here: https://megalommatiscomments.wordpress.com/2014/10/07/germany-cannot-and-will-not-save-the-european-union-but-berlin-can-save-germany-through-eurasia/
Nein to ‘Transfer Union’: the German brake on the construction of a European Union fiscal capacity
Journal of European Integration, 2021
This paper argues that, on the development of European Union (EU)/Eurozone fiscal capacity German governments have consistently engaged in foot-dragging. Few German state elites have ever supported European fiscal capacity building beyond the EC budget. Following the outbreak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, German governments agreed to the creation of financial support mechanisms only with reluctance. We see a case of continuity in German policy preferences driven by consistent ordoliberal and, specifically, moral hazard concerns. The important longterm change that we can observe relates to the growing importance for successive governments of avoiding audience costs driven by sceptical public opinion and the rise of a challenger party in German politics. German government support for a massive EU fiscal response to the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates an exceptional policy position in favour of temporary financial mechanisms involving no fiscal transfers among member state governments.
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020
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