Divided Government and the Expansion of Federal Power, 1946 to 2008 (original) (raw)
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This paper analyzes the relationship, if any, between the constitution of American national government and annual federal deficit spending. Accordingly, it posits the following question: Does divided government have a negative impact on the federal budget by systematically promoting deficit spending? Analytically, we will draw some comparative statistical correlations between the extent of deficit conditions and the constitution of the two proactive branches of the national government—the presidency and the Congress. We will do this in order to test some general and specific hypotheses that will shed light on the relationship, most importantly, whether it exists at all!
Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2000
This paper contributes to the literature on divided government and legislative productivity. We begin by reexamining Mayhew's data on landmark enactment We show that Mayhew's claim that divided government does not affect legislati productivity is a consequence of aggregating time series that exhibit different behavior We then extend Mayhew's analysis by broadening the concept of significance an creating a new four-category measure that encompasses all 17,663 public laws enacte in the period of 1945-94. Using appropriate time-series techniques, we demonstrate that periods of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation by about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the basis of contemporane ous perceptions of legislative significance. Divided government, however, has n substantive effect on the production of important, albeit not landmark, legislation and actually has a positive effect on the passage of trivial laws.
Effects Of Separation Of Power On American Federal Goverment
2014
Bu calisma gucler ayriligi ilkesi ve checks and balances sistemi olarak adlandirilan “control ve denge” mekanizma ilke veya uygulamalarinin American Federal Yonetim sistemi uzerine olan etkilerini analiz etmektedir. Belirtilen ilke ya da uygulamalar American Federal Yonetim sistemini karakterize eden en onemli etkenlerdir. Oyle ki bu sistemde yeni bir politikanin yeterli destegi bulmadan yururluge girmesi imkânsizdir ve hicbir yonetim organi Amerikan politik yasamina baskin olamadigi gibi kontrol edilmeyen bir guce de sahip degildir.
Divided government and US federal rulemaking
Regulation & Governance, 2009
Despite paying a great deal of attention to the effects of divided government on legislative outputs, scholars of American politics have surprisingly ignored the potential impact of divided government on bureaucratic regulatory outputs. In this article we argue that divided government should reduce the volume of federal agency rulemaking. We test this hypothesis against a data set covering 21,000 rules from 1983 to 2005. Our study is one of the first to analyze the determinants of federal bureaucratic rulemaking activity across such a long period of time. Our results demonstrate that during periods of divided government, agencies issue fewer rules and fewer substantively significant rules than they do during periods of unified government. These findings suggest that divided government impedes agency rulemaking.
Reconceptualizing divided government
2014
In this dissertation, I explain why scholars are unable to conclusively find evidence that divided government is the main determinant of legislative gridlock. I argue this unsettled debate is largely attributable to an imprecise conceptual view of inter-branch tensions, and that these conceptual limitations are exacerbated by unrefined measurement practices. I argue refined measures such as party polarization and gridlock intervals better explain institutional behavior than divided government. Using unique datasets estimating legislator preferences on domestic and foreign policy, findings show that when compared to more refined measures, split-party government is not the sole or even the most important source of partisan conflict. In addition, compared to other studies on divided government, I argue the reason the distinction between unified and divided government is often blurred is that a number of underlying political and institutional pressures make sweeping policy change difficult even for most unified governments. These factors contribute to the public's growing dissatisfaction with government's inability to solve many economic and social problems. viii
An Economic Analysis of the Separation of Powers: Some Preliminary Evidence and Many Questions
This is the retyped PDF version of the original paper which was published (roughly) in A5 format. To enable readers to print it, this paper has been created in A4 format. Therefore, the page numbers will not tally between the two editions. Moreover, for PDF versions it has been decided to remove all extraneous matter such as foreword or preface written by others. Though every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the paper, any oversight or typographic errors are sincerely regretted.
Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002
Public Choice, 2008
We investigate the role of Congress in the growth of federal public expenditure since 1930, building on the work of Kau and Rubin (Public Choice, 113:389–402, 2002). The model incorporates majority party strength and the extent of party control of Congress in addition to the median ideological position of elected representatives. We first provide estimates of the relative importance of the state of Congress and of trending supply and demand-side economic factors in the evolution of federal spending. The resulting models are then used to simulate the consequences of the radical and historically unprecedented shift to the right of Congress in 1994/95.
The State of American Federalism, 2002-2003: Division Replaces Unity
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2003
ABSTRACT The national unity formed last year in response to terrorism soon vanished as more typical political infighting returned. Although overshadowed by the buildup to and the conduct of a second war against Iraq, political issues grounded in the nation's federal character contributed to a rise in divisiveness. The mid-term elections of 2002 and redistricting battles in several states drove partisanship to new heights. The continued sluggishness of the nation's economy also exacerbated interparty bickering. Republicans controlled the White House and both houses of Congress, yet some of the president's policy initiatives encountered more serious resistance in his own party than from the opposition. Many of the feuds within the majority party rested on state and regional interests typical of federalism politics. State and local governments remained trapped in the third year of a fiscal crisis, and even large reductions in expenditures did not extricate these governments from the financial fix. Despite their pleas, state and local officials were unable to obtain any significant relief from the federal government. Federal-state relations, as a consequence, exhibited more contentiousness than cooperation. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Testing Theories of Government Growth in the Fifty States, 1945 to 1998
This dissertation explores the determinants of government growth in the American states. Understanding the causes o f public sector growth is important as the administration of government programs is increasingly devolved to the states. Past research has typically been on national-level growth. However, the variety in state institutional structures, resource bases, and population needs makes for an ideal "comparative laboratory." With some exceptions, state-level studies have had a public finance approach that often exclude relevant political and demographic factors that can lead to increased public sector size. My analysis of state government growth tests thirteen models covering both traditional political explanations as well as explanations found in the public finance literature. I use a pooled cross-sectional time-series research design to determine the causes of growth in forty-nine states for the years 1946 to 1997. The study categorizes explanations of government growth as either responsive or excessive. Responsive explanations suggests that growth is a reflection of the needs and demands of the population. Excessive explanations are those that posit growth beyond that demanded by the citizenry. These explanations are tested in a combined model on both undeflated and deflated state government size. I find strong support for three responsive explanations: Political Needs, Party Control, and Political Culture. The analysis indicates weak support for Wagner's Law with confirmatory evidence confined to urbanization. Two components of Wagner's Law, industrialization and per capita income, are negatively related to government growth. vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.