Stephen English, "Mercenaries in the Classical World" (original) (raw)
Related papers
In antiquity, the lines between soldier, bandit and mercenary were blurred. Soldiers could become foreign mercenaries; mercenaries could turn bandit; bandit groups could be hired as auxiliaries. But in many cases, the term which our aristocratic historians chose to use was politically motivated. What were the concerns that these historians sought to explain with this terminology? In some cases, they were ethnic—a desire to promote the discipline of civilized Greeks and Romans over the cheating ambuscades of German and Illyrian barbarians. In other cases, they were intended to change the stature of the enemy—greater skill would be needed to fight an army of soldiers than a gang of bandits (even if they were the same people). In still others, we see evidence of class conflicts—the poor, needing to be paid to provide service in wartime, were seen as less loyal to their country than those who had estates to support them. This presentation will outline several examples of how the ancient historians ‘spun’ events through nomenclature to ensure history told the correct ‘truth’.
Greek mercenary troops and their equipment
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 1994
... David Whitehead's article "Who Equipped Mercenary Troops in Classical Greece?", in a recent volume of this journal,2 expresses disagreement with an argument I have put forward to the effect that employers of mercenaries in fourth-century Greece would "often - perhaps ...
Istrorikes Selides (Historical Pages) magaZINE, 2008
First published in Greek and here is the translation in English.
Legal standing and civic identity of Athenian mercenaries: A case study
Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2015
The author examines different issues considering legal and social standing of mercenaries, mostly being focused upon the fourth court speech (On the Estate of Nicostratus) of the Athenian speech-writer Isaeus, teacher of Demosthenes. On the one hand, he reveals a number of neglected data about mercenaries in terms of their legal activities in and out of their native polis. On the other hand, based on those findings and on other sources, the author studies the issue of Athenian civic identity in the case of mercenaries who spent years or decades out of their city-state without participating in the political life of the polis. In that context he examines the question of whether a mercenary was regarded as "politikos" or "idiotes". As civic identity was mostly based on the citizenship, the author claims that mercenaries enjoyed a kind of sub-identity or "frozen civic identity".
Mercenaries and their Commanders under the Sicilian Tyrants from Gelon to Dionysius II
The discussion here focuses on the scale of involvement by mercenaries and their contribution to the success of Syracuse's tyrant rulers. Some reasons for the emergence of this mercenary phenomenon, when it is largely absent in mainland Greece, will also be offered, while the socioeconomic and political standing of the mercenary troops who were embedded in communities also requires attention. Of particular interest here is the place of the mercenary commanders-where they are identified in the literature (primarily in Diodorus)-and their role in maintaining the position of their employers.
Some theoretical adjustments of Wallerstein’s core-periphery paradigm, based on Polanyi’s pattern of integration developed on reciprocity, are sketched, in order to enable a broader comprehension of premodern world systems, like the Archaic Eastern Mediterranean. Starting from the observation that prestige was the main asset in this type of premodern world systems, I examine in the present article how the larger and more powerful states were able to increase their prestige in the peripheries, through direct and indirect promotion. Indirect promotion is more thoroughly investigated in the particular case of mercenaries coming back from the East to the Aegean.