Statistics, Knowledge and Governance (original) (raw)

Abstract

This paper reviews the role of statistical information in economic and political systems. It discusses how the production of knowledge in a decentralized way is fundamentally different from the traditional production of information in a centralized way by National Statistical Offices (NSOs). An empirical case study using data from the Eurobarometer Survey shows that trust in the statistical system is related to trust in governance institutions (government, parliament and EU). A final section discusses different avenues for constructing indicators of societal progress.

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