Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity (original) (raw)
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The virtues of gossip: Reputational information sharing as prosocial behavior.
Reputation systems promote cooperation and deter antisocial behavior in groups. Little is known, however, about how and why people share reputational information. Here we seek to establish the existence and dynamics of prosocial gossip, the sharing of evaluative information about a target with the intention of protecting others from antisocial or unfair behavior. In this article we present a model of prosocial gossip and the results of five studies testing the model"s claims. Studies 1-4 show that (a) individuals who observe an unjust act readily share information about the unjust actor with a vulnerable person, (b) this behavior is primarily driven by prosocial motivations, and (c) engaging in prosocial gossip repairs negative affect created by observing antisocial behavior. Participants with more prosocial orientations were the most motivated to engage in such gossip, even doing so at a personal cost, and exhibited the greatest reduction in negative affect as a result. Finally, Study 5 demonstrates that prosocial gossip can effectively deter selfishness and promote cooperation. We conclude by discussing implications for reputational theories of the maintenance of cooperation in human groups.
Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2008
Empirical and theoretical evidence from various disciplines indicates that reputation, reputation building and trust are important for human cooperation, social behaviour and economic progress. Recently, it has been shown that reputation gained in games of indirect reciprocity can be transmitted by gossip. But it has also been shown that gossiping has a strong manipulative potential. We propose that this manipulative potential is alleviated by the abundance of gossip. Multiple gossip statements give a better picture of the actual behaviour of a person, and thus inaccurate or fake gossip has little power as long as it is in the minority. In addition, we investigate the supposedly strong connection between reciprocity, reputation and trust. The results of this experimental study (with 11 groups of 12 students each) document that gossip quantity helps to direct cooperation towards cooperators. Moreover, reciprocity, trust and reputations transferred via gossip are positively correlated. This interrelation might have helped to reach the high levels of cooperation that can be observed in humans.
Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation-based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation-based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.
Gossip and Reputation in Everyday Life
Gossip—a sender communicating to a receiver about an absent third party—is hypothesized to impact reputation formation, partner selection, and cooperation. Lab experiments have found that people gossip about others’ cooperativeness and that they use gossip to condition their cooperation. Here, we move beyond the lab and test several predictions from theories of indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection about the content of gossip in daily life and how people use it to update the reputation of others in their social network. In a Dutch community sample (N = 309), we sampled daily events in which people either sent or received gossip about a target over 10 days (k = 5,154). Gossip senders frequently shared information about a target’s cooperativeness and did so in ways that minimize potential retaliation from targets. Receivers overwhelmingly believed gossip to be true and updated their evaluation of targets based on gossip. In turn, a positive shift in a target’s ev...
Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.
Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation OPEN
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation. Cooperation is essential for groups, organizations, and societies to achieve and maintain public goods that benefit all group members. However, cooperation to provide public goods usually requires people to overcome the temptation to free ride and take advantage of others' cooperation. Why do people cooperate despite this temptation to prioritize their own interests? Previous theory suggests that reputation (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups 1–3. Yet, little is known about the relative difference between gossip and punishment to promote cooperation and what happens to cooperation rates after these mechanisms are removed in future interactions 4. We extend previous research by directly comparing gossip and punishment in their relative ability to (1) promote cooperation, (2) enhance individual welfare, and (3) maintain cooperation in future interactions with no such mechanisms. One of the most widely studied solutions to cooperation problems involves opportunities to punish others' (selfish) behavior 1,2. Punishment decreases the incentive to free ride and makes cooperation relatively more beneficial for individuals. Indeed, punishment reduces the conflict between personal and collective interests in providing the public good, and thus increases cooperation 1,2. Yet, punishment is costly for individuals and groups, and is not always a feasible solution to promote cooperation 5. Moreover, although people do punish free riders during controlled experiments when given the chance 2,6 , peer punishment can be uncommon in real-life situations in both small-scale and large-scale societies 7,8. Thus, there is a need to generate other effective solutions to promote cooperation in groups. Importantly, people are prone to gossip about norm violators and free riders, and this gossip facilitates reputation spreading in large groups and social networks 9,10. Gossip is the exchange of positive or negative social information about absent others 10–13. Thus, gossip can influence others' reputation and enable people to select trustworthy partners and avoid cheaters, especially in large groups where directly observing all social interactions is not possible. Both simulation models and empirical studies suggest that reputation monitoring and exchange via gossip serves as a low-cost and efficient mechanism to promote cooperation 11–14. Reputation facilitates cooperation through a system of indirect reciprocity, where people with a cooperative reputation have greater chance to receive future indirect benefits from third parties 3. Indeed, reputation and indirect reciprocity can promote
The Bright and Dark Side of Gossip for Cooperation in Groups
Frontiers in Psychology
Recent experimental studies seem to concur that gossip is good for groups by showing that gossip stems from prosocial motives to protect group members from non-cooperators. Thus, these studies emphasize the "bright" side of gossip. However, scattered studies point to detrimental outcomes of gossip for individuals and groups, arguing that a "dark" side of gossip exists. To understand the implications of gossip for cooperation in groups, both the dark and bright side of gossip must be illuminated. We investigated both sides of gossip in two scenario studies. In Study 1 (N = 108), we confronted participants with a free-rider in their group and manipulated whether the gossip recipient was the free-rider's potential victim or not. Participants showed a higher group protection motivation in response to gossip when imagining gossiping to a potential victim of a norm violator compared to a non-victim. They showed a higher emotion venting motivation when imagining gossiping to a non-victim compared to a potential victim. Both these gossip motives were related to an increased tendency to gossip. In Study 2 (N = 104), we manipulated whether participants were the targets or observers of gossip and whether the gossip was true or false. Results showed that targets of negative gossip intended to increase their work effort in the short run, but only when the gossip was true. Furthermore, gossip targets reported lower long-term cooperative intentions toward their workgroup regardless of gossip veracity. This paper demonstrates that gossip has both a "dark" and "bright" side and that situational factors and agent perspectives determine which side prevails.
Previous research indicates gossip is a social bonding system that is use to establish shared acquaintances and/or attitudes, to punish group norm violators, or for coercion via invoking fear of gossipmongers. However, no empirical work explores directly the relationship between gossip about freeloaders leading to improved cooperation in recipients. Thus, we predicted that the sharing of negative gossip about the freeloading behavior of a third party will lead to higher levels of cooperation. Using levels of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game as a proxy to measure social bonding, we compared cooperation levels of 60 female respondents who met with a confederate randomly assigned to one of three conditions. They either (1) did not talk or were exposed to (2) negative reputation gossip or (3) self-disclosed negative reputation information. Results show that, even after controlling for a list of potential confounding factors, cooperation levels are high in both the control and self-disclosure condition and are significantly lower in the gossip condition. We suggest that gossip may spark initial relations, yet is insufficient to ignite a social bond sustained by cooperative action among complete strangers.
Previous research indicates gossip is a social bonding system that is use to establish shared acquaintances and/or attitudes, to punish group norm violators, or for coercion via invoking fear of gossipmongers. However, no empirical work explores directly the relationship between gossip about freeloaders leading to improved cooperation in recipients. Thus, we predicted that the sharing of negative gossip about the freeloading behavior of a third party will lead to higher levels of cooperation. Using levels of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game as a proxy to measure social bonding, we compared cooperation levels of 60 female respondents who met with a confederate randomly assigned to one of three conditions. They either (1) did not talk or were exposed to (2) negative reputation gossip or (3) self-disclosed negative reputation information. Results show that, even after controlling for a list of potential confounding factors, cooperation levels are high in both the control and self-disclosure condition and are significantly lower in the gossip condition. We suggest that gossip may spark initial relations, yet is insufficient to ignite a social bond sustained by cooperative action among complete strangers.