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Are we sure that majoritarian criterion is the best option to determine and evaluate the results of public choices? Can we still trust a model of democracy of this kind? Can we still trust popular will? In this paper, I discuss about the contemporary conditions of democracy. I analyse in which ways the strategies of construction of the public opinion have changed the grammar of public debate, and also how the calculus of consent has modified the nature of democracy itself. The main idea is that an incorrect priority assigned to the procedures or to the formal structures of institutions has hidden the real aim of public discussion, or more general, the real aim of politics. A curious, ambiguous, but very popular mantra seems to be the golden rule of politics in the contemporary age: "If people want it and if people vote it, then the outcome will be true, good and not contestable, whatever it will be and whatever will be the consequences for them or for others". An important clarification is necessary, before that analysis goes on. I do not want, in anyway, defend or sustain a sort of paternalistic view of public decision. I am not asserting that people can not or do not know how to decide what is the best thing for them. I am just suggesting that we have to protect the idea of democracy from a very dangerous trivialization. In my opinion, indeed, democracy needs complexity and, moreover, it needs a pluralistic approach, which has to consider the fundamental value of a reasonable (and not ideological) dissent.
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008. Copyright © 2009 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA., 2008
This essay is about the meaning of democratic politics, starting from our motivations to engage in politics or public life and continuing through to the kind of deliberative and performative practice that makes engagement pos- sible. As for motivations, there are at least two engines that drive our entry into politics. One is a deep desire to be part of something larger than ourselves. The other is a deep desire to make the world better than it is. The first is self-serving, the second, normative. But both converge in the idea that the world is a better place when all who are part of it have a hand in shaping what that world might be, hence increasing their own public happiness and well-being.
, Reason, Justification, and Consensus Why Democracy Can't Have it All
Reprinted with the permission of the author and Columbia University Press. good that is acceptable to all citizens. According to some, the results of social choice theory led to a critique of populism. 6 These two developments, one sociological and the other economic, were the two main sources for liberal democratic theory up to 1970. The central motifs of these lines of research also had an impact on constitutional theory. In this context, the pluralist model of democracy proposed by Robert Dahl and others provided an inºuential framework for interpreting Madisonian democracy. Dahl was interested in the social conditions under which egalitarian democratic ideals could be approximately realized in complex industrialized societies. In line with James Madison's Federalist Paper no. 10, he identiªed competition among group interests as a crucial condition for democracy. Although Dahl's decentralized, "polyarchal" version of pluralism shed much of Schumpeter's elitism, it retained the emphasis on competition, interests, and voting. 7 This climate was a rather inhospitable one for conceptions of public deliberation about a common good. Although other theorists, such as John Dewey and Hannah Arendt, were prominent in postwar political theory, the competitive-pluralist trend only began to reverse itself in the late 1960s. This reversal can be traced, at least in part, to broad dissatisfaction with the debacles and anonymity of liberal government (e.g., the war in Vietnam and the increasing perception that decision making in government was bureaucratic and beyond the control of citizens). More speciªcally, leftist political activism, with its emphasis on participatory democracy, sparked renewed interest in the possibilities for consensual forms of self-government. 8 The theoretical critique of liberal democracy and revival of participatory politics gradually developed through the 1970s. 9 It was only in the 1980s, however, that a concept of deliberative democracy began to take deªnite shape. The term "deliberative democracy" seems to have been ªrst coined by Joseph Bessette, who argued against elitist (or "aristocratic") interpretations of the Constitution. 10 Bessette's challenge joined the chorus of voices calling for a participatory view of democratic politics. These theorists questioned the key assumptions underlying the earlier economic and pluralist models: that politics should be understood mainly in terms of a conºict of competing interests-and thus in terms more of bargaining than xii Introduction respond only to power? The key to his solution lies in the internal relation between the exercise of political power and the rule of law: in constitutional regimes, government ofªcials are at least constrained by the arguments and reasons that have held up in the public sphere. Insofar as a broadly dispersed, "subjectless communication" among citizens is allowed to develop in autonomous public spheres and enter into receptive representative bodies with formal decision-making power, the notion of popular sovereignty-a democratically self-organizing society-is not beyond the pale of feasibility. Models such as Habermas's differ from updated republicanism and rights-based liberalism by elaborating an idealized deliberative procedure as its point of departure. In the next two essays, Joshua Cohen and John Rawls try to work out the philosophical details of a conception of political justiªcation based on deliberation and public reason. The third essay in part 1, Joshua Cohen's "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," provides a good example of how such an ideal proceduralism could be elaborated. Like Habermas, Cohen deªnes political legitimacy in relation to an ideal consensus: "outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals." 14 Similar to Elster in his discussion of the constraints of the forum, Cohen maintains that the orientation toward reasoned agreement should constrain citizens to focus their proposals on the common good. But Cohen takes a step beyond Elster by specifying procedural standards, such as freedom and lack of coercion and the formal and substantive equality of participants, designed to preserve autonomy and guard against objectionable deliberative outcomes. Cohen then goes on to argue that his ideal procedure provides a suitable model for democratic institutions, one that should be broadly acceptable, stable, just, and institutionally feasible, given the proper mediating structures (such as voting and party competition). As Cohen has argued elsewhere, an ideal procedural model provides the basis for an "epistemic" interpretation of democratic outcomes. 15 This interpretation presupposes that deliberation involves xv Introduction Reason, Politics, and Justiªcation: The Process, Conditions, and Goal of Deliberation The essays in part 2 continue the work of specifying the details of the ideal of deliberative democracy. They primarily address controversies that have emerged after the initial statements of Elster, xvii Introduction Deliberative Democracy as a Substantive Ideal: Equality, Pluralism, and Liberty The remaining essays by Knight and Johnson, Bohman, Richardson, Young, and Cohen concern more substantive issues about the process and conditions necessary for deliberative democracy: political equality, cultural difference, the formation of joint intentions, and the role of the substantive liberal and egalitarian values that inform deliberative procedures. Taken together, they show not only the variety of positions within deliberative theory, but also the robustness of the deliberative ideal in dealing with the problems facing contemporary democracy. Rather than focusing on the outcome of deliberation, Bohman and Knight and Johnson take up the most fundamental condition of deliberation for either epistemic or nonepistemic versions: political equality. Both essays develop substantive conceptions that attempt to go beyond merely building equality into procedures, ideal or otherwise. Certainly, procedural equality, understood as the equality of opportunity to participate in political decision making, is crucial for democratic legitimacy. But deliberative democracy also requires elaborating the substantive aspects of political equality appropriate to its particular ideal. Whereas for Knight and Johnson this is "equal opportunity of access to political inºuence," for Bohman it is "equally effective social freedom." In order to develop procedural aspects of equality, Knight and Johnson turn to analogies to the axioms of social choice theory; Bohman, by contrast, develops this aspect of political equality in terms of Habermas's ideal speech situation where all have equal opportunity to speak. But the main innovation in both essays is to develop the more substantive account in which the work of Amartya Sen on "capability equality" is the primary inspiration. 25 Knight and Johnson argue that this approach has considerable advantages over the Rawlsian approach and answer objections put forward by Cohen that the resource-based account is more practically useful. However, they see problems with Sen's xxiii Introduction of group-based identities in the decision-making process, deliberative democracy will be blind to sources of inequality and asymmetries of power. Adding to her previous work on "group differentiated citizenship," Young argues here that making groups (rather than individuals) the subjects of deliberation has distinct epistemic advantages. These advantages follow from her nonessentialist understanding of social groups as occupying different, relational positions, each with its own particular social perspective. Critical public discussion ought to be about the expression and exchange of different social perspectives, so that each can be transformed into a more reºective and objective social judgment. Deliberation is thus the mutual openness and accountability of different groups to each other's perspectives, each of which is committed to thinking from the standpoint of everyone else. Young makes communication across differences essential to the creation of a wider and potentially shared perspective that is infused with the comprehensive social knowledge derived from the situated knowledge of every particular social group. Difference is thus "a resource" (and not just a burden) for democratic communication among and across various groups, the outcome of which is the more comprehensive and effective form of social knowledge. Given the intense scrutiny to which Joshua Cohen's work has been submitted in this volume, it is only ªtting that it end with an essay by him. Here Cohen gives a revised general statement of the deliberative conception, showing how "the fact of reasonable pluralism" xxv Introduction provides a way to give concrete shape to the conception of citizens as free and equal. Deliberative democracy, he argues, is not merely based on a procedural conception of justiªcation. Rather, it establishes a substantive conception of politics, containing a very speciªc interpretation of egalitarian and liberal values of rights and liberties. Under reasonable pluralism, citizens are free to the extent that they do not have to share some particular religious or moral doctrine; they are equal to the extent that "each is recognized as having the capacities required for participating in discussion aimed at authorizing the exercise of power." Using Rawls's terminology, the idealized procedure is still a model characterization of free reasoning among equals, the features of which can be built into institutions. The added norm of reasonableness is the crucial addition to the model that he develops in "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy." This assumption is strongly challenged by Knight and Johnson, Gaus, Young, and Christiano as an inadequate normative basis for settling problems of difference. Its main use for Cohen is to...
This work is a product of documentary research that has the purpose to provide the meaning of democracy and its principles. In fact, the word democracy came from the Greek word demos, which means "the body of the citizens". The ancient Greek word demokratia meant literally 'people-power' (Paul Cartledge 2011). According to Jacaranda, (2004), Democracy began in ancient Athens around the fifth century BC. Adult male citizens gathered around 40 times a year in Athens to decide on important civil issues. They had a direct say in the decision-making process. This form of democracy is called direct democracy. Under Pericles, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY came to mean the equality of justice and the equality of opportunity (Professor Paul Cartledge, 2011). Still defined from its etymology, today democracy means popular participation in Government or rule by many (Thomas R. Dye, 1994). The people can criticize and replace their elected leaders and representatives if they do not perform well. The people are sovereign-they are the highest authority-and government is based on the will of the people (Phillips W 2007). Leaders may be directly elected (Direct democracy) or through people's representative (Indirect democracy). A. Touraine defines it as the political regime which makes it possible for individuals holding different interests and beliefs to live under the same laws enabling us to live together with our differences. As far as principles of Democracy are concerned, the same author distinguishes two main principles; the first is the ability and willingness to play a part in common affairs, whether at local or national levels. The second is a respect for the rights of citizens, an acknowledgment of their equal dignity. These two main principles summarize among others respect of human rights active political participation, freedom of political expression, the majority rule, separation of powers, laws and procedures apply fairly and equally to all citizens, tolerance, rule of law, regular, free and fair Elections. To conclude, we observe that in democracy people should have a right to a controlling influence over public decisions and decision-makers, and that they should be treated with equal respect and as of equal worth in the context of such decisions. Restriction of the power of the State, autonomy of social actors and awareness of citizens, these are the three conditions for the existence of democracy. For that raison, citizens must be educated and must understand the purpose of democracy, how and why we have it.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2019
According to many social scientists, democratic institutions are subject to much discontent and distrust today. Citizens sense the existence of a substantial disconnect between the rhetoric of representative democracy and its reality—what citizens believe their proper role to be and what the realities of our government and society allow them to be. More to the point, citizens of all stripes believe that those who “represent” them live lives quite different from their own, and that those representatives are not seriously interested in the perspectives, ideas, or well-being of most people. The nature and extent of this discontent raises serious questions about the future of representative democracy and the conditions necessary for it to flourish. What, then, are the conditions of democracy? Among other things, citizens must share some sense of solidarity and common purpose. There must be a quality educational system committed to providing everyone—regardless of race or economic status—with an appropriate foundation for citizenship and personal fulfillment. There must be equal employment opportunity. Citizens must be well educated, and they must have access to credible news sources. Public officials must not be seen to cater to the rich or famous or seek short-term partisan advantage at the expense of long-term systemic values and stability. If a democratic society does not strive to satisfy these conditions, among others, representative democracy will either be brought down or so hollowed out as to become unrecognizable. Rather than attempting the impossible feat of addressing all of the conditions necessary for the flourishing of a democratic society, this Essay first explores what we mean to say when we talk about the concept of representative or constitutional democracy and then considers three of the ways in which our current governmental and political system may frustrate the practice of constitutional democracy. First, many Americans hold an idealized view of our democracy that prevents us from comprehending the full significance of the anti-democratic features of our constitutional system and hampers efforts to preserve and strengthen it. Second, our idealized view of American democracy prevents us from acknowledging that one important aspect of our constitutional tradition has been a preference for defining our political community in terms that are exclusionary, rather than inclusive. That, in turn, blinds us to the strong influence that this exclusionary preference continues to exert on our political life. Third, constitutional democracy requires nothing so much as a fair electoral system, but the ordinary political process often cannot ensure such fairness because politicians control the process and have little incentive either to draw maps that are fair or to undertake other necessary reforms. In many states, the people lack the power to assign these decisions to more disinterested agents, and, in recent years, the courts have tended to hold that such matters are unsuitable for judicial resolution. This Essay argues that these three obstacles must be overcome if representative democracy is to flourish.