MAC Layer Misbehaviors in MANETs (original) (raw)
Related papers
Evaluation and Prevention of MAC Layer Misbehaviours in Public Wireless Hotspots
2015 IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and Communications; Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, 2015
IEEE 802.11 protocol assumes all the nodes in the network cooperate and adhere to the standard. However, nodes may purposefully misbehave in order to obtain extra bandwidth, conserve resources or disrupt network performance. Previously, Kausanaur proposed a Receiver Trusted MAC protocol (REC-TR-MAC) by extending IEEE 802.11 to prevent Medium Access Control (MAC) sender misbehaviours. This protocol trusts the receiving node (Access Point) in a WLAN and enables the Access Point to allocate the MAC protocol random backoff values for wireless clients. Our research investigates MAC layer node misbehaviours in the context of a Public Wireless Hotspot. REC-TR-MAC has been implemented by porting the legacy code-base to the latest ns2. Furthermore, our evaluation has been extended to incorporate several Access Point misbehaviours to simulate the scenario of an untrusted hotspot (misbehaving access point), which has not been investigated much in the literature. In public wireless hotspot the ...
Selfish behavior at the Medium Access (MAC) Layer can have devastating side effects on the perfor- mance of wireless networks, with effects similar to those of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In this paper we consider the problem of detection and prevention of node misbehavior at the MAC layer, focusing on the back-off manipulation by selfish nodes. We first propose an algorithm that ensures honest behavior of non-colluding participants. Furthermore, we analyze the problem of colluding selfish nodes, casting the problem within a minimax robust detection framework and providing an optimal detection rule for the worst-case attack scenarios. Finally, we evaluate the performance of single and colluding attackers in terms of detection delay. Although our approach is general and can be used with any probabilistic distributed MAC protocol, we focus our analysis on the IEEE 802.11 MAC.