Contents of Unconscious Color Perception (original) (raw)
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Synthese, 2022
According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC's resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception.
The Protophenomenal Structure of Consciousness, With Especial Application to the Experience of Color
ABSTRACT 1 Introduction This paper addresses the principal problem of consciousness, which is to reconcile our experience of subjective awareness with the scientific world view; it is essentially the same as Chalmer's "Hard Problem." This problem arises because subjective This report based on a presentation at the International Conference on Consciousness in Science and Philosophy '98, Charleston, IL, November 6--7, 1998. It is in the public domain and may be used for any non-profit purpose provided that the source is credited. 1 experience has a special epistemological status, since it is the personal (and private) substratum of all observation, whereas empirical science is traditionally based on common (nonpersonal, public) specific observations. Although direct reduction of subjective experience to physical principles is impossible, we can use another sort of reduction, for the essence of reduction is an explanation of the more complex in terms of the simpler. T...
Color-consciousness conceptualism
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011
a b s t r a c t I defend against a certain line of attack the view that the conscious contents of color experiences are exhausted by, or at least matched by, the concepts brought to bear in experience by the perceiver. The line of attack is an allegedly empirical argument against conceptualism-the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument (DIA)-based on color pairs the members of which are too similar to be distinguished across a memory delay but are sufficiently distinct to be distinguished in simultaneous presentations. I sketch a model of a conceptualist view of conscious color perception that is immune to the DIA. One distinctive feature of the conceptualism on offer here is that it does not rely upon the widely discussed and widely criticized demonstrative-concepts strategy popularized by John McDowell and others. I offer empirical and philosophical considerations in my criticisms of the DIA and my sketch of my non-demonstrative conceptualism.
This paper addresses the principal problem of consciousness, which is to reconcile our experience of subjective awareness with the scientific world view; it is essentially the same as Chalmer's "Hard Problem." This problem arises because subjective experience has a special epistemological status, since it is the personal (and private) substratum of all observation, whereas empirical science is typically based on common (nonpersonal, public) particular observations. Nevertheless, although subjective experience cannot be reduced to physical observables, we may have parallel phenomenological and physical reductions, which inform each other. However, naive introspection is treacherous since it may be unduly influenced by theoretical preconceptions, but phenomenological training aids unbiased (or less biased) analysis of the structure of consciousness. Through phenomenologically trained observers we may acquire unbiased (public) data about the structure of consciousness. (W...
Colour Vision and Seeing Colours
Colour vision plays a foundational explanatory role in the philosophy of colour, and serves as perennial quarry in the wider philosophy of perception. I present two contributions to our understanding of this notion. The first is to develop a constitutive approach to characterising colour vision. This approach seeks to comprehend the nature of colour vision qua psychological kind, as contrasted with traditional experiential approaches, which prioritise descriptions of our ordinary visual experience of colour. The second contribution is to argue that colour vision does not constitutively involve the ability to see colours, in a natural and categorically committed sense. I argue that two subjects exactly alike in respect of their constitutive colour vision abilities could differ in respect of whether or not they have categorical perception of colour. The argument is supported by thought experiment and dissociations observed in cognitive neuropsychology. The argument also bears connections to recent neo-Whorfian accounts of colour categorisation.
The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors (2014)
Color experience is structured. Some “unique” colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as “pure,” or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as “binary colors.” According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails.
Unconscious and Conscious Processing of Color Rely on Activity in Early Visual Cortex: A TMS Study
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2012
■ Chromatic information is processed by the visual system both at an unconscious level and at a level that results in conscious perception of color. It remains unclear whether both conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information depend on activity in the early visual cortex or whether unconscious chromatic processing can also rely on other neural mechanisms. In this study, the contribution of early visual cortex activity to conscious and unconscious chromatic processing was studied using single-pulse TMS in three time windows 40-100 msec after stimulus onset in three conditions: conscious color recognition, forced-choice discrimination of consciously invisible color, and unconscious color priming. We found that conscious perception and both measures of unconscious processing of chromatic information depended on activity in early visual cortex 70-100 msec after stimulus presentation. Unconscious forced-choice discrimination was above chance only when participants reported perceiving some stimulus features (but not color). ■
Is color ‘categorical perception’ really perceptual?
Memory & Cognition, 2003
Roberson and Davidoff (2000) found that color categorical perception (CP; better cross-category than within-category discrimination) was eliminated by verbal, but not by visual, interference presented during the interstimulus interval (ISI) of a discrimination task. On the basis of this finding, Roberson and Davidoff concluded that CP was mediated by verbal labels, and not by perceptual mechanisms, as is generally assumed. Experiment 1 replicated their results. However, it was found that if the interference type was uncertain on each trial (Experiment 2), CP then survived verbal interference. Moreover, it was found that the target color name could be retained across the ISI even with verbal interference (Experiment 3). We therefore conclude that color CP may indeed involve verbal labeling but that verbal interference does not necessarily prevent it.
Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable?
Topics in Cognitive Science, 2017
Is color experience cognitively penetrable? Some philosophers have recently argued that it is. In this paper, we take issue with the claim that color experience is cognitively penetrable. We argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non-perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. We use this distinction to show that studies suggesting that color experience can be modulated by factors of the cognitive system do not establish that color experience is cognitively penetrable. Additionally, we argue that even if color experience turns out to be modulated by color-related beliefs and knowledge beyond non-perceptual principles, it does not follow that color experience is cognitively penetrable since the experiences of determinate hues involve post-perceptual processes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications that these ideas may have on debates in philosophy.
The represented object of color experience
Philosophical Psychology, 2007
Despite a wealth of data we still have no clear idea what color experiences represent. In fact, color experiences vary with so many factors that it has been claimed that colour experiences do not represent anything. The primary challenge for any representational account of colour experience is to accommodate the various psychophysical results which demonstrate that the colour experience depends not only on the spectral nature of the target but also on the spectral, spatial and figural nature of the surround. A number of theorists have proposed that this dependence of the colour a region appears to be on the spatial and spectral nature of the surround is an aspect of the visual system's constancy mechanism. However this does not in and of itself tell us what, if anything, is represented in colour experience. Ultimately the answer to this question will be informed by one's theory of representational content. I will argue that adopting a molecular scheme of representation enables the development of an account of the represented object of color experience that can do justice to the psychophysical data.